Essays on the Relationship between Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Risk-Taking by Financial Institutions by Iqbal, Jamshed
Jamshed Iqbal
Essays on the 
Relationship 
between Corporate 
Governance 
Mechanisms 
and Risk-Taking 
by Financial 
Institutions
aaa
ACTA  WASAENSIA 403
ACADEMIC DISSERTATION 
To be presented, with the permission of the Board of the School of Accounting 
and Finance of the University of Vaasa, for public examination 
in Auditorium Nissi (K218) on the 15th of June, 2018, at noon. 
Reviewers Professor James H. Gilkeson 
Chair, Integrated Business Department 
University of Central Florida  
4000 Central Florida Boulevard 
Orlando, FL 32816 
USA  
Professor Antonio Trujillo-Ponce 
Director of Banking and Entrepeneurial Financial Research Group 
Department of Financial Economics and Accounting 
Universidad Pablo de Olavide 
Ctra. de Utrera, km.1 
Seville, ES-41013 
Spain 
III 
Julkaisija  Julkaisupäivämäärä 
Vaasan yliopisto Kesäkuu 2018 
Tekijä(t)  Julkaisun tyyppi  
Jamshed Iqbal Artikkeliväitöskirja 
Orcid ID Julkaisusarjan nimi, osan numero 
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1354-5785 Acta Wasaensia, 403 
Yhteystiedot  ISBN 
Vaasan yliopisto 
Laskentatoimen ja rahoituksen yksikkö 
PL 700 
FI-65101 VAASA 
978-952-476-810-8 (painettu)
978-952-476-811-5 (verkkojulkaisu)
ISSN  
0355-2667 (Acta Wasaensia 403, painettu) 
2323-9123 (Acta Wasaensia 403, 
verkkoaineisto) 
Sivumäärä Kieli 
1ϳϴ Englanti 
Julkaisun nimike  
Esseitä hallinto- ja ohjausjärjestelmien vaikutuksesta rahoituslaitosten riskisyyteen 
Tiivistelmä 
Tämä väitöskirja koostuu neljästä esseestä, jotka käsittelevät eri näkökulmista hallinto- 
ja ohjausjärjestelmien vaikutusta pankkien ja muiden rahoituslaitosten riskisyyteen. 
Väitöskirjan kahdessa ensimmäisessä esseessä tarkastellaan hallinto- ja 
valvontakäytäntöjen vaikutusta yhdysvaltalaisten rahoituslaitosten riskinottoon. 
Ensimmäisessä esseessä tutkitaan rahoituslaitosten hallintojärjestelmien vahvuuden ja 
systeemiriskin suhdetta. Tulokset osoittavat, että omistajalähtöiset hallinto-
järjestelmät ja omistajaystävälliset hallitukset lisäävät rahoituslaitosten systeemiriskiä. 
Toisessa esseessä selvitetään hallintojärjestelmien vaikutusta rahoituslaitosten 
maksukyvyttömyysriskiin. Tutkimuksessa todetaan, että omistajalähtöiset 
hallintojärjestelmät kasvattavat rahoituslaitosten maksukyvyttömyysriskiä sekä 
distance-to-default -indikaattorilla että luottoriskijohdannaisten hinnoista mitattuna.  
Kolmas ja neljäs essee tarkastelevat ylimmän johdon palkitsemisjärjestelmien ja 
erityisesti riskinottokannustimien suhdetta pankkien ja muiden rahoituslaitosten 
riskisyyteen. Kolmannen esseen tulokset osoittavat, että ylimmän johdon optio-
perusteisilla riskinottokannustimilla on negatiivinen vaikutus rahoituslaitosten 
systeemiriskiin. Toisaalta tulokset myös osoittavat, että johdon riskinottokannustimet 
lisäsivät rahoituslaitosten riskisyyttä rahoitusmarkkinakriisin aikana vuonna 2008. 
Neljännessä esseessä verrataan toimitusjohtajan kokonaispalkkaa suhteessa muihin 
ylimpiin johtajiin ja tutkitaan tämän palkitsemiseriarvoisuuden vaikutusta 
yhdysvaltalaisten pankkien riskisyyteen. Tutkimustulokset osoittavat, että toimitus-
johtajan ja muun ylimmän johdon palkkaeron kutistuminen kasvattaa pankkien 
riskisyyttä. 
Asiasanat  
Hallinto- ja ohjausjärjestelmät, rahoituslaitokset, pankit, systeemiriski, 
maksukyvyttömyysriski, johdon palkitseminen 

V 
Publisher  Date of publication 
Vaasan yliopisto June 2018 
Author(s)  Type of publication  
Jamshed Iqbal Doctoral thesis by publication 
Orcid ID Name and number of series 
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1354-5785 Acta Wasaensia, 403 
Contact information ISBN 
University of Vaasa 
The School of Accounting and Finance 
P.O. Box 700 
FI-65101 Vaasa 
Finland 
978-952-476-810-8 (print)
978-952-476-811-5 (online)
ISSN  
0355-2667 (Acta Wasaensia 403, print) 
2323-9123 (Acta Wasaensia 403, online) 
Language Number of pages 
1ϳϴ English 
Title of publication  
Essays on the Relationship between Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Risk-
Taking by Financial Institutions 
Abstract 
This dissertation is comprised of four related empirical essays on corporate governance 
in financial institutions. Specifically, each essay focuses on slightly different aspects of 
corporate governance and risk-taking by financial institutions. The first essay examines 
the relationship between corporate governance and the systemic risk of financial 
institutions. Empirical findings indicate that financial institutions with stronger and 
more shareholder-focused corporate governance structures and boards of directors 
are associated with higher levels of systemic risk. The second essay investigates 
whether corporate governance is related to insolvency risk of financial institutions. The 
essay finds that the strength of corporate governance mechanisms is positively related 
to insolvency risk of financial institutions as proxied by Merton’s distance-to-default 
measure and credit default swap spread.   
The third essay examines whether the systemic risk of financial institutions is 
associated with the risk-taking incentives generated by executive compensation. This 
essay documents a negative association between systemic risk and the risk-taking 
incentives of the top executives. However, the results also demonstrate that financial 
institutions with greater managerial risk-taking incentives had higher levels of systemic 
risk in the midst of the global financial crisis in 2008. The fourth essay investigates the 
relationship between Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay-share (pay inequality between 
the CEO and the other top executives) and risk-taking in large bank holding companies 
(BHCs). This essay finds that higher CEO pay-share is associated with lower BHC risk. 
Keywords 
Corporate Governance, Financial Institutions, Systemic Risk, Insolvency Risk, 
Executive Compensation, Financial Crisis, Risk-Taking 

VII 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
This little book is the realization of a dream. For that, I can never, adequately and 
properly, submit my thankful praises to the Ever All-Gracious, the Ever All-
Merciful Creator of all the Worlds for providing me resources and all the help to 
accomplish this task, for which I could never imagine, plan and organize. I can still 
remember the day when I came to Vaasa to pursue my doctoral studies. Over these 
years, numerous souls contributed to my success.  
First, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Professor Sami Vähämaa for 
recruiting me as a doctoral student and supporting me throughout my doctoral 
studies. I not only received the literary and philosophical training from him but 
also learned how to be a good human. I would also like to thank my second 
supervisor, Professor Jukka Sihvonen, for providing valuable comments on 
previous drafts of the essays. I especially appreciate him for always giving 
important suggestions during the research seminars organized by the department. 
I would like to thank the pre-examiners of this dissertation, Professor James 
Gilkeson from the University of Central Florida and Professor Antonio Trujillo-
Ponce from the Universidad Pablo de Olavide. Their valuable comments helped 
me to improve the readability, quality and the exposition of the dissertation. I 
especially thank Professor Gilkeson for extensive and detailed comments on the 
previous versions of the essays. This changed my perspective towards the 
corporate governance among financial institutions and paved the way for future 
research.  
During my doctoral studies, I have had the privilege to work in an excellent 
workplace and research environment. For that, I thank Professor Sami Vähämaa, 
Professor Stefan Sundgren, Professor Timo Rothovius, Professor Juha Junttila and 
Professor Panu Kalmi for providing competent and cooperative research and work 
environment. I would also like to thank Shaker Ahmed, Klaus Grobys, and Antti 
Klemola for their friendship, support and time. I will always cherish the time spent 
at the School of Accounting and Finance. 
I greatly acknowledge the financial support for my studies and dissertation from 
the Department of Accounting and Finance of the University of Vaasa, the Jenny 
and Antti Wihuri Foundation, Finnish Foundation for Economic Education, 
Marcus Wallenberg Foundation, Finnish Cultural Foundation (The South 
Ostrobothnia Regional Fund), and Säästöpankkien Säätiöiden apurahat. 
VIII 
I would also express my deepest gratitude to my mother. For the last 17 years, I 
had to live far away from her to complete my education, but she is always there in 
my heart and an important part of my prayers. My special thank and tribute to my 
better half, Farah. She has always motivated me to excel. Everything becomes easy 
and beautiful when she is by my side. 
Finally, I would, indeed, remiss if I do not have a special thanks and appreciation 
for Searat Ali, Waheed Akbar Bhatti, Nazim Hussain, Arshad Iqbal, Jarno Kiviaho, 
Waqar Nadeem, and Zeeshan Ullah for providing me motivation and immense 
support for the completion of this very task.  
 
Vaasa, May 2018 
Jamshed Iqbal 
 
 
 
 
IX 
Contents  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ............................................................................ VII 
1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 1  
2 CONTRIBUTION OF THE DISSERTATION .............................................. 4 
2.1 Limitations of the dissertation ................................................. 7 
3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND AGENCY THEORY ............................. 8 
4 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS .................. 10 
4.1 Why Corporate Governance May Differ for Financial 
Institutions? ........................................................................... 10 
4.2 Related Literature .................................................................. 13 
4.2.1 The Board of Directors ............................................... 13 
4.2.2 Ownership Structure ................................................... 15 
4.2.3 Executive Compensation ............................................ 16 
5 SUMMARY OF THE ESSAYS ............................................................... 18 
5.1 Corporate governance and the systemic risk of financial 
institutions ............................................................................ 19 
5.2 Corporate governance and the insolvency risk of financial 
institutions ............................................................................ 20 
5.3 Managerial risk-taking incentives and the systemic risk of 
financial institutions .............................................................. 22 
5.4 CEO pay-share and risk-taking in large bank holding 
companies ............................................................................. 24 
REFERENCES .......................................................................................... 27  
X 
Publications 
This doctoral dissertation consists of an introductory chapter and the 
following four essays: 
I. Iqbal, J., Strobl, S., & Vähämaa, S. 2015. Corporate Governance and
the Systemic Risk of Financial Institutions. Journal of Economics and
Business, 82, 42-61.1
II. Ali, S., & Iqbal, J. 2018. Corporate Governance and the Insolvency
Risk of Financial Institutions. Proceedings of the 2018 Financial
Markets & Corporate Governance Conference; Proceedings of the
International Finance and Banking Society, 2017 Oxford Conference;
and Proceedings of the 29th Australasian Finance and Banking
Conference.
III. Iqbal, J., & Vähämaa, S. 2017. Managerial Risk-Taking Incentives and
the Systemic Risk of Financial Institutions. Proceedings of the 30th
Australasian Finance and Banking Conference.
IV. Iqbal, J. 2018. CEO Pay-Share and Risk-Taking in Large Bank Holding
Companies. Proceedings of the 57th Annual Meeting of Southwestern
Finance Association; and Proceedings of the 2018 Annual Meeting
of the Finnish Economic Association.
1 Printed with kind permission of Elsevier. 
 1 INTRODUCTION 
This doctoral dissertation examines the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and risk-taking by financial institutions in four inter-
related essays. Corporate governance is among those public policy issues that has 
received considerable attention from both policymakers and scholars. After the 
global financial crisis, corporate governance of financial institutions has received 
even more attention than that of non-financial firms. This dissertation can broadly 
be divided into two sections. The first section investigates whether the strength of 
corporate governance mechanisms is related to risk-taking in financial 
institutions. The first and second essays examine whether the strength of corporate 
governance mechanisms can explain the cross-sectional variation in systemic risk 
and insolvency risk around the time of the recent financial crisis. The second 
section focuses on executive compensation and risk-taking by financial 
institutions. The third and fourth essays examine whether the risk-taking 
incentives generated by executive compensation are related to risk-taking by 
financial institutions. 
‘Stronger’ corporate governance not only affects the performance of the firms, 
measured by Tobin’s Q (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003; Brown and Caylor, 
2006; Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2009; Ammann et al., 2011) but also encourages 
increased risk-taking that results in higher growth of firms (John, Litov, and 
Yeung, 2008).1 However, for financial institutions, the optimal degree of risk-
taking is higher than for non-financial firms because market participants expect 
government support for financial institutions if they become distressed. Implicit 
and explicit government guarantees encourage financial institutions to take more 
risks (see Acharya, Anginer and Warburton, 2016).2 In addition, shareholder-
friendly governance mechanisms may further encourage to adopt riskier corporate 
policies (Chava and Purnanadam, 2010) which may, in turn, lead to higher 
insolvency risk in financial institutions. In contrast to non-financial firms, 
expectation of government support in times of distress, implicit and explicit 
government guarantees, provide a unique environment to consider financial 
                                                        
1  Corporate governance mechanisms and the board of directors are considered to be 
stronger and more shareholder-friendly when they provide effective monitoring and 
stronger protection of shareholder’s interests, and more generally, better alignment of 
managers’ interests with those of the shareholders. Adams (2012) and de Haan and Vlahu 
(2016) provide comprehensive discussions about the corporate governance of financial 
institutions and the elements of “good” governance. 
2  Implicit government guarantee is the expectation by market that government may 
provide bailout (Acharya et al., 2016). It is referred as implicit because government does 
not explicitly provide commitment to intervene. Implicit government guarantees are not 
limited to only banks but also for other financial institutions (Zhao, 2018). 
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institutions separately (Acharya et al., 2016; Zhao, 2018) because stronger 
corporate governance mechanisms in financial institutions can lead to greater risk-
taking (Erkens, Hung, and Matos, 2012; Anginer, Demirguc-Kunt, Huizinga, and 
Ma, 2014).3 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, it has been widely argued by 
politicians, banking supervisors, and other authorities that the crisis can be, at 
least to some extent, attributed to flaws in the corporate governance practices of 
financial institutions (see, e.g., Kirkpatrick, 2009; Financial Stability Forum, 
2009; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010; Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, 2010; Haldane, 2012). These allegations seem reasonable 
given that corporate governance can be broadly considered as the set of 
mechanisms for addressing agency problems and controlling risk within the firm. 
In general, strong corporate governance practices, and especially effective board 
oversight is supposed to encourage the firm’s top management to act in the best 
interest of shareholders and other stakeholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). So, 
was something actually wrong with the corporate governance of financial 
institutions at the onset of the global financial crisis?  
Driven by this question, one purpose of this dissertation is to explore the role of 
corporate governance in the global financial crisis by investigating the association 
between the strength of corporate governance mechanisms, the risk-taking 
incentives generated by executive compensation, top executive compensation, and 
risk-taking by financial institutions. The empirical findings reported in this 
dissertation indicate that financial institutions with stronger and more 
shareholder-focused corporate governance mechanisms and boards are associated 
with higher systemic risk and insolvency risk, suggesting that what is often 
described as good corporate governance may encourage more risk-taking in the 
financial industry.4 Furthermore, empirical findings also indicate that financial 
institutions with higher managerial risk-taking incentives and higher CEO pay-
share were associated with greater firm risk, especially systemic risk. Financial 
institutions are heavily regulated because of their important role in the financial 
system. Apart from regulations, financial institutions’ governance is complicated 
because of large number of stakeholders (Adams and Mehran, 2012). Thus, 
financial institutions should be considered separately in empirical corporate 
                                                        
3 For instance, Acharya et al. (2016) find that bondholders of the financial institutions, 
especially large ones, expect that the government will protect them in case of failure of the 
institution. 
4  In general, the findings of this dissertation are broadly consistent with the recent 
literature on bank risk-taking (see e.g., Laeven and Levine, 2009; Pathan, 2009; Chava and 
Purnanandam, 2010; Fortin, Goldberg and Roth, 2010; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; 
Adams and Mehran, 2012; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Bai and Elyasiani, 2013; DeYoung, 
Peng and Yan, 2013; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013). 
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governance research because the governance mechanism considered “good” in 
non-financial firms may actually encourage inappropriate level of risk-taking in 
financial institutions.  
This doctoral dissertation consists of an introductory chapter and four interrelated 
essays on corporate governance in financial institutions. The remainder of the 
introductory chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the contribution 
of the dissertation, the contribution of each essay and the limitations, Section 3 
provides a brief discussion of the agency theory, Section 4 discusses how the 
corporate governance of financial institutions differs from that of non-financial 
firms, and Section 5 provides summaries of the four essays. 
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2 CONTRIBUTION OF THE DISSERTATION 
This dissertation, consisting of four essays, provides new evidence on the subject 
of corporate governance in the financial industry by empirically examining the 
relationship between the strength of corporate governance mechanisms and risk-
taking by financial institutions. Although all four essays are related, each examines 
the issue from a different perspective. The first essay focuses on the linkage 
between corporate governance and the systemic risk of financial institutions 
around the time of the recent financial crisis. It shows that “good” corporate 
governance practices may have encouraged more risk-taking in the financial 
industry. The second essay empirically examines the association between 
corporate governance mechanisms and insolvency risk among financial 
institutions. In this essay, both traditional (distance-to-default) and innovative 
market-based (credit default swap (CDS) spread) measures are used as proxies for 
insolvency risk. The third essay investigates the relationship of managerial risk-
taking incentives generated by executive compensation with the systemic risk of 
financial institutions around the time of the recent global financial crisis. The 
fourth essay examines the relationship between CEO pay-share, measured as the 
ratio of CEO total annual compensation to the total annual compensation of the 
CEO and the next four most-highly paid executives in the bank holding company 
(BHC), with the BHC risk.  
As a whole, this dissertation makes important contributions to the banking 
literature and each essay specifically contributes to the recent debate on corporate 
governance and risk-taking in the financial industry. Individually, each of the four 
essays adds to various streams of the corporate governance literature related to 
corporate governance and the insolvency risk of financial institutions, the strength 
of corporate governance mechanisms, and the systemic risk of financial 
institutions, managerial risk-taking incentives and the systemic risk of financial 
institutions, and executive compensation and bank risk-taking. A more detailed 
description of the contribution of each essay is provided below.  
The first essay contributes to the existing literature by empirically examining 
whether the strength of corporate governance mechanisms can explain the cross-
sectional variation in the systemic risk of U.S. financial institutions in the period 
around the recent financial crisis. A growing body of literature has examined how 
certain firm-specific attributes are related to the systemic risk of financial 
institutions. Studies by Brunnermeier, Dong and Palia (2012), Pais and Stork 
(2013), Mayordomo, Rodriguez-Moreno and Peña (2014), Calluzzo and Dong 
(2015), and Acharya and Thakor (2016), among others, have documented that the 
size of the institution, the amount of equity capital, and the extent of lending 
Acta Wasaensia     5 
activities are important factors for explaining the cross-sectional variation in 
systemic risk. This essay provides evidence that stronger corporate governance is 
associated with higher levels of systemic risk among financial institutions. This 
essay also contributes to the literature on bank risk-taking (see e.g., Pathan, 2009; 
Fortin et al., 2010; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Erkens et al., 2012). These studies 
document that shareholder-friendly corporate governance mechanisms encourage 
more risk-taking in financial industry as compared to non-financial firms. This 
essays contributes by providing empirical evidence that shareholder-friendly 
corporate governance mechanisms are positively associated with the level of 
systemic risk among financial institutions.  
The second essay contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, it 
contributes to the literature in corporate finance that relates firm-level 
characteristics to the failure of financial institutions. Previous contributions to this 
literature mostly emphasize investigating the influence of accounting variables on 
financial institutions’ failure probabilities. 5  Studies on the role of corporate 
governance in the failure of financial institutions are relatively scarce. This essay 
contributes by showing that the strength of corporate governance mechanisms 
plays an important role in the insolvency risk of financial institutions. Second, we 
contribute to the literature on the effects of corporate governance on risk-taking in 
financial institutions (see Laeven and Levine, 2009; Pathan, 2009; Fahlenbrach 
and Stulz, 2011; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Erkens et al, 2012; Peni and Vahamaa, 
2012; Berger et al., 2014; Iqbal et al., 2015). 6 These studies mainly find that 
shareholder-friendly corporate governance mechanisms encourage more risk-
taking in the financial industry. As far as we know, this is one of the few studies to 
show the relevance of corporate governance to a financial institution’s insolvency 
risk especially in the context of the recent global financial crisis. Further, most of 
the previous studies on board effectiveness do not include financial institutions in 
their sample (see Adams et al., 2010).7 Lastly, building on the earlier contributions, 
                                                        
5 For instance, see Meyer and Pfifer (1970), Martin (1977), Whalen and Thomson (1988), 
Aubuchon and Wheelock (2010), Cole and White (2012), Berger and Bouwman (2013), Ng 
and Roychowdhury (2014). However, studies on the role of corporate governance in the 
failure of financial institutions are relatively scarce. 
6  Mehran, Morrison and Shapiro (2011) survey studies investigating the relationship 
between corporate governance and measures of risk. 
7 Most of the studies before GFC excluded financial firms from their sample because they 
were considered highly regulated. The additional regulatory oversight maybe viewed as a 
substitute (John, Mehran and Qian, 2010; Adams and Mehran, 2012) for corporate 
governance in financial institutions. However, governance of financial institutions may be 
different from that of non-financial firms because of several reasons. For instance, financial 
institutions have larger number of stakeholders which complicates the governance of 
financial institutions. Apart from investors and depositors, regulators also have stake in 
the performance of financial institution because performance of financial institutions can 
also affect the health of the overall economy (Adams and Mehran, 2012). Implicit and 
explicit government guarantees provide financial institutions a different risk environment 
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we utilize the market-based CDS spread data to proxy insolvency risk, which also 
accounts for credit risk. 
The third essay contributes to the literature in the following ways: First, it 
contributes to the literature of managerial risk-taking incentives (Chava and 
Purnanadam, 2010; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Bai and Elyasiani, 2013; Guo, 
Jalal and Khaksari, 2015). This essay contributes to this literature by relating the 
managerial risk-taking incentives generated by executive compensation to the 
systemic risk of financial institutions. Second, it contributes to the systemic risk 
literature that investigates how certain firm-specific attributes are related to the 
systemic risk (Brunnermeier et al., 2012; Pais and Stork, 2013; Mayordomo et al., 
2014; Calluzzo and Dong, 2015; Acharya and Thakor, 2016). Third, it contributes 
to the literature on corporate governance and risk-taking in the financial industry 
(Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Bai and Elyasiani, 2013; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; 
Berger et al., 2014). Last, it contributes to the literature on shareholder-focused 
corporate governance structures and systemic risk (Iqbal et al., 2015; Battaglia and 
Gallo, 2017). 
The fourth essay makes several important contributions to the existing literature 
and recent policy debate regarding CEO compensation in large BHCs. First, this 
study contributes to the bank risk-taking literature (Laeven and Levine 2009; 
Pathan 2009; Fortin et al., 2010; Beltratti and Stulz 2012; Ellul and Yerramilli 
2013; Berger et al., 2014; Cheng, Hong and Scheinkman, 2015).8 Second, this study 
contributes to the bank compensation literature (Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Bai 
and Elyasiani, 2013). Third, this study contributes to the CEO pay-share literature 
(Bebchuk, Cremers and Peyer, 2011; Kini and Williams, 2012; Bai and Elyasiani, 
2013). Bebchuk et al. (2011) find that CEO pay-share is negatively associated with 
firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q. On the other hand, Kini and Williams (2012) 
find that CEO pay-share is positively associated with firm risk.9 Kini and Williams 
(2012) regard CEO pay-share as a tournament incentive that drives top executives 
to compete for the position of CEO. However, the above studies exclude the 
banking sector from their samples. Among banking studies, this study is closely 
related to that of Bai and Elyasiani (2013) who investigate whether CEO pay-share 
is related to the stability of BHC. They find that greater CEO pay-share ratio is 
related to greater stability among BHCs as measured by the z-score. However, the 
sample is based on data from 1992 to 2008, and therefore before the advent of the 
                                                        
that are not applicable to non-financial firms. Therefore, it is important to consider 
financial institutions separately. 
8 For detailed review of literature on executive compensation and risk-taking in banks, see 
de Haan and Vlahu (2016). 
9 Kini and Williams (2012) examine two measures of risk - cash flow volatility and stock 
return volatility. 
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Dodd-Frank Act. This essay uses comprehensive data on BHCs from 1992 to 2016, 
including the post Dodd-Frank years and using the sample of only economically 
significant BHCs (defined as those having assets greater than $10 billion in 2010 
constant dollars). 
2.1 Limitations of the dissertation 
Although this dissertation attempts to holistically examine the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and risk-taking by financial 
institutions, the present study has at least the following limitations:  
a) This dissertation examines risk-taking by financial institutions from a 
stock market perspective. However, regulators and supervisors mostly look 
at accounting-based information generated by financial institutions rather 
than stock market risk.10  
b) To develop comprehensive but parsimonious framework, the dissertation 
uses comprehensive governance indices rather than looking at each 
variable in isolation.11 
c) Data limitations resulted in the exclusion of some financial institutions 
from the empirical analysis. The samples of the essays are limited to 
publicly listed financial institutions. 
d) In all four essays, we have tried to account for all the firm-specific 
characteristics that may affect the level of risk-taking by financial 
institutions. However, we were unable to account for important credit 
market measures, such as credit ratings, due to data unavailability.  
e) This dissertation only uses data on U.S. financial institutions, and thus, the 
findings may not necessarily be generalized to other countries. 
  
                                                        
10 Recently, several studies have emphasized the importance of monitoring general and 
market based risks in the financial system (e.g., Knaup and Wagner, 2010; Acharya et al., 
2012, Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; Acharya et al., 2017) 
11  Such as board composition, board size, CEO duality, audit committees, poison pill 
adoption, executive ownership, etc.  
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3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND AGENCY THEORY 
“Corporate Governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance 
to corporates assure themselves of getting return on their investment.”  
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p. 737) 
Traditionally, corporate governance addresses the oversight of the board of 
directors on top management to make sure that decision making within the firm is 
in line with the objectives of the firm and its shareholders.  
Agency theory is, perhaps, the most important theory in corporate governance 
research (Ang, Cole, and Lin, 2000; Wasserman, 2006; Durisin and Puzone, 
2009). Agency theory, developed by Coase (1937), Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
and Fama and Jensen (1983), is directed at the key issue of agency relationship. 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the agency relationship is created by a 
contract in which one or more persons (principal or principals) engage another 
person (the agent) to take actions on their behalf. 12  Through this contract, 
principals delegate their decision-making authority to agent(s). Similarly, in 
modern corporations, shareholders (principals) hire managers (agents) to operate 
the firm and delegate decision-making authority to the managers. However, 
problems arise when the managers do not perform for the owners but for 
themselves.  
Agency theory tries to resolve two problems that can arise in an agency 
relationship. First, agency problem may arise when the objectives or interests of 
principal and agent differ. It is expensive or rather difficult for the principal to 
verify that the agent behaves appropriately. Second, risk sharing problem may 
occur when the principal and the agent have different risk preferences. Therefore, 
because of the different risk preferences, the principal and the agent may prefer 
different actions to achieve their objectives.  
According to agency theory, corporate managers may be more risk averse than 
shareholders because of their undiversified human capital investment in the firm 
and benefits associated with control of the firm (Faleye and Krishnan, 2017). This 
creates a conflict of interests (or misalignment of interests) between the managers 
and shareholders.13 With more control and power, managers can run firms for 
their own benefit at a loss of shareholders’ benefits (Adams, Almeida and Ferreira, 
                                                        
12 Agency theory uses ‘contract’ as a metaphor to describe the agency relationship. See 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for details. 
13 The objective of shareholders is to maximize their wealth so they want management to 
take more risks. However, managers may not be willing to take on more risks because of 
their human capital and wealth invested in the firm (de Haan and Vlahu, 2016). 
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2005). However, for outsiders (investors) and principals, it is not possible to 
comprehensively monitor the activities of managers. Therefore, there is a need for 
mechanisms to monitor the activities of managers so that they do not run the firm 
for their own benefit. The literature offers several possible solutions to mitigate the 
conflict of interests between managers and shareholders, such as properly 
constructed board of directors. In this regard, Fama and Jensen (1983) assert that 
the board of directors is the apex of controlling decisions in organizations, and with 
respect to decision making, is the ultimate legal authority (Adams and Ferreira, 
2007). Therefore, research on corporate governance often focuses on the role of 
the board of directors in organizations.14 The board of directors acts as a monitor 
and tries to make sure that the funds provided by the principals are not wasted or 
misused.  
Another way to mitigate the conflict of interests is to provide the managers with 
stock ownership. In this way, managers’ interests will be better aligned with those 
of the firm’s shareholders because stock ownership would provide a direct link 
between the wealth of managers and shareholders (Murphy, 1999). Granting 
stocks would affect the motivation of managers and they would adopt riskier 
policies to maximize the wealth of shareholders (Ross, 2004; Chava and 
Purnanandam, 2010). In addition to monitoring by the board of directors, 
literature also offers solutions such as oversight by blockholders, shareholders’ 
direct intervention, the threat of takeover bid, and the threat of firing (see e.g., 
Adams and Mehran, 2012; de Haan and Vlahu, 2016). 
Better corporate governance, therefore, should provide incentives for managers to 
formulate policies that are risk seeking and do not reflect their own preferences. 
As a result, firms with strong corporate governance mechanisms should have a 
greater level of risk than those with weaker corporate governance mechanisms 
(Ferreira and Laux, 2007; John et al., 2008). However, given than investors are 
sensitive to downside losses (Ang, Chen and Xing, 2006), strong corporate 
governance mechanisms should aim to encourage value enhancing risk-taking 
(John et al., 2008). 
14  Adams et al. (2010) provide a thorough review of previous studies in corporate 
governance with a particular focus on board of directors.  
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4 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 
“Most studies of board effectiveness exclude financial firms from their 
samples. As a result, we know very little about the effectiveness of banking 
firm governance.”  
(Adams and Mehran, 2012, p. 243). 
As discussed previously, management may not always work in the best interests of 
owners (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and with more control and power managers 
can run the firms for their own benefit (Adams et al., 2005). Importantly, for 
outsiders (investors), it is not possible to comprehensively monitor the activities 
of managers because managers always have more and superior information about 
the firm. Therefore, there is a need for mechanisms to monitor the activities of 
managers so that they do not run the firm for their own benefit. This section 
discusses corporate governance mechanisms such as 1) the board of directors, 2) 
ownership structure, and 3) managerial compensation in the context of financial 
institutions. Further, the section addresses how governance mechanisms differ 
between financial and non-financial firms.  
4.1 Why Corporate Governance May Differ for Financial 
Institutions? 
According to agency theory, managers are risk averse and would decrease the 
overall risk of the firm to protect their human capital and wealth invested in the 
firm (Bebchuk, Fried and Walker, 2002). However, the shareholders of financial 
institutions may require a higher level of risk-taking, from managers (Mehran and 
Mollineaux, 2012). For financial institutions, the optimal degree of risk-taking is 
different than for non-financial firms because market participants expect 
government support for financial institutions if they become distressed. Implicit 
and explicit government guarantees may encourage financial institutions to take 
more risks (see, Acharya et al., 2016) as compared to non-financial firms.15 The 
excess returns generated by increased risk would benefit shareholders and 
financial institutions, but the higher level of risk-taking maybe detrimental for the 
society at large during the times of economic downturn (Mehran and Mollineaux, 
2012). For instance, DeYoung et al. (2013) find that shareholders and corporate 
15 Implicit government guarantee is the expectation by the market that government may 
provide bailout (Acharya et al., 2016). It is referred as implicit because government does 
not explicitly provide commitment to intervene. Implicit government guarantees are not 
limited to only banks but also for other financial institutions (Zhao, 2018). 
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boards encouraged increased risk-taking prior to the crisis which was, ultimately, 
costly to the shareholders during the period of the recent financial crisis.  
Because financial institutions can generally take more risk than non-financial 
firms, they are heavily regulated and supervised. The additional regulatory 
oversight is viewed both as substitute (John et al., 2010) or complementary 
(Adams and Mehran, 2012) for corporate governance in financial institutions.  
Because the presence of regulation affects the internal corporate governance 
mechanisms in financial institutions, most of the corporate governance studies 
exclude financial institutions from their sample. Thus, much of the corporate 
governance theory and research is based on non-financial firms (Adams and 
Mehran, 2012; Mehran and Mollineaux, 2012). The key differences between the 
governance mechanisms of financial and non-financial firms are 1) regulations and 
supervision, 2) the capital structure of financial institutions (e.g., high leverage 
and deposits), and 3) complex and opaque business activities.16  
First, regulation and supervision differentiates corporate governance of financial 
institutions from non-financial institutions. The financial industry is highly 
regulated which affects the internal corporate governance mechanisms of financial 
institutions. Major decisions within financial institutions, such as investment, 
growth, compensation, are greatly influenced not only by internal governors 
(board of directors) but also by external governors (regulators, market 
participants, and legislators).17 Both internal and external governors can require 
different level of risk-taking by financial institutions. Strong regulations on 
financial institutions are justified because they play an important role in the health 
of the overall economy and their failure can negatively affect the economy (see e.g., 
de Haan and Vlahu, 2016; John, de Masi and Paci, 2016). Accordingly, the 
regulations in the financial industry are there to protect and promote the overall 
stability of the financial system, and that is why regulators impose several 
constraints on the financial industry, and especially on banks (Caprio and Levine, 
2012). These constraints can be on capital requirements, loan and investment 
choices, and interstate banking (John, Saunders, and Senbet, 2000). Furthermore, 
regulators can impose restrictions on the corporate governance mechanisms in 
financial industry such as constraints on ownership concentration, executive 
compensation, and the composition of boards of directors (Laeven and Levine, 
2009; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013). Regulation may also reduce the incentives of 
                                                        
16  Extensive literature examines the corporate governance mechanisms in financial 
institutions and how they are different from non-financial firms. For instance, Caprio and 
Levine (2002), Macey and O’Hara (2003), Levine (2004), Mülbert (2010), Becht, Bolton, 
and Roell (2012), Mehran and Mollineaux (2012), Laeven (2013), Van der Elst (2015). 
17  For the detailed discussion, see e.g. Adams and Mehran (2012) and Mehran and 
Mollineaux (2012). 
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blockholders to effectively monitor the boards of directors of financial institutions 
(Adams and Mehran, 2003).18  
The capital structure of financial institutions is another crucial difference between 
the governance of financial and non-financial firms. For banks, debt can exceed 90 
percent of the capital structure (Adams and Mehran, 2003; Macey and O’Hara, 
2003; Levine, 2004; Laeven, 2013). In this regard, Gornall and Strebulaev (2014) 
argue that the leverage ratio of banks, measured as debt divided by the total assets, 
can be up to 95 percent, whereas in non-financial firms, the average leverage 
typically ranges between 20 to 30 percent. The presence of high leverage in 
financial institutions also exacerbates the conflict of interest between shareholders 
and debtholders. Since debtholders are the primary claimholders, their objectives 
can differ considerably from those of the shareholders (John and Qian, 2003). For 
instance, the presence of debt in capital structure would benefit shareholders more 
than debtholders if a firm adopts riskier policies (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Adams and Mehran, 2003).   
The capital structure can also affect executive compensation in financial 
institutions. According to agency theory, shareholders want managers to be 
compensated with stock options because stock options would increase the 
managers’ pay-performance sensitivity and would align the interests between 
shareholders and managers. A higher level of stock options provides top managers 
with a stronger incentive to undertake risky investment strategies (Adams and 
Mehran, 2003; Chava and Purnanandam, 2010), and this can reward shareholders 
at the expense of debtholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, debtholders 
anticipate these risk-taking incentives generated by executive compensation, and 
can demand higher premium which would increase cost of debt for financial 
institutions (see, de Haan and Vlahu, 2016). In this regard, Adams and Mehran 
(2003) argue that it is less important to make executive compensation dependent 
on firm performance in regulated industries because stock-based compensation 
can result in increased cost of debt and greater risk-taking. 
Third, the complexity and opacity of business activities and assets are also 
important attributes that make the governance of financial institutions important. 
Compared to non-financial firms, financial institutions are highly interconnected 
among themselves and substantial part of their business activities involve other 
financial institutions (Mülbert, 2010). Thus, competitors and customers can also 
affect the governance of financial institutions (Mülbert, 2010; Adams and Mehran, 
                                                        
18 For instance, in unregulated industries, blockholders invest in firms and become board 
members to affect firm policies but in a regulated environment blockholders become 
passive (Adams and Mehran, 2003).   
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2012). For instance, to comply with the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) and the listing 
rules, banks had to either exclude the customers from the board of directors or 
increase the board size to meet the independence requirement (Adams and 
Mehran, 2012). Further, unlike non-financial firms, financial industry is prone to 
contagion and problems at one financial institution can spread to the other 
financial institutions (Allen and Carletti, 2013). 
4.2 Related Literature 
4.2.1 The Board of Directors 
Like any other company, the role of the board of directors of a financial institution 
is to monitor, advise, and hire and fire managers (Adams and Ferreira, 2007; 
Adams et al., 2010). The board of directors can also be viewed as a tool to ensure 
that the managers run the firm in the shareholders’ best interest. The monitoring 
function of the board ensures that managers act in the interests of the shareholders 
and the advisory function of the board provides managers with guidelines on 
decision making in the firm. Regulation and supervision of financial institutions 
may serve as a substitute for corporate governance and make monitoring function 
less important. However, it can be argued that effective supervision is a 
complementary force which can affect the internal governance mechanisms 
(Adams and Mehran, 2012). 
Several characteristics of the board are regarded as “good corporate governance” 
in corporate governance literature, for instance, greater board independence 
(more independent directors on the board).19 However, the previous literature on 
corporate governance in financial institutions provides mixed evidence regarding 
board independence and its relationship with performance. In this regard, Adams 
and Mehran (2012) find that board independence is not associated with the 
performance of bank holding companies. Further, de Andres and Vallelado (2008) 
find an inverted U-shaped association between board independence and the 
performance of banks when examining a sample of international banks. Moreover, 
using a large sample of U.S. bank holding companies, Pathan and Faff (2013) find 
an inverse relation between board independence and the performance of the 
banks. Using a sample of international financial institutions, Erkens et al., (2012) 
                                                        
19 According to the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 and the NYSE and Nasdaq exchange 
listing rules, the majority of the directors on the board should be independent. 
Independent director should have no connection to company except being a board 
member.  
Adams and Mehran (2012) argue that independent directors, being outsiders, can provide 
effective monitoring of managers. 
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find that financial institutions with more independent boards had worse stock 
returns during the period of the financial crisis. Further, many governance 
reforms, such as the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002, have “one-size-fits-all” 
approach and do not take into account the special features of governance of 
financial institutions. Therefore, the level of board independence should be 
addressed carefully and separately in financial institutions (Adams and Mehran, 
2012). 
Studies that investigate board size in financial institutions, relate it to performance 
and risk measures. In this regard, Adams and Mehran (2012) find a positive 
association between board size and the performance of large U.S. bank holding 
companies. These results are in contrast with the traditional view and findings for 
non-financial firms. Because of free-rider issues, larger boards may not act in the 
interests of shareholders (e.g. Mehran, Morrison, and Shapiro, 2011; Aebi, Sabato, 
and Schmid, 2012). These contradictory results can be explained in the context of 
the nature of business of financial institutions. Financial institutions are complex 
and can benefit from large boards (Adams and Mehran, 2012; Erkens et al., 2012). 
Using a sample of U.S. banks, Aebi et al. (2012) report similar findings even during 
the period of the financial crisis. Regarding the relationship of board size and risk-
taking, using a large sample of U.S. bank holding companies, Pathan (2009) finds 
that small board size is related to a higher level of bank risk. More recently, Berger 
et al. (2016) report a similar inverse relationship between board size and risk-
taking using data on U.S. commercial banks. Using a sample of international 
financial institutions, Erkens et al., (2012) find no relationship between board size 
and stock returns during the period of the financial crisis. 
The literature on corporate governance among financial institutions also examines 
several other characteristics of the board. For instance, Sun and Liu (2014) 
investigate the role of audit committees in bank risk-taking. They find that banks 
with audit committees that include long-tenured board members are associated 
with lower bank risk, and banks with audit committees staffed by busy directors 
are associated with higher bank risk. Further, Aebi et al. (2012) investigate the 
influence of a Chief Risk Officer (CRO) on a bank’s board. They find that banks in 
which a CRO was reporting to the board of directors rather than to the CEO 
delivered stronger performance during the period of the financial crisis. Ellul and 
Yerramilli (2013) construct a risk management index (RMI) based on six variables 
to measure the independence and strength of the risk management role at bank 
holding companies. They find that bank holding companies with a higher RMI 
were related to lower tail risk before the financial crisis and stronger performance 
during the financial crisis. Erkens et al. (2012) find no relationship between the 
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presence of risk committees and stock returns for a sample of international 
financial institutions during the period of the financial crisis. 
4.2.2 Ownership Structure 
Another important mechanism that affects agency-related issues is the firm’s 
ownership structure. Whether dispersed or concentrated, ownership structures 
influence agency problems in financial institutions. In the case of a dispersed 
ownership structure, small shareholders have little incentive to monitor managers 
because of a lack of expertise, the free-rider problem resulting from monitoring 
expenses, and poor shareholder protection.20 So, when the firm has numerous 
small owners (shareholders) who cannot effectively monitor procedures, 
management has more power to allocate resources at its own discretion (John and 
Senbet, 1998). On the other hand, large shareholders have more incentives to 
monitor the actions of management and therefore they are more informed and use 
their voting rights more efficiently. However, large shareholders might also benefit 
at the expense of small owners (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), despite being less 
affected by the free rider problem. Moreover, large shareholders can also 
encourage firms to adopt riskier policies, which may increase their wealth at the 
expense of debtholders and society in general (Mehran and Mollineaux, 2012).  
The recent literature, however, does not support the view that concentrated 
ownership should matter (de Haan and Vlahu, 2016). Using a sample of U.S. 
commercial banks over the period of 2005 to 2008, Grove, Patelli, Victoravich, and 
Xu (2011) find that concentrated ownership is not associated with bank 
performance (measured by excess returns and return on assets).21 Further, Aebi et 
al. (2012) document that large shareholders, institutional shareholders having 
more than 5 percent equity ownership, do not necessarily provide effective 
monitoring for bank risk-taking. However, Beltratti and Stulz (2012) show that 
concentrated ownership is associated with bank risk-taking during the period of 
the financial crisis. Erkens et al. (2012) document that financial institutions with 
greater institutional ownership were taking more risk before the financial crisis 
started, and thus performed worse during the period of the financial crisis. 
However, regarding the effect of concentrated ownership, previous literature 
20 The free-rider problem arises via delegation of power from many to few. In this, no 
individual has enough resources to monitor the principals (Grossman and Hart, 1980). The 
free-rider problem can be avoided by takeover bid mechanism (Grossman and Hart, 1980), 
better shareholder protection (effective rights of minority shareholders) (Rossi and Volpin, 
2004), and concentrated ownership (Bukhart and Panunzi, 2006).  
21 They measure the concentrated ownership by percentage of outstanding shares owned 
by blockholders. A blockholder is defined as “a shareholder who holds more than five 
percent of a firm’s outstanding shares” (Grove et al., 2011). 
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suggests that it depends on shareholder protection laws and regulation. Using a 
sample of international banks, Laeven and Levine (2009) find that banks with 
large controlling shareholders have higher bank risk, proxied by z-score. However, 
this effect is mitigated by the presence of strong shareholder protection laws.  
4.2.3 Executive Compensation 
Another important measure to ensure that managers act in the interests of the 
shareholders is to design executive compensation policies appropriately. For 
instance, by tying executive compensation with firm performance, shareholders 
can provide incentives for the managers to work for the firm and serve the interests 
of shareholders. In this regard, equity-based compensation offers a suitable 
instrument to align the interests of managers with those of shareholders. Because 
in equity-based compensation, executive compensation depends on the share price 
or other metrics (see e.g., Frydman and Jenter, 2010; de Haan and Vlahu, 2016). 
Conyon (2014) reports that executive compensation in the U.S. grew considerably 
from 1992 to 2012, and most CEO compensation is provided in the form of stock 
options, restricted stock, and bonuses related to stock price. Regarding financial 
institutions, Adams and Mehran (2003) report an increase in option-based 
executive compensation in banks over the period of 1986 to 1999.  
Most of the previous empirical literature is dominated by studies investigating the 
consequences of managerial incentives generated by bonuses and option-based 
compensation (e.g., Becht et al., 2012; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Bai and 
Elyasiani, 2013; Zalewska, 2016). For instance, Chen, Steiner and Whyte (2006) 
show that an option-based managerial compensation structure and option-based 
managerial wealth induces more risk-taking in commercial banks. DeYoung, Peng 
and Yan (2013) find that banks with CEOs having greater risk-taking incentives 
took more risk around 2000 to take advantage of growth opportunities.22 More 
recently, Guo et al. (2015) document that bank risk increases incrementally with 
the level of incentive compensation, both short-term and long-term. Bai and 
Elyasiani (2013) show that higher managerial risk-taking incentives and especially 
higher compensation sensitivity to stock return volatility induce greater risk-
taking.  
However, compensation dependent on performance can also have undesirable 
effects. In order to benefit from better performance, managers can take more risk 
22 DeYoung et al. (2013) use delta and vega as risk-taking incentives. Delta measures the 
dollar gain or loss in personal executive wealth for a one percent change in the stock price 
of the firm. Vega measures the dollar gain or loss in personal executive wealth for a one 
percentage point change in the stock return volatility of the firm.  
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than optimal (de Haan and Vlahu, 2016) and increased risk-taking, during the 
periods of economic distress, can lead to unexpected large losses (Beltratti and 
Stulz, 2012). For instance, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) argue that better 
alignment of interests between management and shareholders may not have the 
desired performance outcomes for financial institutions.23 Fahlenbrach and Stulz 
(2011) show that banks with CEOs whose incentives were better aligned with those 
of shareholders did not perform better during the period of the recent financial 
crisis. Beltratti and Stulz (2012) document for an international sample of banks 
that banks with more shareholder-friendly boards performed worse during the 
period of financial crisis.24 Erkens et al. (2012) argue that managerial risk-taking 
incentives can encourage managers to adopt riskier policies which were looking 
lucrative before the financial crisis but were costly to shareholders during the 
financial crisis. 
In summary, despite the growing literature on the relationship between different 
board characteristics and risk-taking and performance of financial institutions, 
ownership structure and performance of financial institutions, and executive 
compensation structure and risk-taking in financial institutions, there is still no 
consensus on the strength of corporate governance mechanisms in the financial 
industry (see e.g., de Haan and Vlahu, 2016; John, Masi and Paci, 2016). The 
literature does not provide satisfactory answers to several important questions, 
including what is the role of board characteristics and expertise in risk-taking in 
the financial industry, and the effects of managerial incentives on risk-taking by 
financial institutions.25 
  
                                                        
23 Providing managers with greater risk-taking compensation incentives.  
24 Beltratti and Stulz (2012, p. 16) conclude that “banks that grew more in sectors that 
turned out to perform poorly during the crisis were pursuing policies favored by 
shareholders before the crisis as their boards were more shareholder-friendly but suffered 
more during the crisis when these risks led to unexpectedly large losses.” 
25  Most extant studies show that executive compensation structures motivate bank 
managers to take more risks that may not be favorable for the shareholders during the 
economic downturn (de Haan and Vlahu, 2016). 
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5 SUMMARY OF THE ESSAYS 
This dissertation encompasses four essays on the relationship between corporate 
governance and risk taking by financial institutions. First three essays are co-
authored, and the fourth essay is single-authored. The contribution of each co-
author is described below: 
Essay 1 “Corporate governance and the systemic risk of financial institutions” is 
co-authored with Professor Sami Vähämaa and Dr. Sascha Strobl. Jamshed Iqbal 
is the main author of this essay. Professor Sami Vähämaa was the initiator of the 
research idea. Jamshed Iqbal was responsible for the collection of data, 
methodological design of the paper, initial tests and the initial interpretation of the 
results. Professor Vähämaa contributed to this paper by providing detailed 
comments on the different versions of the paper and by writing and rewriting some 
parts of the text. Professor Vähämaa also participated in the statistical analyses. 
Dr. Sascha Strobl contributed to this paper throughout the research process by 
giving detailed comments on different versions of the paper and by writing some 
parts of the text. 
Essay 2 “Corporate governance and the insolvency risk of financial institutions” is 
co-authored with Dr. Searat Ali. Jamshed Iqbal is the main author of this essay 
and is responsible for the research idea, data collection for the corporate 
governance and control variables, research design, and the writing of the essay. 
The empirical analysis section is a result of joint efforts by both authors. Dr. Searat 
Ali further contributed by collecting data regarding the insolvency risk variables 
and offering valuable comments and suggestions for improving the essay. 
Essay 3 “Managerial risk-taking incentives and the systemic risk of financial 
institutions” is co-authored with Professor Sami Vähämaa. Jamshed Iqbal is the 
main author of this essay, and is responsible for the research idea, data collection, 
methodological design of the paper, initial tests and the initial interpretation of the 
results. Professor Vähämaa contributed to this paper by providing detailed 
comments on the different versions of the paper and by writing and rewriting some 
parts of the text. Professor Vähämaa also participated in the statistical analyses. 
Essay 4 “CEO pay-share and risk-taking in large bank holding companies” is 
single-authored by Jamshed Iqbal. 
Brief summaries of the four essays are provided in the following: 
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5.1 Corporate governance and the systemic risk of 
financial institutions 
The first essay investigates the association between corporate governance and the 
systemic risk of financial institutions around the recent financial crisis. Systemic 
risk can be broadly defined as a measure of the relation of a particular financial 
institution’s risk-taking to the overall risk-taking in the financial industry. As 
recently noted, for instance, by Anginer et al. (2014), the contribution of an 
individual financial institution to the system’s deficiency may be more relevant 
than the stand-alone risk of that institution during periods of market stress. 
Despite the amplified interest in the measurement of systemic risk over the past 
few years, surprisingly little is known about the institution specific attributes that 
may influence the level of systemic risk. This essay aims to extend the prior 
literature by empirically examining whether the systemic risk of U.S. financial 
institutions is affected by the strength of corporate governance mechanisms.  
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, it has been widely argued by 
politicians, banking supervisors, and other authorities that the crisis can be, at 
least to some extent, attributed to flaws in the corporate governance practices of 
financial institutions (see e.g., Kirkpatrick, 2009; Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2010; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2010; 
Haldane, 2012). These allegations seem reasonable given that corporate 
governance can be broadly considered as the set of mechanisms for addressing 
agency problems and controlling risk within the firm. In general, strong corporate 
governance practices and especially effective board oversight are supposed to 
encourage the firm’s top management to act in the best interests of shareholders 
and other stakeholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). So, was something wrong with 
the corporate governance of financial institutions at the onset of the global 
financial crisis? We show in this paper that “good” corporate governance practices 
may have encouraged rather than constrained excessive risk-taking in the financial 
industry. Specifically, our empirical findings demonstrate that financial 
institutions with stronger and more shareholder-focused corporate governance 
mechanisms and boards of directors are associated with higher levels of systemic 
risk.  
Our study contributes to the existing literature by empirically examining whether 
the strength of corporate governance mechanisms can explain the cross-sectional 
variation in the systemic risk of U.S. financial institutions around the recent 
financial crisis. The measures of systemic risk used in our empirical analysis are 
the marginal expected shortfall (MES) and systemic risk (SRISK) proposed by 
Acharya, Engle and Richardson (2012). MES measures the decline of a firm’s 
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equity when the market drops more than two percent and SRISK the expected 
capital shortage of a firm amidst a financial market crisis. We utilize the Corporate 
Governance Quotient as well as the Board Quotient issued by Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS) to measure the strength of corporate governance 
mechanisms and the board of directors within financial institutions.  
In brief, our empirical findings indicate that financial institutions with stronger 
and more shareholder-focused corporate governance mechanisms and boards are 
associated with greater systemic risk, suggesting that good corporate governance 
may encourage increased risk-taking in the financial industry. We also document 
that the positive association between good governance and systemic risk was 
particularly strong amidst the financial crisis in 2008. In general, our findings 
regarding the effects of strong governance on systemic risk are broadly consistent 
with the previous literature on bank risk-taking (see e.g., Pathan, 2009; Fortin et 
al., 2010; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). We believe that the results reported in this 
paper offer several important implications. Most importantly, our results 
demonstrate that “good”, shareholder-focused corporate governance mechanisms 
in the financial sector may not be enough to constrain risk-taking and to prevent 
financial crises in the future.  
5.2 Corporate governance and the insolvency risk of 
financial institutions 
This essay empirically examines the connection between corporate governance 
and insolvency risk of financial institutions. This study uses both traditional 
(distance-to-default) and market-based (credit default swap (CDS) spread) 
measures to proxy for insolvency risk. CDS spread is the market estimate of 
default/insolvency risk. Bolton, Mehran and Shapiro (2015) link CEO 
compensation to CDS spread as a measure of default risk. Recent studies (e.g., 
Bolton, Mehran, and Shapiro, 2015) utilize CDS spread to proxy insolvency risk 
and suggest that it is preferable because it also accounts for creditors risk 
(Colonnello, 2017; Feldhutter, Hotchkiss, and Karakas, 2016).26 
This essay contributes to the growing corporate governance literature that 
connects corporate governance mechanisms to risk-taking by financial institutions 
(Pathan, 2009; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Erkens et al., 2012; Berger et al., 2016; 
Iqbal et al., 2015). This essay contributes to the literature in the following ways: 
First, building on prior studies, it relates corporate governance to insolvency risk 
                                                        
26 Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005) and Norden and Weber (2009) find that CDSs 
provide an accurate and informative measure of credit risk. 
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for a large sample of U.S. financial institutions. This is one of the few studies to 
show the relevance of corporate governance to a financial institution’s insolvency 
risk.  This essay shows that strong governance mechanisms significantly affect the 
insolvency risk of financial institutions that can cause instability in the overall 
financial system. Secondly, this essay provides some evidence that financial 
institutions with strong boards have a greater insolvency risk. It is still relevant to 
study the relationship between board strength and insolvency risk because the 
existing literature does not provide a satisfactory answer regarding the role of 
boards in controlling the agency relationship (Adams et al., 2010). Further, most 
of the previous studies on board effectiveness do not include financial firms in their 
sample (see Adams et al., 2010). This essay also confirms the previous literature 
(Adams and Mehran, 2012) indicating that in the financial industry, restrictions 
on board size can be counter-productive. Lastly, this essay contributes to the recent 
literature that relates corporate governance to CDS spread. Several recent studies 
incorporate CDS spreads (Hart and Zingales, 2010; Bolton, Mehran and Shapiro, 
2015), suggesting CDS spread is an important measure of risk.  
This essay finds that the insolvency risk of financial institutions, proxied by either 
its market-based distance to default or CDS spread, is positively associated with 
the shareholder-friendliness of its corporate governance. Further, this positive 
association between corporate governance and insolvency risk is more important 
for larger financial institutions and during the financial crisis. The findings are 
broadly consistent with the prior literature on risk-taking by financial institutions 
(see e.g., Pathan, 2009; Fortin, Goldberg and Roth, 2010; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; 
Erkens et al., 2012). These findings suggest that stronger corporate governance 
mechanisms may encourage greater risk-taking in the financial industry. A 
potential explanation for these results is that shareholder-friendly boards of 
directors encouraged managers to take more risks to increase shareholder return 
prior to the crisis (Laeven and Levine, 2009: Erkens et al., 2012). DeYoung et al. 
(2013) argue that prior to the global financial crisis (during 2000–2006), CEO 
compensation in banks was changed which encouraged more risk-taking. Because 
financial institutions are entering into more complex activities and have 
broadened their scope, this effect may have been amplified in recent years, making 
it difficult for regulators to keep pace with the changes. The results in this essay 
are economically significant and robust to several additional analyses, including 
propensity score matching to mitigate the concerns regarding endogeneity.    
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5.3 Managerial risk-taking incentives and the systemic 
risk of financial institutions 
This essay examines whether the systemic risk of financial institutions is 
associated with the compensation-based risk-taking incentives of the top 
executives. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, policy 
makers, regulators, and bank supervision authorities have alleged that the risk-
taking incentives generated by executive compensation policies at banking 
organizations were among the factors contributing to the development of the crisis 
(see e.g., Kirkpatrick, 2009; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010; 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2009b, 2010; Mehran et al., 
2011). Furthermore, the financial crisis revealed the distinct adverse consequences 
of bank risk-taking and systemic risk on global financial stability, economic 
growth, and societal well-being. Given that the compensation policies of top 
executives are generally designed to mitigate agency problems and to maximize 
shareholder value, the incentives generated by executive compensation may 
encourage more risk-taking in the financial industry (e.g., Chen et al., 2006; 
Bebchuk, Cohen and Spamann, 2010; Bebchuk and Spamann, 2010; Bai and 
Elyasiani, 2013). 
Do compensation-based risk-taking incentives of the top executives increase the 
riskiness of financial institutions and the level of systemic risk? In this paper, we 
aim to address this question by empirically examining the linkage between 
systemic risk and the sensitivities of chief executive officer (CEO) and chief 
financial officer (CFO) compensation to changes in stock prices and stock return 
volatility.27 Using data on large, publicly traded U.S. financial institutions, we find 
ambiguous evidence on the association between managerial risk-taking incentives 
and the systemic risk of financial institutions. Our results indicate that the 
sensitivities of top executive compensation to volatility are negatively related to 
systemic risk. However, our empirical findings also demonstrate that financial 
institutions with greater managerial risk-taking incentives were associated with 
significantly higher levels of systemic risk in 2008, during the peak of the global 
financial crisis. 
This essay proceeds with the basic hypothesis that managerial risk-taking 
incentives encourage managers to increase the riskiness of the firm by adopting 
riskier financial policies (Chava and Purnanandam, 2010). In financial 
institutions, that can increase the level of systemic risk especially during the 
                                                        
27 We follow Chava and Purnanadam (2010) to analyze the effect of risk-taking incentives 
of both CEOs and CFOs. They show that CFO’s risk-taking incentives can influence 
corporate financial policies.  
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periods of distress. To empirically examine the notion, this essay uses delta and 
vega measures of manager’s stock and option holdings as the proxies for risk-
taking incentives.28 Delta, the sensitivity of a manager’s portfolio to stock price, 
measures the dollar gain or loss in a manager’s wealth if the firm’s stock price 
changes (Kini and Williams, 2012).29 A higher delta will encourage the manager to 
increase the wealth of the firm’s shareholders because delta is also used as a proxy 
for incentive alignment between shareholders and management (Fahlenbrach and 
Stulz, 2011). Vega is the sensitivity of a manager's portfolio to changes in equity 
volatility. Vega provides a relatively direct measure for the risk-taking incentives 
of a manager because managers with a higher vega tend to gain from greater firm 
risk. This essay shows that greater managerial risk-taking incentives may have 
encouraged increased risk-taking in the financial industry, especially during the 
period of the recent financial crisis. Specifically, the empirical findings show that 
financial institutions with CEOs and CFOs having higher managerial risk-taking 
incentives were associated with greater levels of systemic risk during the financial 
crisis. For the overall sample, this essay finds either an inverse or an insignificant 
relationship between risk-taking incentives and the systemic risk of financial 
institutions, which is in line with agency theory holding that executives should take 
risks to increase the wealth of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
In our empirical analysis, we use data on 71 large U.S. financial institutions over 
the period 2005-2010. We measure the systemic risk of individual financial 
institutions with the market-based approach proposed by Acharya et al. (2012), 
Acharya et al. (2017), and Brownlees and Engle (2017).30 Specifically, we use the 
marginal expected shortfall (MES) and systemic risk (SRISK) to gauge systemic 
risk. MES measures the decline of a financial institution’s equity capital when the 
market drops more than two percent in a single day. SRISK is the expected capital 
shortage of an institution during a financial crisis.31 Essentially, MES and SRISK 
aim to measure how exposed a given financial institution is to aggregate tail shocks 
in the financial system. 
                                                        
28 Several studies use Delta and Vega as proxies of risk-taking incentives e.g. Chava and 
Purnanandam (2010), Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) and Kini and Williams (2012). 
29  Chava and Purnanandam (2010) provide discussion on how Delta is risk-taking 
incentive. 
30 Several alternative approaches for measuring systemic risk have been proposed in the 
literature in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Different approaches are discussed 
and compared, for instance, in Bisias, Flood, Lo, and Valavanis (2012), Hattori, Kikuchi, 
Niwa and Uchida (2014 ), and Kleinow, Moreira, Strobl and Vahamaa (2017). 
31 A firm is considered to be as systemically risky if it is likely to face a capital shortage 
during the periods of financial turmoil (Acharya et al., 2017). This capital shortage can be 
damaging to the real economy because the failure of a systemically risky firm will have 
effects throughout the financial industry (Acharya et al., 2017).  
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The empirical findings reported in this paper indicate that the relationship 
between managerial risk-taking incentives and systemic risk is ambiguous. The 
results show that the sensitivities of top executive compensation to volatility (i.e., 
the CEO and CFO vegas) are generally negatively associated with systemic risk, 
while there is essentially no relationship between pay-performance sensitivity (i.e., 
the delta) and systemic risk. Our regressions indicate that one standard deviation 
increases in CEO and CFO vegas are associated with approximately six percent 
reductions in SRISK. These findings are in stark contrast with the hypothesis that 
greater managerial risk-taking incentives would increase the level of systemic risk.  
On the other hand, our empirical results indicate that financial institutions with 
greater managerial risk-taking incentives were associated with significantly higher 
levels of systemic risk in 2008, during the peak of the global financial crisis. The 
positive association between the pre-crisis deltas and vegas of the top executives 
and systemic risk during the crisis is economically significant; our estimates 
indicate that a one standard deviation increase in deltas and vegas increases MES 
by about 25-40 basis points during the crisis. The documented positive association 
between CEO and CFO risk-taking incentives and systemic risk during the severe 
market turmoil in 2008 may indicate that financial institutions with greater 
compensation-based managerial risk-taking incentives were taking more risk 
before the crisis in order to maximize shareholder wealth, and that these risks were 
then materialized and exposed during the financial crisis (Erkens et al., 2012).  
5.4 CEO pay-share and risk-taking in large bank holding 
companies 
This essay examines whether CEO pay-share (pay inequality between the CEO and 
the other top executives) is associated with risk-taking among large bank holding 
companies (BHCs).32 The main hypothesis in this study is that BHCs with greater 
CEO pay-share should have higher risk (default risk and tail risk). This is because, 
according to tournament theory, an executive’s rank in the firm determines his/her 
compensation (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). Ang, Lauterbach, and Schreiber (2002) 
argue that greater CEO pay is justified because CEOs have a greater responsibility 
towards the firm. However, tournament theory provides different arguments for 
                                                        
32 Bebchuk et al. (2011), Kini and Williams (2012), and Bai and Elyasiani (2013) use CEO 
pay-share as a measure of CEO power and risk incentive measures of CEO compensation.  
The regulatory burden under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) generally depends on bank size. BHCs with assets above USD 
10 billion are subject to greater oversight than BHCs with less than USD 10 billion in assets. 
Therefore, this study considers BHCs as large if the book value of their assets is greater 
than USD 10 billion in 2010 constant dollars. 
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this view and argues how the CEO’s compensation can be several times greater 
than those of the other executives. 33 In this regard, Lazear and Rosen (1981) 
propose a tournament model where workers in the firm are compensated based on 
their ranks. In this way, not only monitoring costs are reduced but it also gives 
workers incentive to win the tournament and receive the prize. In the case of 
executives, CEO’s pay is the prize because that is substantially greater than those 
of other executives. Greater CEO pay motivates other top executives to be the next 
CEO and win the tournament (Ang et al., 2002). In order to achieve this, executives 
adopt riskier policies to increase their performance (Kini and Williams, 2012). So, 
greater pay inequality would also result in the better performance of the firm (Lin, 
Yeh and Shih, 2013). However, in order to achieve the higher level of performance 
executives will take on more risks in the presence of tournament incentives (Goel 
and Thakor, 2008). In doing so, the executives will increase the overall risk of the 
firm. In the banking industry, the pay inequality between the CEO and the other 
top executives is even larger (Ang et al., 2002) and this larger pay inequality may 
result in increased risk-taking in the banking industry. 
In contrast to the tournament theory, Bebchuk et al. (2011) argue that firms might 
differ in terms of tournament incentives for senior executives and thus CEO pay-
share level might differ in the firms. Because the CEO has power over the decision-
making in the firm, the CEO might affect the level of pay-share. Therefore, a high 
CEO pay-share might indicate governance problems in the firm where CEO can 
extract greater pay. The ability to extract greater pay can also refer to the additional 
information that other CEO power proxies (e.g. CEO is also the founder and CEO 
duality) may not capture.34 With more power, CEOs can run the firm for his/her 
own benefits at the expense of the shareholders (Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira, 
2005). Thus, greater CEO power may result in lower firm value (Bebchuk, Cohen, 
and Ferrel, 2009) and lower credit rating (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and Lafond, 
2006). In banks, CEO power is also associated with less bank risk (Pathan, 2009). 
This might be because managers are risk averse (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and 
therefore adopt safer policies to protect their own investment in the firm (Pathan, 
2009). Furthermore, the higher risk would also increase the probability of default 
by increasing the bankruptcy costs (Parrino et al., 2005). Therefore, unlike other 
senior executives, CEOs do not have strong incentives to adopt riskier policies. 
Consistent with these arguments, the main alternative hypothesis in this study is 
that BHCs with greater CEO pay-share should be less risky.  
33 Ang et al. (2002) report that bank CEOs, on average, earn 1.8 times more than the next 
most highly paid executive in the bank, and 2.6 times more than the fifth most highly paid 
executive. 
34 CEO Power is “the power the CEO has over the board and other top executives” (Adams, 
Almeida, and Ferreira, 2005, p 1408). 
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Using an unbalanced panel of 122 large and economically significant U.S. BHCs 
(those with assets greater than USD 10), this study finds that greater CEO pay-
share is associated with lower BHC risk. These findings are consistent with the 
alternative hypothesis (CEO power argument) suggesting that powerful CEOs 
reduce the overall risk exposure of the BHC to protect their own human capital and 
financial wealth. These results are robust against a number of alternative 
estimation methods, different sample periods (before GFC, and after Dodd-
Frank), and even against tests for addressing endogeneity where CEO pay-share is 
instrumented with industry median pay-share. These results may suggest that 
when CEO pay-share rises, CEOs become more risk averse and powerful, and thus 
implement less risk business policies.  
The findings of this study have important implications for researchers, the board 
of directors, shareholders, and regulators. Most of the previous studies focused on 
the composition of CEO pay. This study highlights the importance of inequality of 
compensation amongst the top executive team.  The inverse relationship between 
CEO pay-share and BHC risk supports the view of possible risk aversion. The 
findings caution researchers against considering powerful CEOs as only risk-
seekers. Moreover, the results indicate that shareholders and boards of directors 
can influence CEO pay share to alter the risk-taking propensity of the 
management. 
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1. Introduction
This paper focuses on the linkage between corporate governance and the systemic risk of financial
institutions around the recent financial crisis. Systemic risk can be broadly defined as a measure of
the relation of a particular financial institution’s risk-taking to the overall risk-taking in the financial
industry. As recently noted, for instance, by Anginer, Demirguc-Kunt, and Zhu (2014), the contribution
of an individual financial institution to the system’s deficiency may be more relevant than the stand-
alone risk of that institution during periods of market stress. Despite the amplified interest toward
the measurement of systemic risk over the past few years, surprisingly little is so far known about
the institution specific attributes that may influence the level of systemic risk1. In this paper, we aim
to extend the prior literature by empirically examining whether the systemic risk of U.S. financial
institutions is affected by the strength of corporate governance mechanisms.
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, it has been widely argued by politicians, banking
supervisors, andotherauthorities that thecrisis canbe, at least to someextent, attributed toflaws in the
corporate governance practices of financial institutions (see e.g., Kirkpatrick, 2009; Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision, 2010; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2010; Haldane,
2012). These allegations seem reasonable given that corporate governance can be broadly considered
as the set of mechanisms for addressing agency problems and controlling risk within the firm. In gen-
eral, strong corporate governance practices, and especially, effective board oversight are supposed
to encourage the firm’s top management to act in the best interest of shareholders and other stake-
holders (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). So was something actually wrong with the corporate governance
of financial institutions at the onset of the global financial crisis? We show in this paper that “good”
corporate governance practicesmay have encouraged rather than constrained excessive risk-taking in
the financial industry. Specifically, our empirical findings demonstrate that financial institutions with
stronger and more shareholder-focused corporate governance mechanisms and boards of directors
are associated with higher levels of systemic risk2.
At first glance, itmay seemsomewhat counterintuitive that financial institutionswith stronger cor-
porate governancemechanisms are associatedwith higher levels of systemic risk. However, consistent
with traditional shareholder value maximization, well-governed financial institutions may have tried
to improve their profitability to placate shareholders before the crisis by increasing the level of risk-
taking. Empirical support for this view is provided, for instance, by Beltratti and Stulz (2012), who
document that banks with more shareholder-friendly boards took more risk at the onset of the global
financial crisis and performed significantly worse during the crisis. Investors may have neglected or
became less sensitive to the surge in bank risk-taking because of the growing complexity and opaque-
ness of banking activities (e.g., Mehran, Morrison, & Shapiro, 2011). Furthermore, as noted by Mehran
et al. (2011), there is a “dark side to expertise” on the board of directors; expert boardmembersmay be
hired to justify and increase risk-taking for the sakeof valuemaximization insteadof aiding inmonitor-
ing the topmanagement. Consistentwith this view,Minton, Taillard, andWilliamson (2014) document
that independent directors with financial expertise encouraged increasing bank risk-taking prior to
the global financial crisis, and moreover, that the board’s expertise is strongly negatively associated
with bank performance during the crisis.
Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier, and Stulz (2012) argue that institution specific characteristics are respon-
sible for the high correlation they find between stock returns in the 1998 financial crisis and the
recent crisis. They label this argument as the risk culture hypothesis. According to Fahlenbrach et al.
(2012), the business model of a financial institution, especially if it is successful, can be hard to change
and reinforces the culture of the company. Acharya and Volpin (2010), in turn, argue that firms can,
1 Among the few exceptions are the recent studies by Acharya and Thakor (2011), Brunnermeier, Dong, and Palia (2012), Pais
and Stork (2013), Anginer et al. (2014), Mayordomo, Rodriguez-Moreno, and Pen˜a (2014), and Calluzzo and Dong (2015). We
discuss the related systemic risk literature in Section 2.
2 Corporate governance mechanisms and the board of directors are considered to be stronger and more shareholder-friendly
when theyprovide effectivemonitoring and stronger protection of shareholder’s interests, andmore generally, better alignment
of managers’ interests with those of the shareholders. Adams (2012) and de Haan and Vlahu (2015) provide comprehensive
discussions about the corporate governance of financial institutions and the elements of “good” governance.
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at least to some extent, choose their corporate governance arrangements which affect and are also
affected by the governance choices of other firms. Hence, the choice of corporate governance arrange-
ments of a given firm may have externalities on other firms. Both lines of thought view corporate
governance structures as endogenous but, especially, the risk culture hypothesis of Fahlenbrach et al.
(2012) implies long lags and a general tendency of governance mechanisms influencing the level of
risk-taking and not the other way around.
In this paper, we presume that corporate governance mechanisms may influence the corpo-
rate risk culture, and consequently, the level of systemic risk. Given the moral hazard problems
caused by the “too-big-to-fail” phenomenon and deposit insurance systems (e.g., Merton, 1978),
shareholder-focused governance mechanisms may encourage bank managers to adopt more risky
business strategies and operationswhich, in turn,may lead to increased systemic risk3. Because finan-
cial institutionsdonothave todirectly pay for thenegative consequences of their excessive risk-taking,
shareholder-focused corporate governance structures of individual institutions may not only increase
the riskiness of a specific institution but also create negative externalities on the financial system by
increasing the aggregate level of systemic risk4.
Our study contributes to the existing literature by empirically examining whether the strength
of corporate governance mechanisms can explain the cross-sectional variation in the systemic risk
of U.S. financial institutions around the recent financial crisis. The measures of systemic risk used in
our empirical analysis are the marginal expected shortfall (MES) and systemic risk (SRISK) proposed
by Acharya, Engle, and Richardson (2012). MES measures the decline of a firm’s equity when the
market drops more than 2 percent and SRISK the expected capital shortage of a firm amidst a financial
market crisis. We utilize the Corporate Governance Quotient as well as the Board Quotient issued by
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) to measure the strength of corporate governance mechanisms
and board of directors within financial institutions.
In brief, our empirical findings indicate that financial institutions with stronger and more
shareholder-focused corporate governance mechanisms and boards are associated with higher sys-
temic risk, suggesting that good corporate governance may encourage rather than constrain excessive
risk-taking in the financial industry. We also document that the positive association between good
governance and systemic risk was particularly strong amidst the financial crisis in 2008. In general,
our findings regarding the effects of strong governance on systemic risk are broadly consistent with
the previous literature on bank risk-taking (see e.g., Pathan, 2009; Fortin, Goldberg, & Roth, 2010;
Beltratti & Stulz, 2012). We believe that the results reported in this paper offer several important
implications. Most importantly, our results demonstrate that “good”, shareholder-focused corporate
governance mechanisms in the financial sector may not be enough to constrain risk-taking and to
prevent financial crises in the future.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature on
systemic risk and bank risk-taking. Section 3 describes the data and introduces the variables used
in the empirical analysis. Section 4 presents the methods and reports our empirical findings on the
association between corporate governancemechanisms and the systemic risk of financial institutions.
Finally, the last section summarizes the findings and concludes the paper.
2. Related literature
The empirical analysis presented in this paper is closely related to two recent streams of literature.
First, our analysis complements the growing body of literature on factors influencing the systemic risk
of financial institutions. Despite the amplified academic and regulatory interest toward the measure-
ment of systemic risk over the past few years, surprisingly little is so far known about the institution
specific attributes that may affect the level of systemic risk. Among the few exceptions are the stud-
ies by Acharya and Thakor (2011), Brunnermeier et al. (2012), Pais and Stork (2013), Anginer et al.
3 Acharya (2009, 2011) provides a detailed discussion on how moral hazard problems and the “too-big-to-fail” phenomenon
may contribute to systemic risk.
4 A comprehensive discussion on the incentives for excessive risk-taking in the financial industry is provided in de Haan and
Vlahu (2015).
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(2014), Mayordomo et al. (2014), and Calluzzo and Dong (2015). These studies document that the size
of the institution, the amount of equity capital, the extent of lending activities, and the proportion of
non-performing loans are important factors for explaining the systemic risk of financial institutions
(Acharya & Thakor, 2011; Brunnermeier et al., 2012; Pais & Stork, 2013; Mayordomo et al., 2014;
Calluzzo & Dong, 2015). More specifically, prior studies find strong evidence that larger institutions
with lower capital ratios are associated with higher levels of systemic risk. Furthermore, the findings
of Brunnermeier et al. (2012) suggest that the amount of non-interest income is positively related to
systemic risk, while Mayordomo et al. (2014) report that holdings of certain types of financial deriva-
tives may increase the level of systemic risk. Finally, Anginer et al. (2014) document that increasing
bank competition may reduce systemic risk by encouraging risk diversification. To the best of our
knowledge, the current study is the first attempt to empirically examine the relationship between
corporate governance mechanisms and the systemic risk of financial institutions.
In addition to the literature about factors influencing systemic risk, our paper is closely related
to the large body of literature about the role of corporate governance mechanisms and boards of
directors in the financial industry (see e.g., Caprio, Laeven, & Levine, 2007; de Andres & Vallelado,
2008; Fahlenbrach & Stulz, 2011; Yeh, Chung, & Liu, 2011; Adams & Mehran, 2012; Aebi, Sabato, &
Schmid, 2012; Beltratti & Stulz, 2012; Erkens, Hung, & Matos, 2012; Peni & Vahamaa, 2012; Pathan
& Faff, 2013; Wang & Hsu, 2013; Minton et al., 2014). These studies document that differences in
corporate governance mechanisms and observable board characteristics across firms are reflected in
the financial performance and market valuation of financial institutions. Interestingly, the findings of
Beltratti and Stulz (2012), Aebi et al. (2012), Erkens et al. (2012), and Peni and Vahamaa (2012) suggest
that strong corporate governance mechanisms and shareholder-friendly boards were significantly
negatively associated with bank performance during the global financial crisis.
Perhapsmost related to the empirical analysis presented in this paper, the recent studies by Pathan
(2009), Laeven and Levine (2009), Fortin et al. (2010), Beltratti and Stulz (2012), Peni and Vahamaa
(2012), Berger, Kick, and Schaeck (2014), andMinton et al. (2014) examine the influence of governance
andboard structures on the risk-takingof financial institutions. In brief, these studies demonstrate that
good corporate governance mechanisms and shareholder-friendly boards of directors are positively
associated with both balance-sheet and market-based measures of risk-taking. Overall, the previous
studies suggest that shareholder-focused corporate governance structures combined with the share-
holder value maximization objective may encourage excessive risk-taking in the financial industry5.
Our study builds upon the prior bank risk-taking literature by empirically examining how strong cor-
porate governance and shareholder-friendly boards affect the level of systemic risk. Based on the
findings documented in the prior literature, we postulate that financial institutions with stronger and
more shareholder-focused corporate governance mechanisms and boards of directors are associated
with higher systemic risk.
3. Data and variables
Our analysis is based on a sample of 71 large, publicly traded U.S. financial institutions and a sam-
ple period which spans fiscal years 2005–2010. To empirically investigate the relationship between
corporate governance mechanisms and the systemic risk of financial institutions, we collect data on
systemic risk, corporate governance mechanisms, and financial statement and balance sheet variables
from NYU Stern’s V-Lab website, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)/RiskMetrics, and Bureau van
Dijk Bankscope, respectively. Essentially, the sample used in the analysis is an intersection of the
available data from V-Lab and ISS/RiskMetrics. We first identify all financial firms (commercial banks,
investment banks, non-bank lending institutions, and financial services firms) for which systemic
risk data is available from NYU Stern’s V-Lab. We then eliminate from this initial sample the insti-
tutions with insufficient data on the ISS/RiskMetrics corporate governance measures. This leaves us
5 de Haan and Vlahu (2015) provide a comprehensive discussion about bank corporate governance and the risk-taking
incentives in the financial industry.
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with a final sample of 71 individual financial institutions and an unbalanced panel of 332 firm-year
observations6. The list of financial institutions included in the sample is presented in Appendix A.
3.1. Systemic risk measures
The dependent variable in our empirical analysis is systemic risk. Several alternative approaches
for themeasurement of systemic risk have been proposed in the literature (see e.g., Acharya, Pedersen,
Philippon, & Richardson, 2010; Mayordomo et al., 2014). These approaches can be broadly classified
intomeasures based onbalance sheet variables andmeasures based onfinancialmarket data.Whereas
the measures based on balance sheet information are slow-moving and backward-looking in nature,
the market-based measures can provide more timely and forward-looking assessments of systemic
risk.
In our study, we use the two market-based systemic risk measures proposed by Acharya et al.
(2012): (i) marginal expected shortfall (MES) and (ii) systemic risk (SRISK). The data on these two
systemic risk measures are obtained from NYU Stern’s V-Lab website. These measures are based on
the approach of Brownlees and Engle (2011) and utilize publicly available stock market data and
attempt to capture the capital shortfall of an institution amidst a financial crisis based on its stock
return volatility and correlation with the market.
Acharya et al. (2012) define systemic risk (SRISK) as the amount of “capital that a firm is expected
to need if we have another financial crisis”. SRISK for financial institution i at time t can be formally
expressed as:
SRISKi,t = Ei,t
(
Capital Shortfalli
∣∣Crisis
)
(1)
Capital Shortfall in Eq. (1) is estimated under the assumption of an unchanged value of debt if a
crisis occurs within the next six months while the value of equity of the financial institution is low.
In practice, SRISK is estimated based on the marginal expected shortfall (MES), which attempts to
capture the expected loss of equity capital of a firm amidst market turmoil. If a financial institution
has high MES, most of the institution’s equity capital will be depleted during a financial crisis, and
hence, the institutionwill be in danger of failure. This also implies that under-capitalizationof financial
institutions contributes positively to the total systemic risk.
Formally, Acharya et al. (2012) define MES as the expected daily percentage decrease in equity
value of a financial institution when the aggregate stock market declines by more than 2 percent on
a single day. The estimated MES is further extrapolated to a market turmoil that is much more severe
and lasts for a longer period to obtain the Long Run Marginal Expected Shortfall (LRMES). Acharya
et al. (2012) define LRMES as:
LRMESi,t = 1 − exp
(
−18 × MESi,t
)
(2)
Based on LRMES, Acharya et al. (2012) estimate SRISK of financial institution i at time t as follows:
SRISKi,t = Ei,t
[
k
(
Debti,t + Equityi,t
)
− Equityi,t
∣∣Crisis
]
(3)
SRISKi,t = k
(
Debti,t
)
− (1 − k)
(
1 − LRMESi,t
)
Equityi,t (4)
where k denotes the prudential capital ratio which is taken to be 8 percent, LRMES is the Long Run
Marginal Expected Shortfall, Equity is the market value of equity, and Debt is the market value of debt.
Hence, SRISK is the amount of capital needed by a firm in a severe turmoil in which the current equity
falls according to the LRMES and the level of debt stays constant.
MES and SRISK can be calculated based on historical stock price data without simulation or using
simulation. The systemic risk measures used in this study are calculated without simulation in order
to maximize the number of individual financial institutions included in the sample. In the approach
6 Several recent studies have used relatively small samples of financial institutions (see e.g., de Andres & Vallelado, 2008;
Fortin et al., 2010; Fahlenbrach & Stulz, 2011; Adams, 2012; Adams & Mehran, 2012; Peni and Vahamaa, 2012; Peni, Smith, &
Vahamaa, 2013; Mayordomo et al., 2014).
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without simulation, MES, or the expected daily decrease in equity value of a financial institution
when the aggregate stock markets declines by more than 2 percent is first calculated based on the
institution’s stock return volatility, correlation with the aggregate market, and extreme stock price
movements. Then, these estimates are extrapolated to a financial crisis—involving a greater decline
in asset prices over a longer period of time. Based on these extrapolated decreases in equity value,
and under the assumption that a financial institution needs at least 8 percent of equity capital relative
to the value of assets, SRISK is estimated as the amount of capital that the institution would need to
obtain amidst a severe financial crisis. In our empirical analysis, the year-end (December) estimates
of MES and SRISK are used.
3.2. Corporate governance measures
We use the Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ) index issued by Institutional Shareholder Ser-
vices (ISS) to measure the strength of the corporate governance mechanisms of financial institutions7.
These data are obtained from the RiskMetrics Group. CGQ is based on 67 different firm-specific
attributes, which represent both the internal and external governance of the firm. The different corpo-
rate governance elements included in CGQ are audit committees, board of directors, charter/bylaws,
director education, executive and director compensation, ownership, progressive practices, and state
of incorporation. The governance data underlying the CGQ is collected from public filings, company
websites, and surveys conducted by the ISS. The values of CGQ may range from 0 to 100, with higher
values of the quotient corresponding to stronger, more shareholder-focused corporate governance
mechanisms.
In addition to the aggregate governancemeasure CGQ,we also use the ISS Board Quotient (BoardQ)
tomeasure the strengthofboardmonitoringandoversight.Given that theboardofdirectors is themost
important internal governancemechanismwithin afirm, it is of interest to examine the effects of board
strength on the systemic risk of financial institutions. Institutional Shareholder Services calculates the
Board Quotient based on 20 different board attributes such size, independence, busyness, attendance,
and CEO duality. The Board Quotient may take values from 1 to 5, with higher values of the quotient
representing stronger, more shareholder-friendly boards of directors.
3.3. Control variables
In order to examine the association between corporate governance and systemic risk, we need to
account for several institution-specific factors that may affect the level of systemic risk. Following
the prior bank risk-taking literature (e.g., Pathan, 2009; Fortin et al., 2010; Brunnermeier et al., 2012;
Berger et al., 2014;Mayordomoet al., 2014),we control for firm size, capital ratio, profitability, growth,
and asset as well as income structure. The most important control variable when comparing financial
institutions is size. Previous studies have documented that the business strategies, product compo-
sitions, and corporate governance structures of financial institutions are affected by the size of the
institution. Moreover, larger institutions are likely to have greater systemic importance. Consistent
with the literature, we measure institution size (Size) by the logarithm of total assets. Brunnermeier
et al. (2012) document that larger banks are associated with higher systemic risk, while Mayordomo
et al. (2014) do not find any significant relation between size and systemic risk.
The second most important control variable in comparisons of financial institutions is capital ratio
(or leverage ratio). The amount of equity capital is the main variable of interest for banking supervisor
and can be considered as a proxy for the soundness and financial health of the institution. Previous
studies (Acharya&Thakor, 2011;Brunnermeier et al., 2012;Mayordomoet al., 2014)havedocumented
that the amount of equity capital is an important factor for explaining the systemic risk of financial
institutions. We measure Capital ratio as the ratio of equity capital to total assets.
7 The ISS Corporate Governance Quotient been previously used as a proxy for the strength of corporate governance, for
instance, in Chhaochharia and Laeven (2009), Ertugrul and Hegde (2009), and Peni et al. (2013).
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
Variable Mean Median St. dev. Min Max P25 P75 No. of obs.
Dependent variables
Marginal expected shortfall (%) 2.510 2.340 1.097 0.840 8.650 1.66 3.11 332
Systemic risk ($ billions) 4.103 −0.435 20.909 −67.659 136.467 −1.825 2.327 332
Corporate governance variables
Corporate Governance Quotient 48.439 47.650 29.481 0.500 99.400 21.25 72.675 398
Board Quotient 2.719 3.000 1.399 1.000 5.000 1 4 398
Control variables
Size 257.413 57.210 481.591 0.539 3221.972 15.937 193.321 367
Capital ratio 12.683 9.880 13.725 −3.600 90.510 7.907 12.02 367
Return on assets 1.119 0.970 3.075 −18.420 22.570 0.458 1.394 367
Loans to assets 50.695 60.260 24.629 0.000 90.740 34.833 69.495 338
Loan growth 14.637 6.990 58.459 −72.260 704.490 −1.465 17.097 310
Deposits to assets 0.616 0.694 0.245 0.001 0.900 0.498 0.796 362
Non-interest income 49.939 43.580 31.553 −76.020 175.130 30.015 74.15 367
The table reports the descriptive statistics for the sample. The sample consists of 71 publicly traded U.S. financial institutions.
Systemic risk is measured with the following two variables: (i) marginal expected shortfall (MES) is the expected daily per-
centage decrease in equity value of a financial institution when the aggregate stock market falls more than 2 percent and (ii)
systemic risk (SRISK) is the expected capital shortfall (in $ billions) of a financial institution in a crisis scenario. The corporate
governance variables are defined as follows: Corporate GovernanceQuotient is the Corporate GovernanceQuotient (CGQ) index
issued by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Board Quotient is a CGQ sub-index which measures the strength of the
board of directors. The control variables are defined as follows: Size is measured as the logarithm of total assets, Capital ratio
is the ratio of equity to total assets, Return on assets is the ratio of net income to total assets, Loans to assets is the ratio of net
loans to totals assets, Loan growth is the percentage change in loans from year t−1 to year t, Deposits to assets is the ratio of
deposits to total assets, and Non-interest income is the ratio of non-interest income to total income.
In addition to Size and Capital ratio, we account for the institution’s financial performance, growth,
and asset and income structure. We measure financial performance with Return on assets which is
calculated as the ratio of net income to total assets. Growth is measured as the percentage change in
the amount of outstanding loans. We control for the institution’s business model and asset structure
with the ratio of net loans to total assets (Loans to assets) and the ratio of deposits to total assets
(Deposits to assets). Finally, we use the ratio of non-interest income to total income (Non-interest
income) to control for the level of income diversification and non-traditional banking activities. The
data on our control variables are obtained from Bureau van Dijk Bankscope.
4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations
The descriptive statistics for variables used in the empirical analysis are presented in Table 1. As
can be noted from the table, the financial institutions included in our sample are very heterogeneous
in terms of the strength of corporate governance and board oversight, as CGQ varies from a minimum
of 0.5 to a maximum of 99.4 and the BoardQ takes values between 1 and 5. Hence, the descriptive
statistics indicate that our sample of large U.S. financial institutions contains firms with very strong
andveryweak governancemechanisms. In addition to the corporate governancemeasures, the sample
is also heterogeneous in terms of systemic risk. Table 1 shows thatMES varies from aminimumof 0.84
percent to a maximum of 8.65 percent, while SRISK ranges from −67.7 billion to 136.5 billion with a
mean value of 4.1 billion USD.
It can be further noted from the descriptive statistics in Table 1 that the sample is also very hetero-
geneous in terms of the control variables. Although all of the sample firms are large, publicly traded
financial institutions, there is considerable variation in size with the amount of total assets varying
from 540 million to 3.2 trillion USD. The ratios of Loans to assets and Deposits to assets reflect the
inclusions of commercial banks aswell as other types of financial institutions (investment banks, non-
bank lending institutions, and financial services firms) in the sample. Overall, it can be concluded from
Table 1 that our empirical analysis is based on a very heterogeneous sample of financial institutions.
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Table 2
Correlations.
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
(1) Marginal expected
shortfall
0.556 0.130 0.142 0.319 0.018 −0.210 −0.405 0.032 −0.286 0.297
(2) Systemic risk 0.183 0.206 0.450 −0.183 −0.275 −0.261 −0.041 −0.163 0.004
(3) Corporate Governance
Quotient
0.761 0.253 −0.176 0.013 −0.182 −0.005 −0.006 0.131
(4) Board Quotient 0.287 −0.120 −0.019 −0.173 −0.085 −0.023 0.159
(5) Total assets −0.435 −0.133 −0.195 −0.136 −0.199 0.180
(6) Capital ratio 0.450 −0.136 0.200 −0.223 0.150
(7) Return on assets −0.192 0.195 −0.203 0.224
(8) Loans to assets −0.130 0.460 −0.702
(9) Loan growth −0.184 0.151
(10) Deposits to assets −0.446
(11) Non-interest income 1.000
The table reports pairwise correlations for the variables used in the empirical analysis. Marginal expected shortfall is the
expected daily percentage decrease in equity value of a financial institution when the aggregate stock market falls more than
2 percent, Systemic risk is the expected capital shortfall of a financial institution in a crisis scenario, Corporate Governance
Quotient is the Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ) index issued by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), Board Quotient
is a CGQ sub-index which measures the strength of the board of directors, Size is measured as the logarithm of total assets,
Capital ratio is the ratio of equity to total assets, Return on assets is the ratio of net income to total assets, Loans to assets is the
ratio of net loans to totals assets, Loan growth is the percentage change in loans from year t−1 to year t, Deposits to assets is
the ratio of deposits to total assets, and Non-interest income is the ratio of non-interest income to total income.
Table 2 reports the pairwise correlations among the variables used in the analysis. It can be noted
from the table that the two systemic risk measures (MES and SRISK) are positively correlated with
the two corporate governance variables (CGQ and BoardQ), suggesting that financial institutions with
stronger, more shareholder-oriented corporate governance mechanisms and boards are associated
with higher levels of systemic risk. Not surprisingly, the two systemic risk measures (0.556) as well as
the two corporate governancemeasures (0.761) are strongly positively correlatedwith each other. The
correlations also indicate that larger financial institutions tend to have better governance practices as
Size is strongly positively correlated with both CGQ and BoardQ.
Table 2 further shows that the systemic risk measures are strongly positively correlated with Size
and negatively correlated with Loans to assets and Deposits to assets. Hence, consistent with the
findings of Brunnermeier et al. (2012) andMayordomoet al. (2014), the correlations suggest that larger
banks which are more involved in non-traditional banking activities are associated with higher levels
of systemic risk. Finally, it is worth noting that several of our control variables are strongly correlated
witheachother8.Mostnotably, Table2 indicates that Size is stronglynegatively correlatedwithCapital
ratio, while Capital ratio and Return on assets, in turn, exhibit a significant positive correlation with
each other. Furthermore, the three variables which measure the asset and income structure (Loans to
assets, Deposits to assets, andNon-interest income) of the financial institutions are strongly correlated
with each other.
4.2. Univariate tests
Before conducting our main analysis with panel regressions, we begin the analysis by examining
the relationship between corporate governance and systemic risk in a univariate setting. Specifically,
we divide our sample into two subsamples based on CGQ and test for differences in the means and
medians of the variables between the two subsamples. The first subsample contains the financial
institutions with stronger corporate governance mechanisms (institutions with CGQ values in the top
three deciles), while the second subsample consists of institutions with weaker corporate governance
mechanisms (institutionswithCGQvalues in thebottom threedeciles). After constructing the stronger
8 We perform several robustness checks to ensure that our empirical findings are not affected by multicollinearity.
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Table 3
Univariate tests.
Stronger governance Weaker governance Difference Difference
Variable Mean Median Mean Median in means in medians
Dependent variables
Marginal expected shortfall 2.689 2.590 2.278 2.020 0.411** 0.570***
Systemic risk 11.279 −0.117 0.720 −0.512 10.560*** 0.395*
Corporate governance variables
Corporate Governance Quotient 84.973 85.000 13.146 13.000 71.827*** 72.000***
Board Quotient 3.917 4.000 1.400 1.000 2.517*** 3.000***
Control variables
Size 18.560 18.525 17.530 17.190 1.031*** 1.334***
Capital ratio 9.108 9.148 13.157 10.270 −4.049*** −1.122***
Return on assets 0.720 0.900 1.083 0.995 −0.363 −0.095
Loans to assets 47.822 48.040 57.949 67.200 −10.127*** −19.160***
Loan growth 16.232 6.720 11.811 7.640 4.421 −0.920
Deposits to assets 0.642 0.689 0.629 0.693 0.014 −0.004
Non-interest income 52.500 45.325 45.507 40.535 6.993 4.790*
The table reports the results of two-tailed t-tests andWilcoxon rank-sum tests for the null hypothesis that there is no difference
in the means and medians between financial institutions with stronger and weaker corporate governance structures. The
stronger governance subsample consists of financial institutions with Corporate Governance Quotients in the top 30% and
the weaker governance subsample consists of institutions with Corporate Governance Quotients in the bottom 30% of the
sample. Marginal expected shortfall is the expected daily percentage decrease in equity value of a financial institution when
the aggregate stock market falls more than 2 percent, Systemic risk is the expected capital shortfall of a financial institution
in a crisis scenario, Corporate Governance Quotient is the Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ) index issued by Institutional
Shareholder Services (ISS), Board Quotient is a CGQ sub-index which measures the strength of the board of directors, Size is
measured as the logarithm of total assets, Capital ratio is the ratio of equity to total assets, Return on assets is the ratio of net
income to total assets, Loans to assets is the ratio of net loans to totals assets, Loan growth is the percentage change in loans from
year t−1 to year t, Deposits to assets is the ratio of deposits to total assets, and Non-interest income is the ratio of non-interest
income to total income.
* Denote significance at the 0.10 level.
** Denote significance at the 0.05 level.
*** Denote significance at the 0.01 level.
and weaker governance subsamples, we perform two-tailed t-tests and Wilcoxon/Mann–Whitney
median testsunder thenull hypothesis that therearenodifferences in themeansandmediansbetween
the financial institutions with stronger and weaker corporate governance mechanisms.
The results of the univariate tests are reported in Table 3. As can be noted from the table, the differ-
ences inMES and SRISK between the two subsamples in terms of bothmeans andmedians are positive
and statistically significant. Hence, the univariate tests provide considerable evidence to suggest that
financial institutionswith stronger, more shareholder-focused corporate governancemechanisms are
associated with higher systemic risk. The differences in systemic risk measures between the two sub-
samples are also economically highly significant; the mean difference in SRISK between the stronger
andweaker governance subsamples is about 10.6 billionUSD.As an illustrationof thedifferences, Fig. 1
plots the values of SRISK for institutionswith stronger andweaker corporate governancemechanisms.
Regarding the control variables, the univariate tests in Table 3 indicate that financial institutions with
stronger governance practices are significantly larger, more highly levered, and have a lower amount
of loans relative to total assets and a higher percentage of non-interest income.
4.3. Regression results
Weexamine the association between corporate governance and systemic risk by estimating several
alternative fixed-effects panel regressions of the following form:
Riski,t = ˛ + ˇ1Governancei,t−1 + ˇ2Sizei,t−1 + ˇ3Capital ratioi,t−1 + ˇ4Return on assetsi,t−1
+ ˇ5Loans to assetsi,t−1 + ˇ6Loan growthi,t−1 + ˇ7Deposits to assetsi,t−1
+ ˇ8Non-interest incomei,t−1 +
n−1∑
k=1
˛kFirmki +
2010∑
y=2006
ωyYear
y
i
+ εi,t
(5)
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Fig. 1. The figure plots the values of systemic risk (SRISK) for financial institutions with stronger and weaker corporate gover-
nance structures.
where the dependent variable Riski,t is one of the two alternative systemic risk measures for financial
institution i at time t. The first measure is MES calculated as the expected daily decrease in equity
value of a financial institution when the aggregate stock market falls more than 2 percent, while the
second measure is SRISK defined as the expected capital shortfall of a financial institution in a crisis
scenario. Governancej,t is either the CGQ which measures the strength of the institution’s corporate
governancemechanismsorBoardQwhichmeasures the strengthof theboardofdirectors.Wealsoesti-
mate modified versions of Eq. (5) in which we include an interaction variable Governance×Year2008
in order to examine the effect of corporate governance on systemic risk amidst the financial
crisis.
As discussed above,we include several firm-specific financial variables in the regressions to control
for the effects of observable characteristics of financial institutions that may affect the level systemic
risk. These control variables are defined as follows: Size is measured as the logarithm of total assets,
Capital ratio is the ratio of equity to total assets, Return on assets is the ratio of net income to total
assets, Loans to assets is the ratio of net loans to totals assets, Loan growth is the percentage change
in loans from year t−1 to year t, Deposits to assets is the ratio of deposits to total assets, and Non-
interest income is the ratio of non-interest income to total income. Finally, we control for potential
time fixed-effects with fiscal year dummy variables (Yeari) and we also estimate regression specifi-
cations with firm fixed-effects to account for omitted variables and unobservable firm-characteristics
(Firmi).
Table 4 reports the estimates of six alternative versions of Eq. (5) with the marginal expected
shortfall (MES) as the dependent variable. Models 1 and 4 are parsimonious models which include
only Size, Capital ratio, and Return on assets as the control variables, while Models 2 and 5 include
the full set of controls as well as year and firm fixed-effects. Finally, in Models 3 and 6, we
also include the financial crisis interaction variables CGQ×Year2008 and BoardQ×Year2008, respec-
tively. The adjusted R2s of the parsimonious models are about 45 percent, and the inclusion of the
additional control variables and firm fixed-effects increases the adjusted R2s to about 75 percent.
The F-statistics are statistically significant at the 1 percent level in all six alternative regression
specifications.
As can be seen from Table 4, the coefficient estimates for CGQ and BoardQ are positive and statis-
tically significant in Models 1, 3, 4, and 5, and also the coefficients for the crisis interaction variables
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in Models 3 and 6 are positive and statistically highly significant. Hence, consistent with the univari-
ate tests reported in Table 3, our regression results indicate that financial institutions with stronger,
more shareholder-focused corporate governance structures and boards of directors are associated
with higher systemic risk. This finding is broadly consistent with the previous literature on the effects
of corporate governance on traditionally used measures of bank risk-taking (see e.g., Pathan, 2009;
Fortin et al., 2010).
The coefficient estimate for CGQ in Model 1 suggests that a ten-point increase in the Corporate
Governance Quotient increases MES on average by approximately three basis points. Given that the
average book value of equity for the sample institutions is about 18 billion USD, a three basis point
increase in MES can be considered economically significant. Furthermore, the coefficients for Model
3 indicate that the overall positive association between CGQ and MES was statistically significantly
stronger amidst thefinancial crisis; the coefficient estimate for CGQ×Year2008 implies that a ten-point
increase in CGQ would be associated with a 12 basis point increase in MES in year 2008. The estimates
of Models 4 and 5 suggest that a one-point increase in BoardQ is associated with an economically
significant 4–7 basis point increase in MES. Regarding the control variables, the two-way fixed-effects
specification in Table 4 indicate that systemic risk is significantly negatively related to Capital ratio,
Return on assets, Loan to assets, and Loan growth, suggesting that financial institutions with lower
capital ratios, lower profitability, and lower amounts of outstanding loans have higher systemic risk.
The regression resultswith systemic risk (SRISK) as the dependent variable are presented in Table 5.
Similar to Table 4, we report the estimates of six alternative versions of Eq. (5). The adjusted R2s of
these regressions vary from30percent to 53 percent and the F-statistics are significant at the 1 percent
level, indicating a good fit of the estimated models. Again, the test variable of interest in Models 1–3 is
CGQ,while inModels 4–6weuseBoardQas the governancemeasure. Overall, the estimateswith SRISK
as the dependent variable are very similar to the MES results reported in Table 4. Most importantly,
the coefficient estimates for CGQ and BoardQ are positive and statistically significant in every model
specification, and thereby provide further evidence to suggest that financial institutions with stronger
corporate governance mechanisms and more shareholder-oriented boards of directors are associated
with higher systemic risk.
In addition to being statistically significant, the results in Table 5 can be considered economically
significant. The coefficient estimates for the parsimonious Models 1 and 4, for instance, suggest that a
10-point increase in CGQ increases SRISK on average by 950 million USD and that a one-point increase
in BoardQ is associated with a 2.36 billion USD increase in SRISK. Furthermore, similar to Table 4, the
coefficient estimates for the interaction variables CGQ×Year2008 and BoardQ×Year2008 are positive
and statistically highly significant in Models 3 and 6, indicating that the positive association between
good corporate governance and systemic risk was particularly strong amidst the financial crisis in
2008. With respect to the control variables, it can be noted from Table 5 that the level of systemic risk
is affected, at least to some extent, by Size, Capital ratio, Return on assets, and Deposits to assets.
Overall, the regression results reported Tables 4 and 5 as well as the univariate tests in Table 3
provide strong evidence that financial institutions with stronger and more shareholder-focused cor-
porate governance mechanisms and boards of directors are associated with higher levels of systemic
risk. Given that corporate governance is essentially a mechanism for controlling risk-taking, it may
appear somewhat counterintuitive that financial institutions with stronger governance mechanisms
have higher systemic risk. It has been argued in the prior literature (e.g., Mehran et al., 2011; Beltratti
& Stulz, 2012; de Haan & Vlahu, 2015) that strong, shareholder-friendly governance practices may
motivate excessive risk-taking in the financial industry in order to increase shareholders’ wealth. Our
empirical findings provide support to this argument.
4.4. Additional tests
We perform a number of additional tests to examine the robustness of our empirical findings. First,
in order to mitigate concerns related to endogeneity and reverse causality, we estimate alternative
regression specifications to test whether the percentage change in systematic risk from year t−1 to
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year t is influenced by the strength of governance mechanisms in year t−19. Consistent with the risk
culture hypothesis of Fahlenbrach et al. (2012), we assume that corporate governance mechanisms
have a long-term effect on the risk-taking culture of financial institutions that may cause measures of
systemic risk to increase or decrease over time.
Table 6 reports the estimates of eight alternative versions of Eq. (5) inwhich the percentage change
in systemic risk is used as the dependent variable10. In Models 1–4, the dependent variable is the per-
centage change in MES, while in Models 5–8 we use the percentage change in SRISK as the dependent
variable. The estimates of these change regressions are qualitatively similar to our main analysis, and
thereby provide further evidence that strong corporate governance mechanisms may have a posi-
tive effect on systemic risk, at least amidst financial market turmoil. As can be noted from Table 6,
the coefficient estimates for the interaction variables CGQ×Year2008 and BoardQ×Year2008 are pos-
itive and statistically highly significant in Models 2, 4, 6, and 8. These estimates indicate that the
increase in systemic risk during the financial crisis was higher for financial institutions with more
shareholder-oriented governance mechanisms and boards. Interestingly, however, the coefficients
for CGQ and BoardQ are insignificant in the models without the financial crisis interactions while
being negative and statistically significant in the models which include the interaction terms. The
negative coefficients for CGQ and BoardQ are smaller in magnitude than the coefficient estimates for
the interactions terms, suggesting that overall effect of strong governance on the percentage change
in systemic risk was positive in 2008. In general, consistent with our main analysis, the estimates
of the change regressions suggest that the association between governance mechanisms and sys-
temic risk is notably affected by the financial crisis. In addition to the corporate governance variables,
it is worth noting from Table 6 that the percentage changes in MES are positively associated with
Loans to assets and Growth, while the changes in SRISK are strongly negatively related to Return on
assets.
To further address concerns related to reverse causality, we follow the approach of Jo and Harjoto
(2012) to investigate the causal effect of lagged CGQ and BoardQ on MES and SRISK as well as the
inverted causal effect of lagged MES and SRISK on CGQ and BoardQ. These additional regression
estimates (not tabulated) indicate that both the first and the second lags of the corporate gov-
ernance measures are statistically significantly positively related to our systemic risk measures,
while the lagged systemic risk variables cannot explain the governance measures. This suggests
that the direction of causation is from corporate governance to systemic risk and not vice versa.
We also re-estimate alternative versions of Eq. (5) using the second lags of CGQ and BoardQ. The
estimates of these regressions are consistent with our main analysis and indicate that also longer
lags of the corporate governance variables are positively associated with the level of systemic
risk.
Third, to ensure that our results are not affected by multicollinearity, we estimate constrained
versions of Eq. (5) from which either Capital Ratio or Return on Assets is excluded as well as specifi-
cations from which either Loans to assets or Non-interest income is excluded11. As can be noted from
Table 2, the correlation coefficient between Capital Ratio and Return on Assets is 0.45, while Loans
to assets and Non-interest income are strongly negatively correlated with a correlation coefficient
of −0.70. The estimates of the constrained regression specifications (not tabulated) are consistent
with our main regressions and indicate a positive association between the corporate governance vari-
ables and the two measures of systemic risk. Hence, we conclude that our results are not driven by
multicollinearity.
9 As noted in the survey bydeHaan andVlahu (2015), governancemechanisms and especially board characteristics have often
been treated as exogenous variables in the literature despite that there are theoretical arguments as well as empirical evidence
suggesting that governance structures are endogenous. Adams et al. (2010), for instance, argue that corporate governance
mechanisms are largely endogenous.
10 The change regressions reported in Table 6 do not include firm fixed-effects. A large proportion of the changes in MES and
SRISK can be explained by firm fixed-effects and the coefficients for the corporate governance variables become statistically
insignificant at the conventional significance levels when firm fixed-effects are included in the regressions.
11 VIF tests suggest that our regression results should not be influenced by multicollinearity as all the VIF values are
below 5.
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Fourth, in order to examine whether our results are driven by outliers or extreme observations,
we winsorize the systemic risk measures at the 5th and 95th percentiles and re-estimate the regres-
sions using these winsorized dependent variables. The estimation results (not tabulated) based on the
winsorized systemic risk measures are qualitatively consistent with our main analysis, and thereby
suggest that our findings are not caused by outliers. Specifically, the coefficient estimates for CGQ and
BoardQ are positive and statistically significant in most of the alternative regressions specifications,
indicating that financial institutionswith stronger governancemechanisms are associatedwith higher
systemic risk.
Fifth, we investigate the sensitivity of our results to potential firm-size effects. For this purpose,
we re-estimate the regressions using two subsamples from which either the largest 10 percent or the
smallest 10 percent of the financial institutions have been excluded (not tabulated). The estimation
results for the subsample without the smallest institutions are very similar to the results reported in
Tables 4 and 5. However, for the subsample from which the largest financial institutions are excluded,
the coefficient estimates for CGQ and BoardQ are positive but appear statistically insignificant in most
specifications. This suggests that our findings are, at least to some extent, induced by the largest
financial institutions in the sample.
Sixth, to examine whether our results are sensitive to the sample period used in the analysis,
we re-estimate the regressions using three truncated samples from which the first sample year
2005, the crisis year 2008, or the last sample year 2010 has been excluded. The estimates of the
regressions based on the truncated samples (not tabulated) are very similar to our main find-
ings, and once again indicate a strong positive relation between systemic risk and the strength
of corporate governance. In the truncated samples without either 2005 or 2010, the coefficient
estimates for CGQ and BoardQ are consistently positive and statistically significant in most of the
alternative regression specifications. When the crisis year of 2008 is excluded from the sample,
the coefficient estimates for CGQ and BoardQ are positive and statistically highly significant in the
regressions with SRISK as the dependent variable. However, in the regressions with MES as the
dependent variable, the coefficients for CGQ and BoardQ are positive but statistically insignificant,
with the only exception being the coefficient for BoardQ which is significant at the 1 percent level in
the specification corresponding to Model (4) in Table 5. Overall, the estimates based on the trun-
cated samples suggest that the positive association between corporate governance mechanisms
and systemic risk is weaker if the severe financial market turmoil of 2008 is excluded from the
sample.
To further examine the potential effects of the financial crisis on our results, we re-estimate the
regressions without “troubled” financial institutions. The “troubled” institutions are defined as insti-
tutions which either failed or reported losses in excess of two percent of total assets during the crisis.
Again, the estimates of these additional regressions (not tabulated) are very similar to our main analy-
sis. Most importantly, the coefficients for CGQ and BoardQ appear positive and statistically significant
in most of the alternative model specifications.
Finally, we acknowledge that our sample contains very different types of financial institutions.
In order to examine whether our findings are affected by the diversity of the institutions, we re-
estimate the regressions using a sample which is constrained to commercial banks and other lending
institutions with net loans to totals assets ratio of at least 30 percent. The estimates (not tabu-
lated) based on the restricted sample of financial institutions are similar to the results reported in
Tables 4 and 5, and thereby provide further evidence that institutions with stronger corporate gover-
nance mechanisms are associated with higher systemic risk. Hence, we conclude that our results
are robust to the exclusion of investment banks and non-bank financial services firms from the
sample.
5. Conclusions
Corporate governance practices are seen by politicians and regulators as at least partially responsi-
ble for the recent financial crisis (see e.g., Kirkpatrick, 2009; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,
2010; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2010;Haldane, 2012). Therefore,we examine
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the relationship between corporate governance and the systemic risk of financial institutions around
the financial crisis of 2008. Systemic risk can be roughly defined as a financial institution’s contribu-
tion to the overall riskiness of the financial system. During periods of financial turmoil, the failure
of one financial institution may more easily affect others and eventually the whole financial system.
Thus, systemic risk may be a more appropriate risk measure than stand-alone risk (see e.g., Anginer
et al., 2014). In our empirical analysis, we use the systemic risk measures proposed by Acharya et al.
(2012) as a proxy for the systemic risk of large, publicly traded U.S. financial institutions and utilize
the Corporate Governance Quotient as well as the Board Quotient issued by Institutional Shareholder
Services to measure the strength of corporate governance mechanisms and board oversight within
financial institutions.
Our empirical findings indicate that financial institutions with stronger corporate governance
mechanisms and more shareholder-friendly boards are associated with higher levels of systemic risk.
Hence, our results suggest that goodcorporate governancemayencourage rather thanconstrain exces-
sive risk-taking in the financial industry.Webelieve that the results reported in this paper offer several
important implications. Most importantly, our results demonstrate that “good” corporate governance
mechanisms in the financial sector may not be enough to constrain risk-taking and to prevent finan-
cial crises in the future. On the contrary, regulators and policy makers who have been charged with
implementing reforms of the financial industry should take a more careful approach to corporate
governance mechanisms and consider that good governance may potentially have unintended effects
on risk-taking of financial institutions. When shaping solutions for influencing the future behavior of
banks, it is of importance to acknowledge that shareholder-focused governance structures may cre-
ate considerable negative externalities on the financial system by increasing the aggregate level of
systemic risk.
Overall, our results suggest that banking supervisors and regulators should apply more strin-
gent monitoring to financial institutions with strong, shareholder-oriented corporate governance
mechanisms in order to assess their contribution toward systemic risk. More generally, given the
negative social consequences that the excessive risk-taking of major financial institutions can have
on the global financial and economic conditions, our findings provide grounds for challenging the
appropriateness of the traditional shareholder-oriented corporate governance model in the financial
industry. Because of the importance of financial institutions for the society, appropriately designed
governance mechanisms should ensure that the risk-taking incentives are better aligned with the
interests of other stakeholders such as depositors, debt holders, banking supervisors, and the society in
general.
There are several limitations in our empirical analysis that should be addressed in future
research. First, our sample is relatively small and limited to 71 large U.S. financial institutions
and a six-year period around the global financial crisis. The small sample of large, publicly traded
U.S. institutions may limit the generalizability of our results. Moreover, we acknowledge that
the positive association between corporate governance mechanisms and systemic risk is induced,
at least to some extent, by the severe financial market turmoil of 2008. It is possible that the
relationship between governance mechanisms and systemic risk is different in more normal finan-
cial conditions. Therefore, it would be interesting to extend the analysis to a large sample of
international banks and also to utilize a longer sample period. Given that corporate governance
structures change rather slowly, a longer sample period would also allow to analyze whether
changes in governance mechanisms affect the level of systemic risk. Finally, while our empiri-
cal findings demonstrate a strong linkage between two aggregate corporate governance measures
and systemic risk, it would be of interest to examine how and through which channels specific
governance structures and observable board characteristics influence the systemic risk of financial
institutions.
Appendix A.
See Table A1.
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Table A1
List of financial institutions.
1 American Express
2 Associated Banc-Corp.
3 Bank of America
4 Bank of Hawaii
5 Bank of New York Mellon
6 BB&T
7 BBVA Compass Bancshares
8 Bear Stearns
9 BGC Partners
10 BOK Financial
11 Capital One Financial
12 Capitol Federal Financial
13 Charles Schwab
14 Citigroup
15 City National
16 Comerica
17 Commerce Bancshares
18 Countrywide
19 Cullen/Frost Bankers
20 East West Bancorp
21 Fannie Mae
22 Fifth Third Bancorp
23 First Citizens BancShares
24 First Horizon National
25 First Niagara Financial
26 Franklin Resources
27 Fulton Financial
28 Goldman Sachs
29 Hancock
30 Hudson City Bancorp
31 Jefferies Group
32 JP Morgan Chase & Co.
33 KeyCorp
34 Legg Mason
35 Lehman Brothers
36 M&T Bank
37 Marshall & Ilsley
38 Merrill Lynch & Co.
39 Metlife
40 Morgan Stanley
41 National City
42 New York Community Bancorp
43 Northern Trust
44 PNC Financial Services
45 Principal Financial Group
46 Prosperity Bancshares
47 Prudential Financial
48 Raymond James Financial
49 Regions Financial
50 SEI Investments
51 Signature Bank
52 Sallie Mae
53 Sovereign Bank
54 State Street
55 Stifel Financial
56 SunTrust
57 SVB Financial
58 Synovus Financial
59 T. Rowe Price Group
60 TCF Financial
61 TD Ameritrade
62 TransAtlantic
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Table A1 (Continued )
63 UMB Financial
64 UnionBanCal
65 US Bancorp
66 Valley National Bancorp
67 Washington Federal
68 Webster Financial
69 Wells Fargo
70 WMI Holdings
71 Zions Bancorporation
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1. Introduction 
“Corporate Governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporates assure themselves of getting return on their investment.” 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p. 737) 
Agency theory posits corporate managers may pursue their own interests rather 
than maximizing shareholders’ value and thus create a conflict of interest. This 
agency behavior stems from the view that corporate managers may be more risk 
averse than shareholders because they want to protect their undiversified human 
capital and investment in the firm. Shareholder-friendly corporate governance 
mechanisms can influence the behavior of managers and change their willingness 
to take on more risk.1 In this regard, John, Litov, and Young (2008) show that the 
shareholder-friendliness of corporate governance mechanisms encourages risk-
taking and promotes the growth of non-financial firms. More recently, in the wake 
of the financial crisis, several studies have shed light on the role of corporate 
governance towards risk-taking and financial performance of financial institutions 
(Adams, 2012; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Peni and Vahamaa, 2012). 
Specifically, several studies focus on risk taking by financial institutions especially 
during the recent global financial crisis (Pathan, 2009; Laeven and Levine, 2009; 
Berger, Kick, and Schaeck, 2014; Iqbal, Strobl and Vahamaa, 2015). Overall, these 
studies suggest more, deemed inappropriate, risk taking by financial institutions 
during the financial crisis. Thus, stronger corporate governance practices may 
encourage increased risk-taking in the financial industry (Erkens, et al., 2012: 
Iqbal et al., 2015) which may lead to the default of financial institution, especially 
during the periods of financial distress. Therefore, in this paper, we investigate 
whether the corporate governance affects the insolvency risk of financial 
institutions. 
‘Stronger’ corporate governance not only affects the performance of the firms, 
measured by Tobin’s Q (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003; Brown and Caylor, 
2006; Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2009; Ammann et al., 2011) but also encourages 
                                                        
1  For instance, shareholder-friendly corporate governance mechanisms can be better 
investor protection, high number of independent board of directors, separation of the 
chairman and the CEO, not having poison pill in place etc.  
Because shareholders do not internalize the social costs associated with failures of financial 
institutions, they may find it optimal to increase the level of risk. Furthermore, the 
shareholders and investors expect the government to bailout the large financial institutions 
in case of their failures (Acharya, Anginer and Warburton, 2016). However, managers tend 
to have a lower level of risk than those of the shareholders because of their firm-specific 
human capital and investment in the firm (Laeven and Levine, 2009; Erkens, Hung and 
Matos, 2012). 
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increased risk-taking that results in higher growth of firms (John et al., 2008).2 
However, for financial institutions, the optimal degree of risk taking is higher than 
for non-financial firms because market expect government support for financial 
institutions if they become distressed. Implicit and explicit government guarantees 
encourage financial institutions to take more risks (see Acharya, Anginer and 
Warburton, 2016). 3 In addition, shareholder-friendly governance mechanisms 
may further encourage adopting riskier corporate policies (Chava and 
Purnanadam, 2010) which may, in turn, lead to higher insolvency risk in financial 
institutions. In contrast to non-financial firms, expectation of government support 
in times of distress, implicit and explicit government guarantees, provide a unique 
environment to consider financial institutions separately (Acharya et al., 2016; 
Zhao, 2018) because stronger corporate governance mechanisms in financial 
institutions can lead to greater risk taking (Erkens et al., 2012; Anginer, Demirguc-
Kunt, Huizinga, and Ma, 2014).4 Therefore, we hypothesize that strong corporate 
governance mechanisms are positively associated with insolvency risk of financial 
institutions. 
To test the hypothesis, we utilize the comprehensive data on the U.S. financial 
institutions from 2005 to 2010, thus including the period of recent financial crisis 
which previous studies excluded. We use Corporate Governance Quotient and Sub-
Quotients (namely Board Quotient, Compensation Quotient, Audit Quotient and 
Takeover Quotient) issued by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) to measure 
the strength of corporate governance mechanisms. To capture insolvency risk, we 
use traditional (i.e., distance to default) and innovative market based (i.e., credit 
default swap (CDS) spread) measures. Recent studies (e.g., Bolton, Mehran, and 
Shapiro, 2015) utilize CDS spread to proxy insolvency risk and suggest that it is 
preferable because it also accounts for creditors risk (Colonnello, 2017; Feldhutter, 
Hotchkiss, and Karakas, 2016).5 Despite a growing literature on the examination 
of the role of CDS spreads in understanding corporate finance issues, surprisingly 
                                                        
2  Corporate governance mechanisms and the board of directors are considered to be 
stronger and more shareholder-friendly when they provide effective monitoring and 
stronger protection of shareholder’s interests, and more generally, better alignment of 
managers’ interests with those of the shareholders. Adams (2012) and de Haan and Vlahu 
(2016) provide comprehensive discussions about the corporate governance of financial 
institutions and the elements of “good” governance. 
3  Implicit government guarantee is the expectation by market participants that the 
government may provide bailout (Acharya et al., 2016). It is referred as implicit because 
government does not explicitly provide commitment to intervene. Implicit government 
guarantees are not limited to only banks but also for other financial institutions (Zhao, 
2018). 
4 For instance, Acharya et al. (2016) find that bondholders of the financial institutions, 
especially large ones, expect that the government will protect them in case of failure of 
financial institution. 
5 Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005) and Norden and Weber (2009) find that CDSs are, 
also, a more accurate and informative measure of credit risk. 
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little is known about the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms 
and CDS spreads. We contribute to this literature by empirically examining 
whether the strength of corporate governance mechanisms affects CDS spreads for 
financial institutions.  
In summary, we find that the insolvency risk of financial institutions, proxied by 
either its market-based distance to default or CDS spread, is positively associated 
with the shareholder-friendliness of its corporate governance. Further, this 
positive association between corporate governance and insolvency risk is more 
important for larger financial institutions and during the financial crisis. Our 
findings are broadly consistent with the prior literature on risk-taking by financial 
institutions (see e.g., Pathan, 2009; Fortin, Goldberg and Roth, 2010; Beltratti and 
Stulz, 2012; Erkens et al., 2012). These findings suggest that stronger corporate 
governance mechanisms may encourage more risk-taking in the financial industry. 
A potential explanation for these results is that shareholder-friendly boards of 
directors encouraged managers to take more risks to increase shareholder return, 
prior to the crisis (Laeven and Levine, 2009).6 According to DeYoung, Peng, and 
Yan (2013) argue that prior to the global financial crisis (during 2000–2006), CEO 
compensation in banks was changed which encouraged more risk-taking. Because 
financial institutions are entering into activities that are more complex and have 
broadened their scope, this effect may have been amplified in recent years, making 
it difficult for regulators to keep pace with the changes. Our results are 
economically significant and robust to several additional analyses, including 
propensity score matching to mitigate the concerns regarding endogeneity.    
Our study is not the first to establish a link between corporate governance and 
insolvency risk of financial institutions. For instance, Anginer et al. (2014) find 
that shareholder-friendly corporate governance mechanisms are associated with 
greater insolvency risk (i.e., lower Z-score and distance to default) for a sample of 
international banks. However, our study differs from their study in multiple 
aspects. First, they do not test the impact of global financial crisis on governance–
insolvency nexus. Second, their sample only includes large banks and does not 
consider other types of financial institutions. Third, their measure of insolvency 
risk does not include credit default swap spread. Some other studies also examine 
the governance-default linkage but provide contrasting evidence. Using a sample 
of Canadian financial institutions over the period of 2010 to 2013 (post crisis), 
Switzer, Wang and Zhang (2016) find that large and more independent boards 
have higher default risk as measured through distance to default. While in 
contrast, Switzer and Wang (2013) provide evidence that U.S. commercial banks 
                                                        
6  Majority of the directors on the shareholder-friendly boards should be independent 
(Adams and Mehran, 2012). 
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with larger and more independent boards have lower levels of default risk during 
the period from 2001 to 2007, that is, prior to the global financial crisis. With these 
mixed results, the issue of whether the strength of corporate governance 
mechanisms affects the insolvency risk for financial institutions is still an 
empirical matter.7 It is therefore imperative to empirically examine the association 
between the shareholder-friendliness of corporate governance mechanisms and 
insolvency risk of financial institutions, especially around the period of the recent 
global financial crisis. 
We contribute to the literature in the following ways. First, we contribute to the 
literature in corporate finance that relates firm-level characteristics to the failure 
of financial institutions. Previous contributions to this literature mostly emphasize 
investigating the influence of accounting variables on financial institutions’ failure 
probabilities. Some of the earliest works in this literature stream are Meyer and 
Pfifer (1970), Martin (1977), and Whalen and Thomson (1988). These studies 
mainly find that low capitalization results in poor bank performance and increased 
failure probability. Furthermore, a few studies investigate the factors that drive 
bank failures during the global financial crisis (see Aubuchon and Wheelock, 2010; 
Cole and White, 2012; Berger and Bouwman, 2012; Ng and Roychowdhury, 2014). 
Aubuchon and Wheelock (2010) show that economic downturns play an important 
role in bank failures during the crisis period. Cole and White (2012) investigate 
how accounting-based variables contributed to the bank failures in 2009. Berger 
and Bouwman (2012) find that bank equity capital is important for the survival of 
banks (especially smaller banks) during periods of crisis. Ng and Roychowdhury 
(2014) find that during the period of the recent financial crisis loan loss reserves 
added back as regulatory capital were positively associated with bank failures. 
However, studies on the role of corporate governance in the failure of financial 
institutions are relatively scarce. For instance, Berger, Imbierowicz, and Rauch 
(2016) investigate the role of bank ownership and compensation structures in bank 
failures during the recent global financial crisis. We contribute by showing that 
strength of corporate governance mechanisms plays an important role in the 
insolvency risk of financial institutions.  
Second, we contribute to the literature on the effects of corporate governance on 
risk taking in financial institutions (see Laeven and Levine, 2009; Pathan, 2009; 
Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Erkens et al, 2012; Peni and 
                                                        
7 Even for non-financial firms, studies find contradictory evidences. For instance, Chiang, 
Chung and Huang (2015) find that corporate governance is associated with bankruptcy 
possibility whereas Schultz, Tan and Walsh (2017) find no relationship between probability 
of default and corporate governance characteristics.  
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Vahamaa, 2012; Berger et al., 2014; Iqbal et al., 2015).8 These studies mainly find 
that shareholder-friendly corporate governance mechanisms encourage more risk-
taking in the financial industry. For instance, Pathan (2009) finds that board size 
can affect the risk-taking in banks and find that banks with larger boards take less 
risk. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) find that better alignment of bank CEO 
incentives with the interests of shareholders can negatively affect the bank’s 
performance. Iqbal et al. (2015) find that financial institutions with more 
shareholder-friendly governance mechanisms are associated with higher levels of 
systemic risk. Building on these studies, we relate corporate governance to 
insolvency risk for a large sample of U.S financial institutions.  
We particularly focus on the association between corporate governance and 
insolvency risk amidst the recent financial crisis. As far as we know, this is one of 
the few studies to show the relevance of corporate governance to a financial 
institution’s insolvency risk especially in the context of the recent global financial 
crisis. We show that strong governance mechanisms significantly affect the 
insolvency risk of financial institutions. We also find that strong corporate 
governance increases insolvency risk especially for the large financial institutions 
in times of distress that may contribute to the instability in the overall financial 
system. Then, we show that financial institutions with strong boards have a greater 
insolvency risk. We believe that connecting board strength to insolvency risk is 
relevant because the existing literature does not provide a satisfactory answer 
regarding the role of boards in controlling the agency relationship (see e.g., Adams 
et al., 2010; de Haan and Vlahu, 2016). Further, most of the previous studies on 
board effectiveness do not include financial institutions in their sample (see 
Adams et al., 2010).9 We also confirm the previous literature (Adams and Mehran, 
2012) that in the financial industry, restrictions on board size can be counter-
productive. Lastly, building on the earlier contributions, we utilize the market-
based CDS spread data to proxy insolvency risk, which also accounts for credit risk.  
                                                        
8  Mehran, Morrison and Shapiro (2011) survey studies investigating the relationship 
between corporate governance and measures of risk. 
9 Most of the studies before GFC excluded financial firms from their sample because they 
were considered highly regulated. The additional regulatory oversight maybe viewed as a 
substitute (John, Mehran and Qian, 2010; Adams and Mehran, 2012) for corporate 
governance in financial institutions. However, governance of financial institutions may be 
different from that of non-financial firms because of several reasons. For instance, financial 
institutions have larger number of stakeholders which complicates the governance of 
financial institutions. Apart from investors and depositors, regulators also have stake in 
the performance of financial institution because performance of financial institutions can 
also affect the health of the overall economy (Adams and Mehran, 2012). Implicit and 
explicit government guarantees provide financial institutions a different risk environment 
that are not applicable to non-financial firms. Therefore, it is important to consider 
financial institutions separately. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and 
explains the variables used in the empirical analysis. Section 3 presents the 
methods, and reports the empirical findings on the association between corporate 
governance mechanisms and the insolvency risk of financial institutions. Finally, 
the last section concludes with policy implications. 
2. Data and variables
In this study, we investigate the relationship of corporate governance mechanisms 
and insolvency risk for a sample of 556 publicly traded U.S. financial institutions 
over the 2005–2010 period. To empirically examine the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and insolvency risk, we collect data on 
corporate governance mechanisms from the Corporate Governance Quotient 
database developed by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). Insolvency risk 
data is collected from the Credit Research Initiative (CRI) database managed by 
the Risk Management Institute (RMI) at the National University of Singapore.10 
Lastly, data on financial statement and balance sheet variables is collected from 
BankScope of Bureau Van Dijk.  
Starting from the entire population of U.S. banks and diversified financials (950 
financial institutions) in Corporate Governance Quotient database, 11  we first 
identify the financial institutions for which the insolvency risk data (distance to 
default and credit default swap spread) is available from the RMI-CRI database. 
Doing so, we are left with 650 financial institutions. We then eliminate the 
financial institutions from our sample that have insufficient data on financial 
statement and balance sheet variables found in BankScope. This leaves us with a 
final sample of 556 individual financial institutions and an unbalanced panel of 
2126 firm-year observations.12 
10  RMI-CRI database covers over 60,000 listed firms in Asia Pacific, North America, 
Europe, Latin America, the Middle East and Africa. The RMI-CRI database provides 
historical time series of individual distance to default on a monthly frequency at the firm 
level. Thus, monthly frequency of individual distance to default requires an adjustment to 
annual frequency to be consistent with other variables. 
11 ISS classification is based on S&P “GICS” (Global Industry Classification System). We 
download all firm-year observations for banks and diversified financials (GICS code of 
4010 and 4020 respectively). These include diversified banks, regional banks, thrifts & 
mortgage finance, multi-sector holdings, specialized finance, other diversified financial 
services, consumer finance, asset management & custody banks, investment banking & 
brokerage, diversified capital markets, financial exchanges & data, and mortgage real 
estate investment trusts. 
Almost 75 percent of these financial institutions are categorized as Banks in Corporate 
Governance Quotient Database.  
12 Almost 91 percent of the financial institutions are categorized as Banks in the final 
sample.  
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2.1. Insolvency risk measures 
The dependent variable in our study is the insolvency risk (Insolvency Risk). Since 
the seminal work of Beaver (1966), a number of accounting and market-based 
insolvency prediction models have been developed in the literature. The validity of 
accounting-based models has been questioned due to the backward-looking nature 
of the financial statements from which these models are derived (Agarwal and 
Taffler, 2008). Market-based models using the option pricing approach developed 
by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) provide an appealing alternative 
to the prediction of insolvency conditions of listed firms and have been used in 
extant empirical studies (e.g., Hillegeist et al., 2004; Bharath and Shumway, 2008; 
Charitou et al., 2013). Such a methodological approach overcomes the criticisms 
of accounting-based models through the forward-looking nature of market data. 
Market data reflect expectations of a firm’s future cash flows, and hence should be 
more appropriate for prediction purposes. Another prevalent feature of such 
models is their provision of a “finer” volatility assessment that aids in predicting 
the risk of insolvency (Beaver et al., 2005).13 Empirical studies such as Hillegeist 
et al. (2004) recommend that researchers use market-based models of default 
prediction since these models contain more information about default than 
accounting-based models. We therefore use the market-based Merton (1974) 
distance to default (DD) and credit default swap (CDS) spread as measures of 
insolvency risk (see appendix A: general procedure to calculate DD). Much like 
typical insurance, CDS is a financial contract.14  
In a typical CDS contract, the protection seller offers the protection buyer 
insurance against the default of an underlying bond issued by a certain company 
(the reference entity). In the event of default by the reference entity, the seller 
commits to buy the bond for a price equal to its face value from the protection 
buyer.15 In exchange for the insurance, the buyer pays a quarterly premium, called 
the CDS spread, quoted as an annualized percentage of the notional value insured. 
Therefore, by definition, the CDS spread is the pricing of the insolvency risk (Das 
et al., 2009). The higher the insolvency risk of the reference entity, the larger is the 
CDS spread. Tang and Yan (2010) find that the CDS spread captures the major 
                                                        
13 Volatility is a critical factor in predicting default risk since it captures the probability that 
the value of a firm’s assets will decrease to such a point that the firm will be unable to repay 
its debt obligations. Ceteris paribus, the higher the volatility, the higher is the default risk. 
Depending on asset volatilities, two firms with identical leverage ratios can have 
substantially different chances of financial distress. Therefore, measures of volatility 
should be incorporated in financial distress models. 
14 “The contract defines a reference instrument (a bond) issued by some reference entity 
(the obligor)” (Duan, 2014, p. 51). 
15 In practice, the terms of the CDS could involve physical delivery of the defaulted bond or 
cash settlement. 
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portion of the firm level determinants of insolvency risk. Thus, the CDS spread 
should serve as a valid and robust measure of a firm’s insolvency conditions.  
In this paper, we download the CDS spread data from the “Credit Research 
Initiative (CRI)” platform of the National University of Singapore (NUS). 
However, they refer it to as “actuarial spread”.16 Actuarial spread is constructed on 
the design of traditional CDS but without upfront fee. Further, construction of 
actuarial spread is based on the assumption that market participants are risk-
neutral that is why no upfront fee is initially required. Therefore, actuarial spread 
has the same features as the standard CDS spread. 
2.2. Corporate governance measures 
In this paper, we utilize the Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ) index which 
measures the strength of corporate governance mechanisms and is issued by 
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS).17 We obtain these data from RiskMetrics 
Group. CGQ is comprehensive corporate governance index comprised of 67 
different firm-related characteristics including internal and external governance. 
The CGQ includes information about the board of directors, ownership structure, 
directors’ education, audit committees, executive compensation structure, 
charter/bylaws, and form of incorporation. This data is obtained from surveys 
conducted by the ISS, company websites, and public filings. The values of CGQ 
ranges from 0 to 100, with higher values corresponding to stronger, more 
shareholder-focused corporate governance mechanisms.  
In addition to the aggregate governance measure CGQ, we use four sub-indices, 
called board, compensation and ownership, auditing, and takeover that 
summarize aspects of corporate governance. The takeover sub-index, for instance, 
has a higher score, if there are fewer corporate governance-related barriers to 
takeovers. These sub-indices take values from 1 to 5, with higher values 
representing stronger, more shareholder-friendly mechanisms.  
2.3. Control variables 
Following prior literature on bank risk-taking (e.g., Pathan, 2009; Fortin et al., 
2010; Brunnermeier et al., 2012; Berger et al., 2014; Mayordomo et al., 2014; Iqbal 
et al., 2015), we control for several institution-specific variables that may influence 
the insolvency risk of the financial institutions, specifically firm size, profitability, 
                                                        
16 This paper uses CDS spread terminology for ease of understanding.   
17 The ISS Corporate Governance Quotient been previously used as a proxy for the strength 
of corporate governance, for instance, in Chhaochharia and Laeven (2009), Ertugrul and 
Hegde (2009), and Peni, Smith and Vahamaa (2013). 
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growth, and the structures of assets and income. When comparing financial 
institutions, size is the most important control variable. Larger financial 
institutions may pursue riskier corporate policies (Brunnermeier et al. 2012). The 
size (Size) variable is constructed as the natural logarithm of total assets.  
In addition to Size, we account for the institution’s financial performance, growth, 
and asset and income structure. We measure financial performance with Return 
on assets which is calculated as the ratio of net income to total assets. Growth is 
measured as the percentage change in the amount of outstanding loans from last 
year to this year. We control for the institution’s business model and asset 
structure with the ratio of net loans to total assets (Loans to assets) and the ratio 
of deposits to total assets (Deposits to assets). Finally, we use the ratio of non-
interest income to total income (Non-interest income) to control for the level of 
income diversification and non-traditional banking activities. 
In previous literature, capital ratio (or leverage ratio) is used when comparing 
financial institutions. However, in this study, we do not control for capital ratio as 
the construction of DD and CDS preclude it.18 The construction of DD is based on 
the Merton (1974) model which assumes that firms are financed by equity. 19  
Further, CRI computes CDS spread based on the term structure of probabilities of 
default.20 CRI adopts the forward intensity approach of Duan, Sun and Wang 
(2012) to characterize term structure of probabilities of default. Thus, CDS spread 
is based on a physical probability that makes inclusion of equity, as a control 
variable, problematic.21 In addition, capital ratio also serves as a proxy for the 
insolvency risk (Borisova, Fotak, Holland, Megginson, 2015). For instance, 
Anginer et al. (2014) do not control for capital ratio when using z-score and DD to 
proxy insolvency risk. The data on our control variables are obtained from Bureau 
van Dijk Bankscope. The definitions of variables are summarized in Table 1. 
(insert Table 1 about here) 
  
                                                        
18 Although our results are robust to inclusion of capital ratio as control variable.  
19 See Duan and Wang (2012) for the detail on measurement of distance to default.  
20 For instance, see Duan (2014) for the detail on construction of CDS 
21 In addition, previous studies (e.g. Baselga-Pascual, Trujillo-Ponce, Cardone-Riportella, 
2015) argue that regressing capital ratio on the insolvency risk (measured by Z-score and 
distance to default) may be problematic because banks can alter their capital if they become 
more risk.  
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3. Empirical analysis
3.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical 
analysis. Descriptive statistics show that our sample of financial institutions is 
quite heterogeneous in terms of corporate governance strength as CGQ varies from 
0.5 (minimum) to 100 (maximum) and has an average of 53.09. Further, the 
corporate governance sub-indices, board, compensation, audit, and takeover, also 
vary from lowest (0) to the highest (5) possible values suggesting that our sample 
of financial institutions is diverse in terms of the strength of corporate governance 
mechanisms. In addition to this, our sample is also quite heterogeneous in terms 
of insolvency risk. DD has a minimum value of -2.04 and a maximum value of 
11.78. Moreover, CDS varies from a minimum of -2.40 to a maximum of 7.89 with 
a mean value of 3.93. Table 2 also shows that our sample is also quite 
heterogeneous in terms of control variables. There is considerable variation in size, 
ranging from 12.7 million to 2.26 trillion USD.   
(insert Table 2 about here) 
Table 3 shows the pairwise correlations among the variables used in the analysis. 
It can be noted from the table that CGQ and governance sub-indices have a 
negative correlation with DD  and a positive correlation with CDS,22 suggesting 
better governed financial institutions have a greater level of insolvency risk. 
Moreover, as expected, the two insolvency risk variables, DD and CDS, are 
negatively correlated by construction (r=0.93). As the correlation results are not 
controlled by other factors that affect financial distress, they should be viewed with 
caution.23  
(insert Table 3 about here) 
3.2. Univariate tests 
We start by investigating the association between corporate governance and 
insolvency of financial institutions in a univariate setting. We do so by dividing our 
sample of financial institutions into two groups formed on the basis of the strength 
of corporate governance. The first group comprises financial institutions with 
stronger corporate governance structures, that is, financial institutions with CGQ 
values in the top 30 percent. The second group includes financial institutions with 
22 There is a significant negative correlation of CG variables with the components of DD i.e. 
asset volatility and equity volatility, suggesting that better governed firms are more volatile. 
23 We also observe a significant difference at the 1% level in the insolvency risk measures 
between the high CGQ firms and the low CGQ firms (results available on request). 
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weaker corporate governance structures, that is, those with CGQ values in bottom 
30 percent. We analyze the significance of the difference in means using two-tailed 
t-tests under the null hypothesis that there are no differences in the means 
between the financial institutions with stronger and weaker corporate governance 
structures. 
(insert Table 4 about here) 
We report the results of this analysis in Table 4. We find that the two groups are 
significantly different in many respects. First, the difference of means for Distance 
to Default is negative and statistically significant, and for CDS spread is positive 
and statistically significant. Thus, the univariate analysis provides evidence that 
financial institutions with stronger corporate governance mechanisms are 
associated with a higher level of insolvency risk. Regarding the control variables, 
the univariate tests in Table 4 indicate that financial institutions with stronger 
governance structures are significantly larger, and have a lower amount of loans 
relative to total assets and a higher percentage of non-interest income. 
3.3. Regression results 
We use panel data where insolvency risk is the dependent variable for the 
estimation of our model. Our baseline model to examine the association between 
corporate governance and insolvency risk follows several alternative panel 
regressions of the equation below: 
ܫ݊ݏ݋݈ݒ݁݊ܿݕܴ݅ݏ݇௜ǡ௧
ൌ ߙ ൅ߚଵܩ݋ݒ݁ݎ݊ܽ݊ܿ ௜݁ǡ௧ ൅ ߚଶܵ݅ݖ݁௜ǡ௧
൅ ߚଷܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊݋݊ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚସܮ݋ܽ݊ݏݐ݋ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜ǡ௧
൅ ߚହܮ݋ܽ݊ܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܦ݁݌݋ݏ݅ݐݏݐ݋ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜ǡ௧
൅ ߚ଻ܰ݋݊ െ ݅݊ݐ݁ݎ݁ݏݐ݅݊ܿ݋݉݁௜ǡ௧ ൅෍ߙ௞
௡ିଵ
௞ିଵ
ܻ݁ܽݎ௜௬ ൅ ߝ௜ǡ௧ 
(1) 
where the dependent variable Insolvency Riski,t is one of the two alternative 
measures of insolvency risk: the distance to default or CDS spread for financial 
institution i at time t. The distance to default measures the difference between the 
asset value of the financial institution and the face value of its debt, scaled by the 
standard deviation of the asset value (see Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi, 2008, 
p. 2899). Second, the CDS spread is the pricing of the financial distress risk (Das 
et al., 2009). CDS are credit derivatives that allow the transfer of the firm’s default 
risk between two agents for a predetermined time period. Governancej,t is either 
the CGQ which measures the overall strength of the institution’s corporate 
governance mechanisms or BoardQ which measures the strength of the board of 
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directors.24 In order to capture the effect of global financial crisis we also estimate 
modified versions of Equation (1) where we include the interaction variable 
Governance u GFC. Where GFC denotes the crisis year 2008. Further, we use the 
interaction variable Governance u Size to investigate the effect of the size of the 
financial institution.  
As discussed earlier, we use several firm-level variables in order to control for the 
effects of observable characteristics of financial institutions that may impact the 
insolvency risk. Control variables used in this study are consistent with the 
previous literature on the determinants of risk-taking in financial institutions 
(Laeven and Levine, 2009; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Bai and Elyasiani, 2013; Ellul 
and Yerramilli, 2013). Finally, the regressions also include firm and year fixed 
effects, and errors are clustered at the firm level. We also winsorize all the 
independent variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate potential outlier 
effects.25 
Table 5 reports the results for ten alternative versions of Equation (1) with the 
distance to default (DD) as the dependent variable. Models 1 and 6 include only 
Size and Return on assets as the control variables for the purpose of parsimony, 
whereas Models 2 and 7 include the full set of control variables and year fixed-
effects, and Models 3 and 8 include both year and firm fixed-effects along with the 
full set of control variables. Further, Models 4 and 9 include interaction variables 
CGQ u GFC and BoardQ u GFC, respectively to control for the global financial 
crisis. Lastly, in Models 5 and 10 we include size interaction variables CGQ u Size 
and BoardQ u Size, respectively. The adjusted R2s of all models are almost 50 
percent. The F-statistics for all the ten alternative regressions are statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level.  
(insert Table 5 about here) 
Table 5 shows that the overall corporate governance index has a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient in Models 1, 2 and 3. Board index has a negative 
and statistically significant coefficient in Models 6 and 7. These results suggest that 
more shareholder-friendly corporate governance and a more shareholder-friendly 
board increases insolvency risk of financial institutions. In Models 4 and 9, the 
negative coefficients for interaction variables, CGQ u GFC and BoardQ u GFC, 
                                                        
24 We further estimate several versions of Equation (1) where Governancej,t is one of the 
sub-indices namely; board index, compensation and ownership index, auditing index, and 
takeover index which summarizes information regarding different aspects of corporate 
governance. These results are reported in Tables 8 and 9. 
25 We follow Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) and winsorize the independent variables. Results 
are also robust to not winsorizing.  
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suggest that strong corporate governance and a more shareholder-friendly board 
is associated with increased insolvency risk during the period of the financial crisis. 
Hence, the positive association between insolvency risk and strong corporate 
governance may be driven by the global financial crisis. In Models 5 and 10, the 
coefficients for the size interaction variables, CGQ u Size and BoardQ u Size, are 
negative and statistically significant suggesting that positive association between 
strength of corporate governance and insolvency risk is particularly important for 
larger financial institutions. However, board index in Model 10 is positive and 
statistically significant suggesting that a more shareholder-friendly board reduces 
insolvency risk, especially in small financial institutions. This also suggests that 
larger financial institutions take on more risk as they benefit from a becoming 
bigger (Acharya et al, 2016; Zhao, 2018). 
 In summary, Table 5 indicates that financial institutions with stronger, more 
shareholder-friendly corporate governance mechanisms and boards of directors 
are associated with greater insolvency risk. Overall the findings reported in Table 
5 are broadly consistent with the literature on risk-taking by financial institutions 
(see e.g., Pathan, 2009; Fortin et al., 2010; de Haan and Vlahu, 2016; Iqbal et al., 
2015; Acharya et al., 2016; Zhao, 2018). Our results are also economically 
significant. For instance, with an increase in CGQ from 25th percentile to 75th 
percentile is associated with up to a 7.28 percent increase in the insolvency risk of 
financial institutions (see Table 7) and during the global financial crisis, the 
increase in insolvency risk rises to 7.81 percent. We gauge the effect of governance 
on insolvency risk by calculating the marginal effect of an increase of CGQ from 
the 25th to the 75th percentile and then multiply the difference by the coefficient.26 
We then divide this variation by the average insolvency risk.   
(insert Table 6 about here) 
Table 6 presents the regression estimates of Equation (1) with credit default swap 
spread (CDS) as the dependent variable. Regressions in this table are similar to 
those in Table 5 with estimates of ten alternative versions of Equations (1). Here, 
the adjusted R2s of these regressions vary from 45.1 percent to 51.7 percent. The F-
statistics are significant at the 1 percent level, which indicates a good fit for the 
estimated models. Again, the Governance variable in Models 1–5 is CGQ and in 
Models 6–10 is BoardQ. Overall, the regression estimates with CDS as dependent 
variable are similar to the DD results reported in Table 5. The coefficient estimates 
for CGQ and BoardQ in Table 6 are positively associated with CDS spread 
                                                        
26  We follow Chung, Elder and Kim (2010) to gauge the economic significance by 
calculating the marginal effect of an increase in the governance index from the 25th to 75th 
percentile.  
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indicating that stronger corporate governance mechanisms and more shareholder-
friendly boards of directors are associated with greater insolvency risk. In Models 
4 and 9, the positive coefficients for interaction variables, may suggest that the 
positive association between insolvency risk and strong corporate governance may 
be driven by the global financial crisis. In Models 5 and 10, the coefficients for the 
size interaction variables, CGQ u Size and BoardQ u Size, are positive and 
statistically significant, again, suggesting that positive association between 
strength of corporate governance and insolvency risk is particularly important for 
larger financial institutions.27 However, the overall governance index in Model 5 
and the board index in Model 10 have negative and statistically significant 
coefficients suggesting that strong corporate governance and a more shareholder-
friendly board reduces insolvency risk, especially in small financial institutions. 
These findings provide further evidence that insolvency risk of financial 
institutions is positively associated with shareholder-friendly corporate 
governance mechanisms. Again, our results are also economically significant. For 
instance, a change in CGQ from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile is 
associated with an up to 3.05 percent increase in insolvency risk of financial 
institutions as measured by CDS spread (see Table 7) and during the global 
financial crisis the increase in insolvency risk as measured by CDS spread is up to 
3.39 percent. 
(insert Table 7 about here) 
(insert Table 8 about here) 
Table 8 reports the estimates of six alternative versions of Equation (1) with the 
distance to default (DD) as the dependent variable. However, here Governancej,t 
represents four sub-indices: board, compensation, audit, and takeover. Model 1 
only includes size as a control variable and Model 2 includes only Size and Return 
on assets as the control variables for parsimony. Whereas, Models 3 and 4 include 
full set of control variables and year fixed-effect and Model 4 also includes firm 
fixed-effects along with a full set of control variables. Further, Model 5 includes 
interaction variables Governance Indices u GFC for global financial crisis. Lastly, 
in Model 6 we include the size interaction variables Governance Indices u Size. 
The adjusted R2s of all the models are almost 50 percent except Model 1 where the 
adjusted R2s is 34.6 percent. The F-statistics for all the six alternative regressions 
are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
                                                        
27 Bigger financial institutions may be riskier, because they expect a bailout by regulators 
in case of failure (Acharya et al, 2016). 
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Table 8 depicts that the overall board index has a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient in Models 1–3, suggesting that the presence of a more 
shareholder-friendly and strong board increases insolvency risk of financial 
institutions. This is consistent with the previous literature finding that strong 
boards in financial institutions are associated with greater levels of risk (Pathan, 
2009). Model 5 shows that the compensation sub-index has a strong negative 
coefficient suggesting better alignment of interests increases insolvency risk 
during the period of financial crisis. Lastly, Model 6 shows that larger financial 
institutions have more insolvency risk.  
(insert Table 9 about here) 
Table 9 reports the regression estimates of Equation (1) with credit default swap 
spread (CDS) as the dependent variable. Regressions in this table are similar to 
those in Table 8 with estimates of six alternative versions of Equations (1). Here, 
also, Governancej,t represents four sub-indices. The adjusted R2s of all the models 
vary from 29 percent to almost 52 percent. The F-statistics for all the six alternative 
regressions are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The regression 
estimates reported in this table are comparable to Table 8 where the board index 
is positive and statistically significant in Models 1–3 showing that a more 
shareholder-friendly and strong boards increase insolvency risk of financial 
institutions. Model 5 shows that the compensation sub-index has strong positive 
coefficient, suggesting better alignment of interests increases insolvency risk 
during the period of financial crisis. Lastly, Model 6 shows that shareholder-
friendly board in a larger financial institution is associated with greater insolvency 
risk. 
In summary, from the regression results reported in Tables 5, 6, 8, and 9, we find 
that insolvency risk of a financial institution is positively associated with the 
shareholder-friendliness of that financial institution’s corporate governance 
especially for large financial institutions and during the period of the global 
financial crisis. Prior literature (e.g., Mehran et al., 2011; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; 
de Haan and Vlahu, 2016) highlights that strong, shareholder-friendly governance 
practices may encourage more risk-taking in the financial industry in order to 
increase shareholders’ wealth. We provide empirical support for this argument. 
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3.4. Addressing endogeneity 
We recognize that the coefficients reported in Tables 5 and 6 may, to some extent, 
be biased because corporate governance structure is largely endogenous (Adams 
et al., 2010). Two important concerns should be addressed, as these can affect the 
interpretation of our results. First, it could be that we do not actually capture the 
relationship between insolvency risk and CGQ because of omitted variables. To 
mitigate this issue, we use firm fixed-effects and try to include different control 
variables and show that our results hold. Second, it could be that there is reverse 
causality, that insolvency risk affects CGQ and not the other way around. For 
instance, the risk preferences of financial institutions can also affect the strength 
of corporate governance mechanisms. To address this issue, we use lagged CGQ 
and propensity score matching.  
3.4.1 Lagged variables 
Although we include both firm fixed-effects and year fixed effects to alleviate the 
endogeneity concerns, in order to further investigate the predictive ability of 
corporate governance mechanisms for insolvency risk and also eliminate the 
concerns regarding reverse causality, we follow Jo and Harjoto (2012) and 
estimate causal effect of lagged CGQ on insolvency risk measured by distance to 
default and CDS spread. We also investigate the inverted causal effect of lagged 
distance to default and CDS spread on CGQ. The regression results (not tabulated) 
indicate that results are similar to our previous results in Tables 5 and 6 for both 
first and second lags of corporate governance measures. Furthermore, we also find 
that the direction of causation is from corporate governance to insolvency risk and 
not the other way around. These results provide support to our main findings that 
strong corporate governance mechanisms lead to higher levels of insolvency risk 
in financial institutions. 
3.4.2. Propensity score matching 
To further eliminate the endogeneity bias, we conduct propensity score matching 
where we match firm-years with CGQ index greater than median (treatment 
group) with firm-years with CGQ index lower than median (control group). Table 
10 reports the propensity score matching estimation results and compares the 
insolvency risk (measured by distance to default and credit default swap (CDS) 
spread) of financial institutions in the treatment and control groups. First, we 
estimated the probability that a financial institution has stronger corporate 
governance mechanisms (i.e. has CGQ index greater than the median). This 
probability is the propensity score and is the predicted value from a logit regression 
where the dependent variable is a dummy variable which equals one if CGQ index 
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is greater than the median and zero otherwise. The logit regression results are 
reported in the pre-match column of Panel A of Table 10 and the same control 
variables are included as in Table 5 and Table 6. The regression results suggest that 
financial institutions with stronger corporate governance mechanisms have a 
lower loans to total assets ratio and lower performance as measured by return on 
assets ratio.  
(insert Table 10 about here) 
For this purpose, each financial institution with a CGQ greater than the median is 
matched to a financial institution with a CGQ lower than the median by the closest 
propensity score. We employ matching with replacement and allow for the control 
firms to be matched to multiple treatment firms. We further require that the 
difference between the propensity score of treatment and matched firms does not 
exceed 0.5% in absolute value.  
In order to ensure that financial institutions in both groups (treatment and 
control) are almost similar in terms of observable characteristics, we perform two 
diagnostic tests. In the first test, we re-estimate the logit regression model for the 
post-match sample. The results of this regression are reported in the post-match 
column of Panel A of Table 10. All the regression coefficients are statistically 
insignificant and smaller than those in the column pre-match, suggesting that both 
groups are almost similar in terms of observable characteristics. Panel B of Table 
10 reports the results of the second diagnostic test in which we examine the 
difference for each control variable between the treated financial institutions and 
the matched control financial institutions. Again, we find no significant difference 
in observable characteristics between the two groups. Thus, these results suggest 
that propensity score matching alleviates the problem of endogeneity and removes 
other observable differences and increases the probability that any difference in 
the insolvency risk between the treated and control groups is because of the 
strength of corporate governance mechanisms.  
Lastly, the propensity score matching estimates and the multivariate results using 
the matched sample are reported in Panel C and Panel D of Table 10, respectively. 
As it is evident in Panel C of Table 10, we find significant differences in both 
insolvency risk measures between the treatment and control group. In detail, we 
find that distance to default is lower and CDS spread is higher in the financial 
institutions with stronger corporate governance mechanisms than the otherwise 
indistinguishable financial institutions with relatively weaker corporate 
governance mechanisms). Likewise, the multivariate results reported in Panel D 
of Table 10 show that financial institutions with stronger corporate governance 
have a greater insolvency risk. The results from this analysis suggest that 
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endogeneity bias is not likely to drive our main inference, that is, stronger 
corporate governance mechanisms is associated with greater insolvency risk in the 
financial industry. 
3.5. Additional analysis 
In order to check the robustness of our empirical findings, we perform several 
additional tests. First, we restrict our sample only to deposit-taking financial 
institutions, that is, financial institutions with a deposit to asset ratio of at least 
10%. We then re-estimate all the regression models in Tables 5 and 6. The 
regression results (not presented here) are similar to our previous results showing 
that strong corporate governance mechanisms and more shareholder-friendly 
boards are associated with a higher level of insolvency risk. This suggests that non-
depository financial institutions do not drive our main findings.  
Second, in order to examine whether our empirical findings are affected by the 
diversity of financial institutions, we restrict our sample to lending financial 
institutions and commercial banks, that is, financial institutions with a loans to 
asset ratio of at least 30%. We re-estimated all the regression models in Tables 5 
and 6 with this restricted sample. The regression results (not presented here) are 
similar to our previous findings in Tables 5 and 6, thus providing support to our 
main findings that financial institutions with strong corporate governance 
mechanisms are associated with a higher level of insolvency risk.  
Third, we also examine the potential effect of the size of the financial institution 
on our results. For this purpose, we divided our sample into two subsamples where 
we either exclude the smallest 10 percent or the largest 10 percent of financial 
institutions from the main sample. The re-estimated regression results (not 
presented here) for the subsample without the smallest 10 percent of financial 
institutions are quite similar to our main results reported in the Tables 5 and 6, 
that is, stronger and shareholder-friendly governance provisions are detrimental 
for the survival of the financial institutions. However, the coefficient estimates for 
governance (not tabulated) for the subsample where we exclude the largest 10 
percent of financial institutions mostly become insignificant although positively 
related to insolvency risk. These findings provide some evidence that, to some 
extent, larger financial institutions might be driving our results.  
Fourth, we excluded the observations from the year 2008 (the year of the global 
financial crisis) to preclude the concern of extreme observations. We then re-
estimated most of the regression models in Tables 5 and 6 based on this sample. 
We observe, based on empirical results (not presented here), that our findings that 
stronger corporate governance mechanisms are associated with a higher level of 
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insolvency risk in financial institutions do not change even when we exclude the 
extreme observations from 2008. 
Fifth, since we utilize CDS spread as a measure for insolvency risk, therefore we 
also include cost of debt among control variables.28 We re-estimated most of the 
regression models in Tables 5 and 6 by adding cost of debt among control 
variables. Our results (not presented here) are qualitatively similar to our main 
findings that stronger corporate governance mechanisms are associated with a 
higher level of insolvency risk in financial institutions. However, the regression 
coefficients for CGQ become insignificant when we include firm fixed effects. 
Consistent with previous literature (Borisova et al., 2015), we find that higher cost 
of debt is associated with higher level of insolvency risk. 
Sixth, following Das et al. (2009), we include volatility of equity returns among 
control variables and re-estimated most of the regression models in Table 6. Our 
results (not presented here) are qualitatively similar to our main findings that 
stronger corporate governance mechanisms are associated with a higher level of 
insolvency risk in financial institutions. The regression coefficients for CGQ are 
positive and statistically significant. Furthermore, volatility of equity returns is 
positively associated with insolvency risk, which is consistent with the findings of 
Das et al. (2009). 
Finally, we excluded troubled financial institutions from our sample, that is, those 
with a return on assets ratio of less than 2%. We did so to examine the effect of the 
financial crisis on our findings. We re-estimated the regression based on this 
sample. The additional analysis (not tabulated) reveals that the exclusion of these 
extreme observations does not have much impact on our main findings. Overall, 
the additional analysis provides strong evidence that in financial institutions 
stronger and more shareholder-friendly governance mechanisms can lead to a 
higher level of insolvency risk.  
4. Conclusions 
Given the high-profile failures of financial institutions (e.g., Lehman Brothers) 
during the global financial crisis, investors and regulators are somewhat skeptical 
of financial market participants. The financial crisis is arguably related to the 
unethical behavior of corporate executives and failures of corporate governance to 
curtail increased risk-taking in financial institutions. Our study, therefore, is 
important to provide insight on the implications of the corporate governance in 
                                                        
28 “Debt capital can come from private sources (e.g., banks) or from public sources (the 
debt markets). In either case, the cost of debt is the applicable interest rate” (Sharfman 
and Fernando, 2008). 
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financial institutions which can to take on too much risk owing to the different risk 
environment with incentives and protections. In particular, our study contributes 
to the ongoing debate on the risk taking implications of shareholder-friendly 
corporate governance and provides what is to the best of our knowledge the first 
comprehensive and robust evidence on the relationship between corporate 
governance and insolvency risk of financial institutions around the global financial 
crisis. 
Based on the sample of 556 US financial institutions over the period from 2005 to 
2010 and using two measures of insolvency risk, namely market-based distance to 
default and innovative credit default swap spread, our results suggest that more 
shareholder-friendly corporate governance is related to increased insolvency risk 
of the financial institutions. This empirical relationship is robust against the 
inclusion of firm specific characteristics, year and firm fixed effects, alternative 
sample specifications (e.g., excluding troubled financial institutions) and 
alleviating endogeneity concerns using lagged variable and propensity score 
matching approaches. Overall, our findings on the positive association between 
corporate governance and insolvency risk are consistent with the earlier research, 
on financial institutions and banks, showing that the shareholder-friendly 
corporate governance encourages corporate executives to take on more risk, which 
might ultimately lead to increased insolvency risk.  
Since the global financial crisis is particularly associated with more level of risk 
taking by financial institutions, we further explored the interaction effect of 
shareholder-friendly corporate governance and the global financial crisis on the 
insolvency risk. As expected, we find that the positive association between 
corporate governance and insolvency risk is stronger during the period of the 
financial crisis. This finding corroborates the existing literature showing that the 
global financial crisis was, at least to some extent, caused by the increased risk 
taking by financial institutions. We also explored whether the size encourages 
financial institutions to take more risk. Specifically, our empirical results reveal 
that the positive linkage between corporate governance and insolvency risk is 
stronger for larger financial institutions.  
Our findings offer important implications for corporate executives, regulators, 
investors, and researchers. The results could assist managers of financial 
institutions to control risk-taking behavior by reforming corporate governance 
mechanisms. Financial regulators could benefit from this study that it could 
provide a basis from which to enhance economic growth, reduce bankruptcy levels, 
and add value to the wealth of stockholders by focusing on corporate governance 
areas. Regulators should pay close attention because strong corporate governance 
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mechanisms in the financial industry can encourage more risk taking during the 
period of economic turmoil, which can cause instability in the overall financial 
system.  
References  
Acharya, V., D. Anginer, and A. J. Warburton, 2016. The End of Market Discipline? 
Investor Expectations of Implicit Government Guarantees, Working paper. 
Adams, R., 2012. Governance and the financial crisis, International Review of 
Finance 12(1), 7–38. 
Adams, R., and H. Mehran, 2012. Bank board structure and performance: evidence 
for large bank holding companies, Journal of Financial Intermediation 21, 243–
267. 
Adams, R.B, B. E. Hermalin, and M. S. Weisbach, 2010. The Role of Boards of 
Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey, Journal 
of Economic Literature 48(1), 58–107.  
Agarwal, V., and R. Taffler, 2008. Comparing the performance of market-based 
and accounting-based bankruptcy prediction models, Journal of Banking and 
Finance 32 (8), 1541–1551. 
Ammann, M., D. Oesch, and M. Schmid, 2011. Corporate governance and firm 
value: international evidence, Journal of Empirical Finance 18, 36–55. 
Anginer, D., A. Demirguc-Kunt, H. Huizinga, and M. Zhu, 2014. Corporate 
Governance and Bank Insolvency Risk International Evidence, Policy Research 
Working Paper 7017, World Bank. 
Aubuchon, C. P., and D. C. Wheelock, 2010. The geographic distribution and 
characteristics of US bank failures, 2007-2010: Do bank failures still reflect local 
economic conditions?, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 92(05), 395-415. 
Bai, G., and E. Elyasiani, 2013. Bank stability and managerial compensation. 
Journal of Banking and Finance 37(3), 799–813. 
Baselga-Pascual, L., A. Trujillo-Ponce, and C. Cardone-Riportella, 2015. Factors 
influencing bank risk in Europe: Evidence from the financial crisis, North 
American Journal of Economics and Finance, 34, 138–166. 
Beaver, W. H., 1966. Financial ratios as predictors of failure, Journal of 
accounting research 4, 71–111. 
Beaver, W. H., M. F. McNichols, and J.-W. Rhie, 2005. Have financial statements 
become less informative? Evidence from the ability of financial ratios to predict 
bankruptcy, Review of Accounting Studies 10 (1), 93–122. 
Beltratti, A. and R. M. Stulz, 2012. The credit crisis around the globe: Why did 
some banks perform better?, Journal of Financial Economics 105(1), 1–17. 
78     Acta Wasaensia 
Berger, A. N., and C. H. S. Bouwman, 2012. How does capital affect bank 
performance during financial crises?, Journal of Financial Economics 109(1), 
146–176. 
Berger, A., B. Imbierowicz, and C. Rauch, 2016. The roles of corporate governance 
in bank failures during the recent financial crisis, Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking 48(4), 729–770. 
Berger, A.N., T. Kick, and K. Schaeck, 2014. Executive board composition and bank 
risk taking, Journal of Corporate Finance 28, 48–65. 
Bharath, S. T., and T. Shumway, 2008. Forecasting default with the merton 
distance to default model, Review of Financial Studies 21(3), 1339–1369. 
Black, F., and M. Scholes, 1973. The pricing of options and corporate liabilities, 
The journal of political economy 81 (3), 637–654. 
Blanco, R., S. Brennan, and I. W. Marsh, 2005. An empirical analysis of the 
dynamic relation between investment-grade bonds and credit default swaps, The 
Journal of Finance, 5, 2255–2281. 
Bolton, P., H. Mehran, and J. Shapiro, 2015. Executive compensation and risk 
taking, Review of Finance 19(6), 2139–2181. 
Borisova, G., V. Fotak, K. Holland, and W. L. Megginson, 2015. Government 
ownership and the cost of debt: Evidence from government investments in publicly 
traded firms, Journal of Financial Economics, 118(1), 168–191. 
Brown, L.D., and M. L. Caylor, 2009. Corporate governance and firm operating 
performance. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 32, 129–144. 
Brunnermeier, M, G. Dong, and D. Palia, 2012. Banks’ non-interest income and 
systemic risk, Working paper, Princeton University. 
Campbell, J., J. Hilscher, and J. Szilagyi, 2008. In search of distress risk, The 
Journal of Finance 63, 2899–2939. 
Charitou, A., D. Dionysiou, N. Lambertides, and L. Trigeorgis, 2013. Alternative 
bankruptcy prediction models using option-pricing theory, Journal of Banking 
and Finance 37(7), 2329–2341. 
Chava, S., and A. Purnanandam, 2010. CEOs versus CFOs: incentives and 
corporate policies, Journal of Financial Economics 97, 263–278 
Chhaochharia, V., and L. Laeven, 2009. Corporate governance norms and 
practices, Journal of Financial Intermediation 18(3), 405–431. 
Chiang, S. M., H. Chung, and C. M. Huang, 2015. A note on board characteristics, 
ownership structure and default risk in Taiwan, Accounting and Finance 55, 57–
74. 
Chung, K. H., J. Elder, and J-C., Kim, (2010). Corporate Governance and Liquidity, 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 45(2), 265–291. 
Acta Wasaensia     79 
Cole, R. A., and L. J. White, 2012. Déjà Vu all over again: The causes of US 
commercial bank failures this time around, Journal of Financial Services 
Research 42, 5–29. 
Colonnello, S., 2017. Internal Governance and Creditor Governance: Evidence 
from Credit Default Swaps, IWH Discussion Papers, No. 6/2017. 
Das, S. R., P. Hanouna, and A. Sarin, 2009. Accounting-based versus market-
based cross-sectional models of CDS spreads, Journal of Banking and Finance 33 
(4), 719–730. 
de Haan, J., and R. Vlahu, 2016. Corporate governance of banks: A survey, Journal 
of Economic Surveys 30(2), 228–277. 
DeYoung, R., E. Y., Peng, and M. Yan, 2013. Executive compensation and business 
policy choices at U.S. commercial banks, Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, 48(1), 165-196. 
Duan, J. C., 2014. Actuarial par spread and empirical pricing of CDS by 
decomposition, Global Credit Review, 4, 51–65. 
Duan, J. C., J. Sun, and T. Wang, 2012. Multiperiod Corporate Default Prediction–
A Forward Intensity Approach, Journal of Econometrics, 170(1), 191–209. 
Duan, J. C., T. Wang, 2012. Measuring distance-to-default for financial and non-
financial firms, Global Credit Review, 2, 95–108. 
Ellul, A., and V. Yerramilli, 2013. Stronger risk controls, lower risk: Evidence from 
U.S. bank holding companies, The Journal of Finance 68, 1757–1803. 
Erkens, D.H., M. Hunga, and P. Matos, 2012. Corporate governance in the 2007–
2008 financial crisis: Evidence from financial institutions worldwide, Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 18, 389–411. 
Ertugrul, M., and S. Hegde, 2009. Corporate governance ratings and firm 
performance, Financial Management 38(1), 139–160. 
Fahlenbrach, R., and R. Stulz, 2011. Bank CEO incentives and the credit crisis, 
Journal of Financial Economics 99, 11–26. 
Feldhutter, P., E. Hotchkiss, and O. Karakas, 2016. The value of creditor control in 
corporate bonds, Journal of Financial Economics 121, 1– 27 
Fortin R., G. Goldberg, and G. Roth, 2010. Bank risk taking at the onset of the 
current banking crisis, Financial Review 45(4), 891–913. 
Gompers, P., J. Ishii, and A. Metrick, 2003. Corporate governance and equity 
prices, Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, 107–155 
Hillegeist, S. A., E. K. Keating, D. P. Cram, and K. G. Lundstedt, 2004. Assessing 
the probability of bankruptcy, Review of Accounting Studies 9(1), 5-34. 
80     Acta Wasaensia 
Iqbal, J., S. Strobl, and S. Vähämaa, 2015. Corporate governance and the systemic 
risk of financial institutions, Journal of Economics and Business 82, 42–61. 
Jo, H., and M. A. Harjoto, 2012. The causal effect of corporate governance on 
corporate social responsibility, Journal of Business Ethics 106, 53–72. 
John, K., H. Mehran, Y. Qian, 2010. Outside monitoring and CEO compensation 
in the banking industry, Journal of Corporate Finance, 16(4), 383–399. 
John, K., L. Litov, and B. Yeung, 2008. Corporate Governance and Risk-taking, 
The Journal of Finance 63(4), 1679–728. 
Laeven, L., and R. Levine, 2009. Bank governance, regulation and risk taking, 
Journal of Financial Economics 93(2), 259–275. 
Martin, D., 1977. Early warning of bank failure: A logit regression approach, 
Journal of Banking and Finance 1(3), 249–276. 
Mayordomo, S., M. Rodriguez-Moreno, and J. I. Peña, 2014. Derivatives holdings 
and systemic risk in the U.S. banking sector, Journal of Banking and Finance 45, 
84–104. 
Mehran, H., A. Morrison, and J. Shapiro, 2011. Corporate governance and banks: 
What have we learned from the financial crisis?, Staff report, Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York. 
Merton, R. C., 1974. On the pricing of corporate debt: The risk structure of interest 
rates, The Journal of Finance 29(2), 449–470. 
Meyer, P. A., and H. W. Pfifer, 1970. Prediction of bank failures, The Journal of 
Finance 25(4), 853–868. 
Ng, J., and S. Roychowdhury, 2014. Do loan loss reserves behave like capital? 
Evidence from recent bank failures, Review of Accounting Studies 19(3), 1234–
1279. 
Norden, L., and M. Weber, 2009. The co-movement of credit default swap, bond 
and stock markets: An empirical analysis, European Financial Management, 15, 
529–562. 
Pathan, S., 2009. Strong boards, CEO power and bank risk-taking, Journal of 
Banking and Finance 33(7), 1340–1350. 
Peni, E., and S. Vähämaa, 2012. Did Good Corporate Governance Improve Bank 
Performance during the Financial Crisis?, Journal of Financial Services Research 
41, 19–35 
Peni, E., S. D. Smith, and S. Vahamaa, 2013. Bank corporate governance and real 
estate lending during the financial crisis, Journal of Real Estate Research 35(3), 
313–343. 
Schultz E. L., D. T. Tan, and K. D. Walsh, 2015. Corporate governance and the 
probability of default, Accounting and Finance 57, 235–353. 
Acta Wasaensia     81 
Sharfman, M. P., and C. S. Fernando, 2008. Environmental risk management and 
the cost of capital. Strategic Management Journal, 29, 569–592. 
Shleifer, A., and R. W. Vishny, 1997. A survey of corporate governance, The Journal 
of Finance 52(2), 737–783. 
Switzer, L. N., and J. Wang, 2013. Default risk estimation, bank credit risk, and 
corporate governance, Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments 22, 91–112. 
Switzer, L. N., J. Wang, and Y. Zhang, 2016. Effect of corporate governance on 
default risk in financial versus nonfinancial firms: Canadian evidence, Canadian 
Journal of Administrative Sciences, DOI: 10.1002/cjas.1423. 
Tang, D. Y., and H. Yan, 2010. Market conditions, default risk and credit spreads, 
Journal of Banking and Finance 34 (4), 743–753. 
Whalen, G., and J. B. Thomson, 1988. Using financial data to identify changes in 
bank condition, Economic Review - Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland 24(2), 17–
26. 
Zhao, L., 2018. MarketǦbased estimates of implicit government guarantees in 
European financial institutions, European Financial Management, 24, 79–112. 
82 Acta Wasaensia
 
Table 1. Variable Definitions and Sources. 
 
Variable name  Definition  Data source  
Insolvency Risk Variables  
Distance to default  Annual average of distance to default based on stock based on stock price variability  
Obtained from Risk 
Management Institute at 
NUS 
Credit Default 
Swap Spread  
credit derivatives that allow the transfer of 
the firm’s default risk between two agents 
for a predetermined time period 
Obtained from Risk 
Management Institute at 
NUS 
   
Governance variables  
Corporate 
governance  Overall corporate governance index  ISS  
Board  Corporate governance index based on board characteristics  ISS  
Compensation and 
ownership  
Corporate governance index based on 
compensation and ownership 
characteristics  
ISS  
Auditing  Corporate governance index based on auditing characteristics  ISS  
Takeover  Corporate governance index based on takeover characteristics  ISS  
   
Control variables  
Size Logarithm of total assets  BankScope  
Return on assets Ratio of net income to total assets BankScope  
Growth Percentage change in the amount of outstanding loans BankScope  
Loans to total 
assets  Ratio of net loans to total assets BankScope  
Non-interest 
income Ratio of non-interest income to total income BankScope  
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Table 4. Univariate tests. 
Strong Governance Weak Governance 
Variable Mean Mean Diff. in Means 
Dependent variables: 
CDS 3.7 54 3.374 0.3783 *** 
DD 2.065 2.524 -0.459 *** 
Explanatory variables: 
CGQ 86.492 14.428 7 2.064 *** 
BoardQ 4.385 1 .492 2.893 *** 
Compensation 4.120 2.519 1 .601 *** 
Audit 3.7 99 2.419 1 .380 *** 
Takeover 3.275 2.942 0.333 *** 
Control variables: 
Total assets 14.678 14.649 0.030 
Return on assets 0.157 0.526 -0.370 *** 
Loans to assets 66.513 67 .400 -0.888
Loan growth 5.065 7 .970 -2.905 *** 
Deposits to assets 0.774 0.772 0.003
Non-interest income 23.352 22.919 0.433
This table reports the results of two-tailed t-tests under the null hy pothesis that there is no 
difference in the means between financial institutions with stronger and weaker corporate 
governance mechanisms. The subsample with stronger governance contains financial institutions 
with CGQ in the top 30% and the subsample of weaker governance contains financial institutions 
with CGQ in the bottom 30% of the sample. CDS is the credit default swap spread is the pricing of 
the financial distress risk (Das et al., 2009). CDS are credit derivatives that allow the transfer of 
the firm’s default risk between two agents for a predetermined time period. DD is the Distance to 
Default measures the difference between the asset value of the financial institution and the face 
value of its debt, scaled by the standard deviation of the financial institution’s asset value. CGQ 
(Corporate Governance Quotient) measures the strength of the firm’s corporate governance 
mechanisms and BoardQ (Board Quotient) measures the strength of the board of directors. The 
control variables are defined as follows: Size is measured as the logarithm of total assets, Global 
Financial Crisis is the dummy  variable for global financial crisis, Return on assets is the ratio of 
net income to total assets, Loans to assets is the ratio of net loans to totals assets, Loan growth is 
the percentage change in loans from y ear t–1  to y ear t, Deposits to assets is the ratio of deposits 
to total assets, and Non-interest income is the ratio of non-interest income to total income. ***, 
**, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
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Table 10. Propensity score matching estimator. 
Panel A: Pre-m atch propensity score regression and post-match diagnostic 
regression 
Dependent Variable: 
Equals 1  if CGQ is greater than median and 0 
otherwise 
Pre-match Post-match 
Size 0.007 0.001 
(0.23) (0.03) 
Return on assets -0.062** 0.027 
(-1 .99) (0.52) 
Loans to assets -0.009*** -0.001
(-2.7 5) (-0.13)
Loan growth -0.002 -0.004
(-1 .25) (-1 .11)
Deposits to assets 0.290 0.008
(0.76) (0.01)
Non-interest income 0.001 0.001
(0.94) (0.30)
Y ear effect Y es Y es
Constant 0.560 0.070
(0.91) (0.06)
Observations 2131 2082
Pseudo R2 0.0069 0.0023
Panel B: Differences in firm  characteristics 
Variable Treated group Control group Difference t-stat
Size 14.455 14.433 0.022 0.30 
Return on assets 0.240 0.240 0.000 0.01  
Loans to assets 67 .204 67 .546 -0.342 -0.53
Loan growth 6.351 7 .525 -1 .174 -1 .50
Deposits to assets 0.782 0.784 -0.002 -0.24
Non-interest income 23.885 23.113 0.772 0.59
Panel C: Propensity score m atching estimator 
Variable Firm y ear obs. with high CGQ Firm y ear obs. With low CGQ Difference T-stat
DTD 1 .769 1 .942 -0.173* -1 .65
CDS 3.978 3.814 0.164* 1 .77
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Table 10. Propensity score matching estimator (continued). 
Panel D: Regression analysis based on treatment and control group 
DD - regression CDS - regression 
Index dummy -0.135*** 0.062** 
(-2.7 2) (2.45) 
Size 0.149*** -0.027***
(9.17) (-3.24)
Return on assets 0.442*** -0.323***
(24.61) (-34.78)
Loans to assets -0.005*** 0.003***
(-2.7 5) (3.15) 
Loan growth -0.004*** 0.001* 
(-2.81) (1 .65) 
Deposits to assets 0.857*** -0.594***
(3.67) (-5.00)
Non-interest income 0.001 -0.001***
(1 .22) (-2.94)
Y ear effect Y es Y es 
Constant 0.143 4.7 51*** 
(0.41) (26.65) 
Observations 2082 2070 
Adjusted R-squared 0.541 0.505 
F-Statistics 205.036 176.802 
This table reports the results of propensity score matching estimation. Panel A reports the logit 
regression results. Here the dependent variable is a dummy variable which equals one if CGQ index 
is greater than the median and zero otherwise. Panel B reports the results of the second diagnostic 
test in which we examine the difference for each control variable between the treated financial 
institutions (financial institutions with stronger corporate governance mechanisms) and the 
matched control financial institutions (financial institutions with CGQ lower than median). Panels 
C and D report the propensity score matching estimates and the multivariate results using the 
matched sample. Independent variables are following. Size is measured as the logarithm of total 
assets, Return on assets is the ratio of net income to total assets, Loans to assets is the ratio of net 
loans to totals assets, Loan growth is the percentage change in loans from y ear t–1 to y ear t, 
Deposits to assets is the ratio of deposits to total assets, and Non-interest income is the ratio of 
non-interest income to total income.  Year fixed-effects are included in all regressions. ***, **, and 
* denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
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Appendix A: General procedure to calculate distance to default 
(DD) 
The Merton (1974) model views the firm’s equity value as a European call option on 
the firm’s assets, with a strike price equal to the face value of the firm’s liabilities. This is 
because of the shareholders’ limited liability and their residual claim on the firm’s assets. 
If the firm’s value exceeds the level of liabilities (strike price) at the time of maturity, when 
the value of the equity is positive, shareholders exercise their option and the firm survives. 
If the firm’s value falls below the level of liabilities (strike price) at the time of maturity, 
when the value of equity becomes zero, the model assumes shareholders do not exercise 
their option and the firm defaults. Thus, the larger the positive distance between firm 
value and firm liabilities, the lower is the probability of financial distress. 
Value of firm ( ஺ܸ) = value of equity ( ௘ܸ) + Value of debt (X) 
Value of equity ( ௘ܸ) = Value of firm ( ஺ܸ) – Value of debt (X) 
Value of firm ( ஺ܸ) > Value of debt (X) Î Value of equity ( ௘ܸ) is positive (firm survives) 
Value of firm ( ஺ܸ) < Value of debt (X) Î Value of equity ( ௘ܸ) is zero (firm defaults)   
The Merton (1974) model has two important assumptions for the calculation of DD. 
First, it assumes that the value of the firm follows the geometric Brownian motion that is 
expressed as follows: 
݀ ஺ܸ ൌ ߤ ஺ܸ݀ݐ ൅ߪ஺ ஺ܸܹ݀ (A.1) 
where ஺ܸ denotes the value of firm’s assets, ߤ represents expected continuously 
compounded returns on the firm’s assets, ߪ஺ indicates instantaneous volatility of the 
firm’s assets, and ݀ ܹ is a standard Wiener process. 
Second, the model assumes that the firm has only two securities outstanding; namely, 
common stock and a zero coupon bond maturing at time (T).  
Based on these two assumptions, the equity of the firm can be viewed as a call option 
on the value of the firm’s assets, with a strike price equal to face value of the debt maturing 
at time T. Therefore, the market value of equity as a function of the total value of the firm’s 
assets can be expressed by using Black and Scholes’ (1973) formula for call options: 
௘ܸ ൌ ஺ܸܰሺ݀ଵሻ െ ܺ݁ି௥் ܰሺ݀ଶሻ (A.2) 
where ܸ ௘ is the market value of the firm’s equity, X is the face value of the debt, r is the 
risk-free rate, T is the time horizon for the maturity of debt, N symbolizes the function of 
the cumulative standard normal distribution, and ݀ଵ and ݀ଶ are given by the following 
formulas: 
݀ଵ ൌ
௟௡ቀೇಲ೉ ቁାቀ௥ା
భ
మఙಲ
మቁ்
ఙಲξ் ,      ݀ ଶ ൌ݀ଵ െߪ஺ξܶ (A.3) 
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In Eq. (A.2), ܸ ௘, X, r, and T are readily observable and known factors, whereas ܸ ஺ and 
ߪ஺ are difficult to observe and are unknown factors. This means there are two unknowns 
in one equation, so a unique solution to Eq. (A.2) is not available. Thus, another equation 
involving one of the two unknown factors is required.  
As in the Merton (1974) model, it is assumed that the value of the firm’s equity is a 
function of the value of its assets and time, so the second equation that relates the 
volatility of the firm’s equity to the volatility of the firm’s assets can be written as: 
ߪ௘ ൌ ቀ௏ಲ௏೐ ቁ
డ௏೐
డ௏ಲ ߪ஺ (A.4) 
According to the Black-Scholes-Merton model, the term డ௏೐డ௏ಲ  in Eq. (4) is equal to 
ܰሺ݀ଵሻ, and can be rewritten as follows: 
ߪ௘ ൌ ቀ௏ಲ௏೐ቁ ܰሺ݀ଵሻߪ஺ (A.5) 
Now, Eq. (A.2) and (A.5) can be solved simultaneously for the values of ஺ܸ and ߪ஺, 
and DD can be calculated by using the following equation: 
ܦܦ ൌ ௟௡ቀ
ೇಲ
೉ ቁାቀఓି
భ
మఙಲ
మቁ்
ఙಲξ் (A.6) 
The probability of default (PD) is calculated as follows: 
ܲܦ ൌ ܰሺെܦܦሻ  (A.7) 
In a nutshell, for the calculation of DD, the following steps are required: 
1) Estimating the volatility of the firm’s equity (ߪ௘) through historical stock price data or
option-implied volatility data. Historical stock price data to estimate the volatility of
the firm’s equity is easily available. Following the Hull (2009)  methodology, equity
volatility can be calculated as:
ܴ௜ ൌ ሺ݌ݎ௧ െ ݌ݎ௧ିଵሻ        (A.8)
where ܴ ௜  is the daily stock returns, is the natural logarithm, ݌ݎ௧is the stock price at
the end of the day and ݌ݎ௧ିଵ is the stock price at the end of the previous day: ݅ =1, 2,
3…n.
Annualized volatility is then estimated as:
ߪ௘ ൌ ଵටభ೙
ට ଵ௡ିଵσ ோ೔మ೙೔సభ െ
ଵ
௡ሺ௡ିଵሻሺσ ܴ௜ሻ௡௜ୀଵ
ଶ      (A.9)
where n denotes the number of observations in one year i.e., number of trading days. 
2) Selecting the forecasting horizon (T). Generally, the forecast horizon is one year (T=1). 
3) Measuring the face value of the debt (X). Generally, current liabilities plus half of the
non-current liabilities are used to proxy the face value of debt, as also advised by
Moody’s KMV.
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4) Collecting the risk-free rate (r). 3-month bank accepted bill or T-bills can be used to
proxy risk-free rate.
5) Measuring the market value of equity ( ௘ܸ). It is calculated as the number of
outstanding shares multiplied by market price per share.
Solving Eq. (A.2) and (A.5) simultaneously for the values of ( ஺ܸ) andሺߪ௘), and then 
calculate the DD using Eq. (A.6) and PD using Eq. (A.7). 
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We measure managerial risk-taking incentives with the sensitivities of chief 
executive officer (CEO) and chief financial officer (CFO) compensation to changes 
in stock prices and stock return volatility. Using data on large U.S. financial 
institutions, we document a negative association between systemic risk and the 
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results also demonstrate that financial institutions with greater managerial risk-
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1. Introduction 
“Compensation practices at some banking organizations have led to misaligned 
incentives and excessive risk-taking, contributing to bank losses and financial 
instability.”  
Chairman Ben S. Bernanke (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
2009a)  
This paper examines whether the systemic risk of financial institutions is 
associated with the compensation-based risk-taking incentives of the top 
executives. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, policy 
makers, regulators, and bank supervision authorities have alleged that the risk-
taking incentives generated by executive compensation policies at banking 
organizations were among the key factors contributing to the development of the 
crisis (see e.g., Kirkpatrick, 2009; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010; 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2009b, 2010; Mehran, 
Morrison and Shapiro, 2011). Furthermore, the financial crisis revealed the 
distinct adverse consequences of bank risk-taking and systemic risk on global 
financial stability, economic growth, and societal well-being. Given that the 
compensation policies of top executives are generally designed to mitigate agency 
problems and to maximize shareholder value, the incentives generated by 
executive compensation may encourage excessive risk-taking in the financial 
industry (e.g., e.g., Palia and Porter, 2004; Chen, Steiner and Whyte, 2006; 
Bebchuk, Cohen and Spamann, 2010; Bebchuk and Spamann, 2010; Bai and 
Elyasiani, 2013). 
Do compensation-based risk-taking incentives of the top executives increase the 
riskiness of financial institutions and the level of systemic risk? In this paper, we 
aim to address this question by empirically examining the linkage between 
systemic risk and the sensitivities of chief executive officer (CEO) and chief 
financial officer (CFO) compensation to changes in stock prices and stock return 
volatility.1 Using data on large, publicly traded U.S. financial institutions, we find 
ambiguous evidence on the association between managerial risk-taking incentives 
and the systemic risk of financial institutions. Our results indicate that the 
sensitivities of top executive compensation to volatility are negatively related to 
systemic risk. However, our empirical findings also demonstrate that financial 
institutions with greater managerial risk-taking incentives were associated with 
                                                        
1  Following Chava and Purnanadam (2010), we examine the effects of risk-taking 
incentives of both CEOs and CFOs. Chava and Purnanadam (2010) document that CFO 
incentives may have a stronger role than those of the CEO’s on corporate financial policies.  
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significantly higher levels of systemic risk in 2008, during the peak of the global 
financial crisis.  
Our analysis is closely related to prior literature addressing the effects of 
managerial compensation structures on bank performance and risk-taking. 2  
Previous studies have examined how different elements of top executive 
compensation and the incentives generated by managerial compensation 
structures are reflected in the riskiness of financial institutions. Using data on U.S. 
commercial banks, Chen et al. (2006) document that option-based compensation 
and the option-based wealth of bank CEOs induce greater risk-taking. DeYoung, 
Peng and Yan (2013) document that the compensation structures of CEOs are 
important determinants of bank business policies and risk-taking. Their findings 
also suggest that banks with higher CEO compensation sensitivities to volatility 
are associated with higher levels of systematic and idiosyncratic risk and are more 
involved with non-traditional banking activities. Guo, Jalal and Khaksari (2015) 
examine the relationship between CEO compensation structure and bank risk-
taking, and find that a higher proportion of incentive compensation increases 
default risk and stock return volatility. Perhaps the study most related to our 
analysis is that of Bai and Elyasiani (2013), which examines the linkage between 
bank stability and CEO’s compensation-based risk-taking incentives. They find 
that higher sensitivity of CEO compensation to stock return volatility induces risk-
taking and leads to greater bank instability.  
The linkages between executive compensation structures and bank performance 
and riskiness during the global financial crisis have been previously examined in 
Bebchuk et al. (2010), Fortin, Goldberg and Roth (2010), Fahlebrach and Stulz 
(2011), and Bhagat and Bolton (2014). These studies provide somewhat mixed 
evidence about the effects of managerial compensation incentives on bank 
outcomes amidst the recent crisis. Bebchuk et al. (2010) investigate the 
compensation structures of the top executives in Bear Stearns and Lehman 
Brothers, and conclude that the compensation arrangements in those banks may 
have provided more risk-taking incentives for the top executives. Fortin, Goldberg 
and Roth (2010) examine the determinants of bank risk-taking at the onset of the 
global financial crisis. Their empirical findings indicate that banks with higher 
CEO option-based compensation and bonuses were associated with greater risk-
taking. Fahlebrach and Stulz (2011) investigate the influence of CEO compensation 
on the stock returns and profitability of U.S. banks during the financial crisis. In 
contrast to the view that managerial compensation incentives encouraged higher 
                                                        
2  Mehran, Morrison and Shapiro (2011) and de Haan and Vlahu (2016) provide 
comprehensive reviews of the link between executive compensation of risk-taking in the 
financial industry. 
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risk-taking, Fahlebrach and Stulz (2011) document that option-based 
compensation incentives and cash bonuses were unrelated to bank performance 
during the crisis. Finally, using data on 14 of the largest U.S. financial institutions, 
Bhagat and Bolton (2014) find evidence that the incentives generated by executive 
compensation led to more bank risk-taking and contributed to the outbreak of the 
financial crisis.  
Our study builds upon the prior literature by empirically examining whether the 
systemic risk of financial institutions is associated with the compensation-based 
risk-taking incentives of their top executives. The Financial Stability Board (2009) 
defines systemic risk as “a risk of disruption to financial services that is (i) caused 
by an impairment of all or parts of the financial system and (ii) has the potential 
to have serious negative consequences for the real economy”. In this regard, 
Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon and Richardson (2017) show that 
undercapitalization of the financial sector is damaging to the real economy because 
financial institutions are highly interconnected. They define the systemic risk of an 
individual financial institution as “its propensity to be undercapitalized when the 
system as a whole is undercapitalized” and propose a market-based measure for 
estimating the systemic risk of individual financial institutions.3 As argued by 
Engle, Jondeau and Rockinger (2015), the undercapitalization of individual 
financial institutions during a crisis period is the externality that generates 
systemic risk. Thus, individual financial institutions and their interdependencies 
contribute to the overall riskiness of the financial system (Anginer, Demirguc-Kunt 
and Zhu, 2014; Acharya et al., 2017).  
Based on the findings documented in the prior literature, we presume in this paper 
that managerial risk-taking incentives may influence the level of systemic risk. The 
risk-taking incentives generated by executive compensation are generally designed 
to maximize shareholder value by decreasing managerial risk aversion so that 
managers undertake riskier but value enhancing and growth oriented investments 
(John, Litov and Yeung, 2008). As noted by Fahlebrach and Stulz (2011) among 
others, greater alignment of incentives between executives and shareholders in the 
financial industry may create a conflict between shareholder orientation and 
financial stability. Opportunistic managers may take more risks to pursue 
performance-based compensation benefits and this increased risk-taking may 
increase the downside risk of their institutions, especially during the periods of 
financial turmoil (e.g., Ang, Chen and Xing, 2006; Bai and Elyasiani, 2013; Ellul 
                                                        
3 All types of financial intermediaries can be considered systemically important (Financial 
Stability Board, 2009). Acharya (2011) notes that “for the purposes of systemic regulation, 
one should think of a ‘financial firm’ as not just the commercial bank taking deposits and 
making loans, but also include investment banks, money-market funds, insurance firms, 
and potentially even hedge funds and private equity funds”.  
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and Yerramilli, 2013; Poletti-Hughes and Ozkan, 2014). 4  Because financial 
institutions are highly interconnected and are prone to contagion (Allen and 
Carletti, 2013), the downside risk of a single financial institution can contribute to 
the overall riskiness of the financial system (Anginer, et al., 2014). We therefore 
hypothesize that managerial risk-taking incentives are positively associated with 
systemic risk. 
Over the past few years, a growing body of literature has examined how certain 
firm-specific attributes are related to the systemic risk of financial institutions. 
Studies by Brunnermeier, Dong and Palia (2012), Pais and Stork (2013), 
Mayordomo, Rodriguez-Moreno and Peña (2014), Calluzzo and Dong (2015), and 
Acharya and Thakor (2016), among others, have documented that the size of the 
institution, the amount of equity capital, and the extent of lending activities are 
important factors for explaining the cross-sectional variation in systemic risk. 
These studies indicate larger institutions with lower capital ratios and greater 
involvement in nontraditional banking activities are associated with higher levels 
of systemic risk. Closely related to our analysis, Iqbal, Strobl and Vähämaa (2015) 
and Battaglia and Gallo (2017) examine the relationship between shareholder-
focused corporate governance structures and systemic risk. Their empirical 
findings suggest that financial institutions with more shareholder-oriented 
corporate governance mechanisms and boards of directors have greater systemic 
risk. In this paper, we aim to extend the prior systemic risk literature by examining 
the linkage between systemic risk and the compensation-based risk-taking 
incentives of the top executives.  
In our empirical analysis, we use data on 71 large U.S. financial institutions over 
the period 2005-2010. Following the prior literature (e.g., Chava and Purnandam, 
2010; Fahlebrach and Stulz, 2011; Bai and Elyasiani, 2013; DeYoung et al., 2013), 
we measure the risk-taking incentives of the CEOs and CFOs with the sensitivities 
of their personal compensation to changes in the stock price and stock return 
volatility of their institutions. These two compensation sensitivities are commonly 
known as delta and vega. Delta is a relatively direct proxy for pay-performance 
sensitivity and it provides a broad measure for how well top executive incentives 
are aligned with shareholder interests (e.g., Fahlenbrach and Stulz 2011). As noted 
for example by Bai and Elyasiani (2013), vega provides an explicit measure of the 
risk-sensitivity of executive compensation. We measure the systemic risk of 
individual financial institutions with the market-based approach proposed by 
                                                        
4  Although systemic risk (the danger of a breakdown of the financial system) and 
systematic risk (the exposure of individual firms to common risk factors) are conceptually 
different risk measures, a greater amount of the systematic risk can increase systemic risk 
(Löffler and Raupach, 2018).  
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Acharya, Engle and Richardson (2012), Acharya et al. (2017), and Brownlees and 
Engle (2017). 5 Specifically, we use the marginal expected shortfall (MES) and 
systemic risk (SRISK) to gauge systemic risk. MES measures the decline of a 
financial institution’s equity capital when the market drops more than two percent 
and SRISK is the expected capital shortage of an institution during a financial 
crisis. Essentially, MES and SRISK aim to measure how exposed a given financial 
institution is to aggregate tail shocks in the financial system.6 
The empirical findings reported in this paper indicate that the relationship 
between managerial risk-taking incentives and systemic risk is ambiguous. The 
results show that the sensitivities of top executive compensation to volatility (i.e., 
the CEO and CFO vegas), are generally negatively associated with systemic risk, 
while there is essentially no relationship between pay-performance sensitivity (i.e., 
the delta) and systemic risk. Our regressions indicate that one standard deviation 
increases in CEO and CFO vegas are associated with approximately six percent 
reductions in SRISK. These findings are in stark contrast with the hypothesis that 
greater managerial risk-taking incentives would increase the level of systemic risk.  
On the other hand, our empirical results indicate that financial institutions with 
greater managerial risk-taking incentives were associated with significantly higher 
levels of systemic risk in 2008, during the peak of the global financial crisis. The 
positive association between the pre-crisis deltas and vegas of the top executives 
and systemic risk during the crisis is economically significant; our estimates 
indicate that a one standard deviation increase in deltas and vegas increases MES 
by about 25-40 basis points during the crisis. The documented positive association 
between CEO and CFO risk-taking incentives and systemic risk during the severe 
market turmoil in 2008 may indicate that financial institutions with greater 
compensation-based managerial risk-taking incentives were taking more risk 
before the crisis in order to maximize shareholder wealth, and that these risks were 
then materialized and exposed during the financial crisis (e.g., Erkens, Hung and 
Matos, 2012). This interpretation of our results is broadly consistent with the 
previous studies which suggest that banks with more shareholder-focused 
corporate governance structures were taking more risk before the crisis (e.g., 
Fortin et al., 2010; Erkens et al., 2012; Peni and Vähämaa, 2012). 
                                                        
5 Several alternative approaches for measuring systemic risk have been proposed in the 
literature in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Different approaches are discussed 
and compared, for instance, in Bisias, Flood, Lo, and Valavanis (2012), Hattori, Kikuchi, 
Niwa and Uchida (2014 ), and Kleinow, Moreira, Strobl and Vahamaa (2017). 
6 MES and SRISK are market-based measures of capital shortage during severe market 
turmoil. A firm is considered to be as systemically risky if it is likely to face a capital 
shortage during the periods of financial turmoil (Acharya et al., 2017). This capital shortage 
can be damaging to the real economy because the failure of a systemically risky firm will 
have effects throughout the financial industry (Acharya et al., 2017).  
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The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and 
introduces the variables used in our empirical analysis. Section 3 presents the 
methods and reports our empirical findings on the association between managerial 
risk-taking incentives and the systemic risk of financial institutions. The final 
section summarizes the findings and concludes the paper. 
2. Data and variables 
We use data on 71 large, publicly traded U.S. financial institutions spanning the 
period 2005-2010. The data on CEO and CFO compensation, systemic risk, and 
financial statement and balance sheet variables of the financial institutions are 
obtained from S&P Capital IQ’s ExecuComp, the V-Lab of the Stern School of 
Business of New York University, and the Bureau van Dijk Bankscope, 
respectively. Our initial sample consists of the 98 financial institutions examined 
in Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) and we eliminate from this initial sample the 
institutions with missing or insufficient executive compensation and systemic risk 
data on Execucomp and/or V-Lab. This leaves us with a sample of 71 individual 
financial institutions and an unbalanced panel of 332 firm-year observations.7 The 
sample includes commercial banks, investment banks, non-bank lending 
institutions, and financial services firms. The list of financial institutions included 
in the sample is presented in Appendix 1.  
2.1. Systemic risk    
Our dependent variable is the systemic risk of individual financial institutions. 
Systemic risk of a financial institution can be broadly defined as a measure of how 
much an individual institution contributes to the tail of the system’s loss 
distribution (see e.g., Acharya et al., 2012; Anginer et al., 2014; Acharya et al., 
2017). The global financial crisis prompted considerable interest in the 
measurement of systemic risk and several alternative risk metrics have been 
proposed in the literature in recent years (for surveys, see e.g. Bisias et al., 2012 
and Hattori et al., 2014). These alternative approaches to measuring systemic risk 
can be classified into accounting-based and market-based risk measures. The 
accounting-based systemic risk measures are estimated from balance sheet 
variables and are by construction backward-looking, while the market-based 
measures utilize financial market data and can thereby provide a timelier estimate 
of systemic risk. 
                                                        
7 Several recent studies have used relatively small samples of financial institutions (see e.g., 
Chen et al., 2006; Fortin et al., 2010; Fahlenbrach and Stultz, 2011; Adams and Mehran, 
2012; Peni and Vähämaa, 2012; Peni, Smith and Vähämaa, 2013; Mayordomo et al., 2014; 
Iqbal et al., 2015).  
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In our empirical analysis, we apply the market-based approach developed by 
Acharya et al. (2012), Acharya et al. (2017), and Brownlees and Engle (2017) to 
gauge systemic risk. Specifically, we utilize the marginal expected shortfall (MES) 
and systemic risk (SRISK) obtained from the NYU Stern’s V-Lab to measure the 
systemic risk of individual financial institutions. These two systemic risk metrics 
are estimated from stock market data and attempt to capture the capital shortfall 
of an institution during periods of market stress based on its stock return volatility 
and correlation with the market. Essentially, MES and SRISK measure how 
exposed a given financial institution is to aggregate tail shocks in the stock 
markets. We use the year-end (December) estimates of MES and SRISK as the 
dependent variable in our analysis.  
SRISK can be defined as the amount of “capital that a firm is expected to need if 
we have another financial crisis” (Acharya et al., 2012). Formally, SRISK for a 
financial institution i at time t can be expressed as: 
 Crisis ShortfallCapitalE SRISK iti,ti  ,          (1) 
Capital Shortfall in Equation (1) is determined under the assumption that the book 
value of debt of a financial institution would remain relatively unchanged if a crisis 
occurred within the next six months whereas the value of equity would decline. 
The computation of SRISK is based on MES which measures the expected loss of 
equity capital during periods of market stress. MES can be broadly interpreted as 
the marginal contribution of an individual financial institution to the overall 
systemic risk, with higher MES reflecting a greater contribution of the institution 
to the aggregate level of systemic risk. If a financial institution has high levels of 
MES, most of the institution’s equity capital will be depleted during a financial 
crisis, and hence, the institution will be in danger of failure. This also implies that 
undercapitalization of financial institutions contributes positively to the overall 
systemic risk in the financial system (Engle et al. 2015; Acharya et al., 2017; 
Brownlees and Engle, 2017).  
Acharya et al. (2012) define MES as the expected daily percentage decrease in the 
value of equity of an individual financial institution when the aggregate stock 
market declines by more than two percent. By extrapolating MES to a longer and 
more severe period of market stress, Acharya et al. (2012) obtain the long run 
marginal expected shortfall (LRMES) which can be approximated as: 
 titi MES LRMES ,, 18exp1 u                                                                                     (2) 
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Based on LRMES, Acharya et al. (2012) estimate SRISK of financial institution i at 
time t as follows:  
 
 > @CrisisEquityEquityDebtkESRISK tititititi ,,,,,                                                      (3) 
     titititi EquityLRMESkDebtkSRISK ,,,, 11                                                          (4) 
where k denotes the prudential capital ratio which is taken to be eight percent, 
LRMES is the long run marginal expected shortfall, Equity is the market value of 
equity, and Debt is the market value of debt. Hence, SRISK is the amount of equity 
capital needed by a financial institution in a severe crisis in which the current 
equity value falls according to the LRMES and the level of debt stays constant. 
MES and SRISK are estimated from historical stock price data. First, MES, or the 
expected daily decrease in equity value of a financial institution when the aggregate 
stock markets declines by more than two percent is calculated based on the 
institution’s stock return volatility, correlation with the aggregate market, and 
extreme stock price movements. Then, these MES estimates are extrapolated to a 
financial crisis. Based on these extrapolated decreases in equity value, and under 
the assumption that a financial institution needs at least eight percent of equity 
capital relative to the value of assets, SRISK is computed as the expected amount 
of equity capital that the institution would need to raise during a severe financial 
crisis. A more detailed description of the estimation of MES and SRISK can be 
found in Acharya et al. (2012), Acharya et al. (2017), and Brownlees and Engle 
(2017). 
2.2. CEO and CFO risk-taking incentives   
The main independent variables in our empirical analysis are measures of risk-
taking incentives generated by executive compensation. Following the prior 
literature on compensation-based incentives (see e.g., Chava and Purnandam, 
2010; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Kini and Williams, 2012), we measure the risk-
taking incentives of the CEOs and CFOs with the sensitivities of their personal 
compensation to changes in the stock price and stock return volatility of their 
institutions. More specifically, we utilize the delta and vega of the stock option 
holdings of individual executives as proxies for the compensation-based risk-
taking incentives of the top executives.  
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CEO delta and CFO delta measure the dollar gain or loss in personal executive 
wealth for a one percent change in the stock price of the financial institution. 8 
Consequently, delta is a relatively direct proxy for pay-performance sensitivity and 
it provides a broad measure of how well managerial incentives are aligned with 
shareholder interests (e.g., Fahlenbrach and Stulz 2011). The delta also provides 
an indirect measure of managerial risk-taking incentives because in order to 
increase shareholder wealth and their own compensation, the top executives are 
incentivized to take risks that ultimately increase the overall risk exposure of the 
firm (Chava and Purnanadam, 2010; Kini and Williams, 2012). CEO vega and CFO 
vega measure the dollar gain or loss in personal executive wealth for a one 
percentage point change in the stock return volatility of the financial institution. 
As discussed by Bai and Elyasiani (2013), vega is an explicit measure of risk-
sensitivity of executive compensation, and thereby it provides a direct proxy for 
the compensation-based risk-taking incentives of the top executives.  
We follow the approach of Core and Guay (2002) and Fahlenbrach and Stulz 
(2011) to calculate the deltas and vegas for the top executives in each financial 
institution. Specifically, we collect data on the components of CEO and CFO 
compensation from ExecuComp.9 The deltas and vegas are calculated based on the 
Black-Scholes option valuation model using detailed information on fiscal year-
end outstanding option grants awarded to the CEOs and CFOs.10 For each option 
grant, we obtain the strike prices and expiration dates from ExecuComp. We use 
the fiscal year-end stock price and stock return volatility over the previous three 
years as the Black-Scholes inputs for stock price and volatility, and the 10-year 
Treasury rate is used as a proxy for the risk-free interest rate. With these inputs, 
the deltas and vegas can be computed as the first partial derivatives of the Black-
Scholes model with respect to stock price and volatility, respectively. By 
aggregating the deltas and vegas on each option grant for each executive, we are 
able to measure the changes in personal executive wealth associated with changes 
in stock price and stock return volatility. 
                                                        
8 Following Chava and Purnanandam (2010) and Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), we use 
dollar gain or loss to compute deltas and vegas.   
9  We identify CEO and CFO of each financial institution from the “CEOANN” and 
“CFOANN” variables, respectively. Because of missing information for CFOs in 
ExecuComp database, the number of observations is lower for CFO delta and vega. To 
ensure that we have the correct CEOs and especially CFOs, we manually match the names 
of the CEOs and CFOs from the proxy statements of the financial institutions. 
10 In 2004, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued FAS 123R and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted new disclosure requirements for 
executive compensation that require firms to report detailed information on the 
compensation of at least five highest-paid executives. Given these disclosure requirements, 
firms have to report outstanding equity awards at fiscal year-end by providing detailed 
information about outstanding option grants, including the exercise prices and expiration 
dates of the options.  
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2.3. Control variables    
We employ a number of control variables in our empirical analysis to account for 
the potentially confounding effects of institution-specific factors on the level of 
systemic risk. Previous studies have documented that the riskiness of financial 
institutions is related to variables such as size, capital ratio, profitability, growth, 
and asset and income structure (see e.g., Pathan, 2009; Fortin et al., 2010; 
Brunnermeier et al., 2012; Bai and Elyasiani, 2013; Iqbal et al, 2015; Berger, 
Roman and Sedunov, 2016).  
Firm size is often considered the most important control variable when comparing 
financial institutions because different sized organizations may have very different 
characteristics, business strategies, governance mechanisms, and product 
compositions (Peni et al., 2013, Palvia et al., 2015). Moreover, larger institutions 
are likely to have greater systemic importance. Following the prior banking 
literature (e.g., Laeven and Levine, 2009; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; DeYoung et al., 
2013; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013), we measure the size of the financial institutions 
(Size) by the natural logarithm of total assets. With respect to systemic risk, 
Brunnermeier et al. (2012), Pais and Stork (2013), and Iqbal et al. (2015) document 
that larger financial institutions are associated with higher levels of systemic risk, 
while Mayordomo et al. (2014) do not find any significant relation between 
systemic risk and bank size.   
The second important variable that needs to be controlled for when comparing 
financial institutions is the amount of equity capital. The capital ratio is the main 
variable of interest for banking supervisors and regulators.  The amount of equity 
capital is the predominant factor in reducing insolvency risk and capital ratio can 
be considered as a proxy for the soundness and financial health of the institution. 
We measure Capital ratio as the ratio of equity capital to total assets. Brownlees 
and Engle (2017) posit that the degree of undercapitalization of financial 
institutions can impose significant negative externalities on the real economy and 
reflects the level of systemic risk when the entire financial system is 
undercapitalized. Moreover, Acharya and Thakor (2016), Brunnermeier et al. 
(2012), and Mayordomo et al. (2014) have documented that capital ratio is an 
important factor for explaining the systemic risk of individual financial 
institutions.11  
                                                        
11 The systemic risk of an individual financial institution is the contribution of an individual 
financial institution to the downside risk of the whole financial system (Anginer et al. 
2014). Acharya et al. (2017) define systemic risk of an individual financial institution as “its 
propensity to be undercapitalized when the system as a whole is undercapitalized”. 
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Furthermore, following the prior bank risk-taking literature, we control for the 
financial performance, growth, and asset and income structure of the financial 
institutions. We measure profitability of the institutions with Return on assets 
which is computed as the ratio of net income to total assets. Profitability can be 
seen as a crude proxy of management quality and more profitable institutions may 
be in better positions to build capital buffers and to reduce systemic risk. Previous 
studies have documented a negative association between profitability and systemic 
risk (Iqbal et al., 2015; Berger et al., 2016). We use the annual percentage change 
in the amount of outstanding loans as a proxy for the growth of the institutions 
(Growth). The growth rate is an important determinant of the riskiness of financial 
institutions (Foos, Norden, and Weber, 2010). We utilize the ratio of net loans to 
total assets (Loans to assets) and total deposits divided by total assets (Deposits to 
assets) to control for the asset and liability structures of the financial institutions. 
These variables reflect the lending and funding risks of the institutions. Finally, we 
use the ratio of non-interest income to total income (Non-interest income) to 
control for the level of income diversification and the differences in business 
models across institutions. The balance sheet and income statement data for our 
control variables are collected from the Bureau van Dijk Bankscope. 
3. Empirical analysis 
3.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations    
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in our empirical 
analysis. The table illustrates that the financial institutions in our sample are very 
heterogeneous in terms of the compensation-based risk-taking incentives of their 
top executives. CEO delta takes values from a minimum of about USD 700 to a 
maximum of USD 53.1 million, while CFO delta takes varies between USD 50 and 
USD 38.2 million. The mean CEO delta of USD 1.6 million is about four times 
larger than the mean CFO delta of USD 400,000, as is the mean CEO vega of USD 
320,000 compared to the mean CFO vega of USD 81,000. The mean and median 
values of the CEO deltas and CEO vegas over the sample period are plotted in 
Figure 1. Regarding the systemic risk measures, Table 1 shows that our sample 
contains financial institutions associated with very different levels of systemic risk. 
MES varies from a minimum of 0.8 percent to a maximum of 8.7 percent with a 
mean of 2.1 percent, while SRISK ranges from –67.7 billion to 136.5 billion with a 
mean value of 4.1 billion USD. 
(insert Table 1 about here) 
The descriptive statistics for the control variables in Table 1 demonstrate that our 
sample comprises very divergent types of financial institutions. Although all firms 
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in our sample are large, publicly traded financial institutions, the amount of total 
assets (Size) varies substantially from about USD 540 million to USD 3.2 trillion. 
The inclusion of commercial banks as well as other types of financial institutions 
(investment banks, non-bank lending institutions, and financial services firms) in 
our sample is manifested in the considerable variation of the asset and income 
structure variables (Loans to assets, Deposits to assets, and Non-interest income). 
Overall, it can be concluded from the descriptive statistics that our empirical 
analysis is based on a heterogeneous sample of financial institutions.  
(insert Figure 1 about here) 
Pairwise correlations between the two systemic risk measures, managerial risk-
taking incentives, and the control variables are presented in Table 2. The strong 
positive correlations between the systemic risk measures and the deltas and vegas 
of the top executives suggest that financial institutions with greater managerial 
risk-taking incentives are generally associated with higher levels of systemic risk. 
Thus, the correlations provide support for the view that compensation-based risk-
taking incentives of the top executives encourage risk-taking in the financial 
industry. The correlations in Table 2 also demonstrate that MES and SRISK are 
strongly positively correlated with each other (0.74), and furthermore, that the 
risk-taking incentives of the CEOs and CFOs are strongly positively correlated.12 
Given the high correlations between CEO delta and CFO delta (0.93) and CEO 
vega and CFO vega (0.99), we estimate separate regression models for CEO and 
CFO risk-taking incentives.  
(insert Table 2 about here) 
With respect to the control variables, it can be noted from Table 2 that the risk-
taking incentives of the CEOs and CFOs as well as the two systemic risk measures 
are positively correlated with the Size. Hence, these correlations indicate that 
larger financial institutions are associated with higher levels of systemic risk and 
that the top executives of larger institutions have stronger personal incentives to 
increase firm-level risk-taking. Our systemic risk measures MES and SRISK also 
appear to be strongly negatively correlated with Loans to assets and positively 
correlated with Non-interest income, suggesting that financial institutions that are 
more involved with traditional banking activities are associated with lower 
systemic risk. Finally, it is worth noting from Table 2 that several of our control 
variables are relatively highly correlated with each other. 13  The strongest 
                                                        
12 We conduct additional tests to ensure that our findings are not affected by the strong 
correlations between the deltas and vegas. 
13 Given these correlations, we perform several robustness checks to ascertain that our 
results are not affected by multicollinearity. 
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correlations observed among the control variables are those between Capital ratio 
and Return on assets (0.55) and Loans to assets and Non-interest income (-0.65). 
3.2. Univariate tests 
We first examine the relationship between managerial risk-incentives and 
systemic risk in a univariate setting. For this purpose, we divide the financial 
institutions into two subsamples based on the level of systemic risk. The first 
subsample consists of firm-year observations with MES in the top quartile (high 
systemic risk) and the second subsample comprises firm-year observations with 
MES in the bottom quartile (low systemic risk). Table 3 reports the results of two-
tailed t-tests with the null hypothesis that there are no differences in the means of 
the top executive deltas and vegas and the control variables between the high and 
low systemic risk subsamples.14 Interestingly, the t-tests indicate that there are no 
statistically significant differences in the CEO and CFO risk-taking incentives 
between the financial institutions associated with high and low systemic risk. Thus, 
in contrast to our expectations, the univariate tests do not provide support for the 
view that greater managerial risk-taking incentives would contribute positively to 
the level of systemic risk. 
(insert Table 3 about here) 
Regarding the control variables, it can be noted from Table 3 that the high systemic 
risk institutions are very different from the low systemic risk institutions. 
Specifically, the univariate tests show that financial institutions associated with 
higher systemic risk are significantly larger and have higher capital ratios. 
Moreover, the statistically significant differences between the two subsamples in 
terms of Loans to assets, Deposits to assets, and Non-interest income suggest that 
the high systemic risk institutions are more involved in non-traditional banking 
activities. 
3.3. Regression results 
We examine the association between managerial risk-taking incentives and 
systemic by estimating alternative versions of the following panel regressions 
specification:  
14  We also perform the Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney median tests to examine differences 
between the high and low systemic risk subsamples. The results are consistent with the t-
tests reported in Table 3.  
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where the dependent variable Riski,t is one of the two alternative systemic risk 
measures for financial institution i at time t. The first risk measure is the marginal 
expected shortfall, MES, calculated as the expected daily decrease in equity value 
of a financial institution when the aggregate stock market falls more than two 
percent. The second risk measure is systemic risk, SRISK, defined as the expected 
capital shortfall of a financial institution in a crisis scenario. Delta and Vega 
measure the compensation-based risk-taking incentives of the CEOs and CFOs. 
Delta is the sensitivity of executive compensation to changes in stock price, while 
Vega is the sensitivity of executive compensation to changes in stock return 
volatility. In the regressions, we use natural logarithms of MES, SRISK, Delta, and 
Vega. Given the high correlations between CEO and CFO risk-taking incentives, 
we do not include the deltas and vegas of the CEOs and CFOs simultaneously in 
the regressions. In addition to the baseline specification, we also estimate modified 
versions of Equation (5) in which we interact the deltas and vegas with a dummy 
variable for year 2008. With these additional specifications, we aim to assess the 
potential effects of the financial crisis on the relation between managerial risk-
taking incentives and systemic risk.  
The control variables in Equation (5) are defined as follows: Size is measured as 
the logarithm of total assets, Capital ratio is the ratio of equity to total assets, 
Return on assets is the ratio of net income to total assets, Loans to assets is the 
ratio of net loans to totals assets, Loan growth is the percentage change in loans 
from year t–1 to year t, Deposits to assets is the ratio of deposits to total assets, and 
Non-interest income is the ratio of non-interest income to total income. Following 
the prior literature, all the independent variables are lagged by one year. Our 
regressions include year fixed-effects (Year) to control for time-specific 
unobservable factors which may influence systemic risk and we also include bank-
type fixed-effects (Bank-type) for different types of financial institutions based on 
SIC codes to control for potentially omitted variables and unobserved 
heterogeneity. Throughout the regressions, we use robust standard errors which 
are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm to account for the 
potential correlation across observations of the same financial institution over 
time. 
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The regression results with marginal expected shortfall, MES, as the dependent 
variable are reported in Table 4. CEO risk-taking incentives are used as the 
independent variables of interest in Models 1-3 and CFO incentives in Models 4-6. 
For both CEO and CFO risk-taking incentives, we first estimate the regressions by 
including Delta and Vega in the same regression with all of the control variables 
(Models 1 and 4). We then estimate four alternative interaction specifications in 
which the CEO and CFO deltas are interacted with a dummy variable for the crisis 
year 2008 (Models 2 and 5) and in which the CEO and CFO vegas are interacted 
with the same dummy (Models 3 and 6).  As can be seen from Table 4, the adjusted 
R2s of our alternative regression specifications vary between 64 and 72 percent and 
the F-statistics are all statistically significant at the 1 percent level, indicating a 
good fit of the models.15 
(insert Table 4 about here) 
The main variables of interest in our regressions are Delta and Vega and the two 
interaction variables Delta u Year2008 and Vega u Year2008. As can be noted from 
Table 4, the coefficient estimates for CEO delta and CEO vega in Model 1 are 
statistically insignificant, suggesting that MES is not affected by CEO risk-taking 
incentives. However, after the inclusion of the crisis interactions in Models 2 and 
3, the coefficient estimate for CEO vega is negative and statistically significant and 
the coefficients for the both interaction variables CEO delta u Year2008 and CEO 
vega u Year2008 are positive and highly significant. Accordingly, our estimates 
indicate that financial institutions led by CEOs with greater compensation-based 
risk-taking incentives were associated with significantly higher MES in the midst 
of the global financial crisis in 2008.  
In Models 4-6 with CFO risk-taking incentives as the variables of interest, the 
coefficients for CFO delta are negative and statistically significant, suggesting that 
MES is lower for institutions with greater CFO pay-performance sensitivity. This 
finding is inconsistent with the view that compensation-based managerial 
incentives encourage greater risk-taking. Nevertheless, similar to the CEO 
incentive regressions, the coefficient estimates for both interaction variables CFO 
delta u Year2008 and CFO vega u Year2008 are positive and statistically significant 
at the 1 percent level in Models 5 and 6. Since delta and vega are proxies of 
managerial risk-taking incentives, the interaction regressions in Table 4 suggest 
that financial institutions with greater compensation-based risk-taking incentives 
                                                        
15 The adjusted R2 is 26 percent when only the control variables are used as the independent 
variables. After the inclusion of bank-type and year fixed-effects, the adjusted R2 is about 
58 percent.  
118     Acta Wasaensia 
of the top executives at the onset of the financial crisis were associated with higher 
levels of systemic risk during the severe financial market turmoil in 2008. 
In addition to being statistically significant, the coefficients for the interaction 
variables in Table 4 can also be considered economically significant. The 
coefficient estimate for CEO delta u Year2008 in Model 2 suggests that a one 
standard deviation increase in the pre-crisis CEO delta would be associated with a 
30 basis point increase in MES in the year 2008. Similarly, the magnitudes of the 
statistically significant coefficients for CEO vega and CEO vega u Year2008 in 
Model 3 jointly imply that a one standard deviation increase in pre-crisis vega of 
the CEO increases MES by approximately 40 basis points during the financial 
crisis. Consistent with Models 2 and 3, the estimates for the CFO risk-taking 
incentives in Models 5 and 6 indicate that one standard deviation increases in CFO 
delta and CFO vega are associated with about 25 basis point increase in MES 
amidst the crisis. Given that the average book value of equity for the financial 
institutions in our sample is about USD 16 billion, these 25-40 basis point 
increases in MES are economically highly significant.  
With respect to the control variables, the regression results in Table 4 show that 
systemic risk as measured by MES is statistically significantly positively associated 
with Size and Non-interest income and negatively associated with Return on 
assets. Thus, our estimates suggest that larger financial institutions which are 
more involved in non-traditional banking activities and institutions with weaker 
financial performance are associated with higher levels of systemic risk. 
(insert Table 5 about here) 
Table 5 reports the regression results with systemic risk, SRISK, as the dependent 
variable. Similar to Table 4, CEO risk-taking incentives are used as the 
independent variables of interest in Models 1-3, while CFO incentives are used in 
Models 4-6. As can be noted from Table 5, the F-statistics for all six model 
specifications are statistically significant at the 1 percent level and the adjusted R2s 
of the estimated regressions range from 31 percent to 57 percent.  
Overall, the estimates of the SRISK regressions in Table 5 are very similar to the 
MES regressions reported in Table 4. The most notable differences between the 
two sets of results are the statistically significant coefficients for CEO vega in 
Model 1 and CFO vega in Model 4. These negative and highly significant 
coefficients indicate that financial institutions with greater risk-sensitivities of the 
top executives are generally associated with lower levels of systemic risk. The 
coefficient estimates indicate that a 10 percent increase in CEO vega would 
decrease SRISK by 0.7 percent, while a corresponding increase in CFO vega is 
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associated with a 1.2 percent decrease in SRISK. Furthermore, one standard 
deviation increases in CEO vega and CFO vega would decrease SRISK by 
approximately 6.0 percent. The average SRISK for the institutions included in our 
sample is about USD 4.1 billion, and therefore, these reductions in SRISK can be 
considered economically significant. The documented negative linkage between 
CEO and CFO vegas and SRISK contrasts with the hypothesis that higher 
managerial risk-taking incentives would contribute positively to the level of 
systemic risk. Consistent with the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), this 
negative association between vegas and systemic risk may suggest that the top 
executives of financial institutions tend to be risk averse. 
Similar to Table 4, the coefficient estimates for the interaction variables Delta u 
Year2008 and Vega u Year2008 are positive and statistically significant at the 1 
percent level in all four interaction regressions. Thus, consistent with our MES 
regressions, the regressions in Table 5 suggest that financial institutions with 
greater risk-taking incentives of the top executives prior the financial crisis were 
associated with higher levels of systemic risk during the crisis. Nevertheless, the 
magnitudes of the coefficients indicate that the positive association between 
managerial risk-taking incentives and SRISK in the midst of the financial crisis is 
rather marginal. The estimates of Models 2 and 3 imply that a 10 percent increase 
in pre-crisis CEO delta and CEO vega would increase SRISK by less than 0.10 
percent during the financial crisis. With respect to CFO incentives, the estimates 
of Model 5 and 6 suggest that 10 percent increases (one standard deviation 
increases) in pre-crisis CFO delta and CFO vega are associated with 0.6 percent 
(4.7 percent) and 0.3 percent (1.4 percent) increases in SRISK, respectively. With 
average SRISK of about USD 4.1 billion, these increases in SRISK during the crisis 
can be considered economically significant. 
The coefficient estimates for the control variables in Table 5 indicate that systemic 
risk is significantly negatively related to Return on assets, Loans to assets, and 
Non-interest income, while being positively associated with Size. This suggests 
that systemically more risky financial institutions are larger and have lower 
profitability, lower amounts of outstanding loans, and less income diversification. 
In general, the regression results reported in Tables 4 and 5 provide mixed 
evidence about the linkage between top executive risk-taking incentives and the 
systemic risk of financial institutions. On the one hand, our results indicate that 
the sensitivities of CEO and CFO compensation to stock return volatility are 
negatively associated with the systemic risk of financial institutions over our 
sample period 2005-2010. This finding is in stark contrast with the hypothesis that 
higher managerial risk-taking incentives would increase the level of systemic risk. 
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On the other hand, our regressions demonstrate that financial institutions with 
greater managerial risk-taking incentives were associated with significantly higher 
levels of MES and SRISK in the midst of the global financial crisis in 2008. 
Nevertheless, taken as a whole, the regressions in Tables 4 and 5 together with the 
univariate tests in Table 3 do not provide strong support for the view that the risk-
taking incentives of the top executives contribute positively to the level of systemic 
risk.  
3.4. Robustness checks  
We perform several additional tests to investigate the robustness of our findings. 
First, in order to ensure that the high correlations between the managerial risk-
taking incentive variables do not affect our results, we re-estimate Models 1 and 4 
in Tables 4 and 5 using only one incentive variable at a time (not tabulated). 
Similar to Model 1 in Table 4, the coefficients for CEO delta and CEO vega with 
MES as the dependent variable are statistically insignificant even when these 
variables are not used simultaneously in the regression. In contrast to our main 
analysis, the coefficient estimates for CFO delta and CFO vega are negative and 
statistically significant in the MES regressions (Model 4 in Table 4) and the 
coefficients for CEO delta and CFO delta are negative and significant at the 1 
percent level in the SRISK regressions (Models 1 and 4 in Table 5). The coefficients 
for CEO vega and CFO vega in the regressions with SRISK as the dependent 
variable are negative and highly significant consistent with Models 1 and 4 in Table 
5. Thus, these additional regressions strongly suggest that financial institutions 
with greater compensation-based managerial risk-taking incentives are generally 
associated with lower systemic risk. 
Second, following Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), we re-estimate all our regression 
specifications by using the sums of CEO and CFO deltas and CEO and CFO vegas 
as the incentive variables. Fahlebrach and Stulz (2011) use the combined 
incentives of the top five highest-paid executives, whereas we only combine the 
deltas and vegas of the CEOs and CFOs. The estimates of these additional 
regressions (not tabulated) are very similar to the estimates reported in Table 4 
and 5. The coefficients for the combined deltas and vegas as well as for the 
interaction variables have the same signs and also largely the same significance 
levels as in our main analysis.  
Third, we winsorize all the variables at the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles to examine 
whether our findings are affected by outliers or extreme observations. When the 
regressions are re-estimated with the winsorized variables (not tabulated), the 
coefficients for the risk-taking incentive variables remain virtually unchanged. 
Once again, the estimates indicate that CEO vega and CFO vega are significantly 
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negatively associated with SRISK, and the positive and significant coefficients for 
the interaction variables demonstrate that financial institutions with greater 
managerial risk-taking incentives in 2007 were associated with higher MES and 
SRISK amidst the financial crisis in 2008.We therefore conclude that our 
empirical findings are not driven by outliers.  
Fourth, we re-estimate the regressions by using firm fixed-effects instead of bank-
type fixed-effects to control for omitted variables and unobserved heterogeneity. 
The estimation results with firm fixed-effects (not tabulated) are broadly 
consistent with our main regressions. Specifically, the coefficient estimates for the 
interaction variables Delta u Year2008 and Vega u Year2008 are always positive and 
statistically significant, and therefore suggest that the level of systemic risk during 
the financial crisis was higher for financial institutions with greater managerial 
risk-taking incentives.  
Fifth, we estimate parsimonious versions of the regressions with Size, Capital 
ratio, and Return on assets as the only control variables to ascertain that our 
findings are not driven by spurious correlations between the variables used in the 
regressions. Again, the coefficients for the variables of interest (not tabulated) are 
consistent with our main analysis. Our parsimonious regressions indicate that 
managerial risk-taking incentives are generally negatively associated with 
systemic risk, while being significantly positively associated with the level of risk 
during the severe financial market turmoil in 2008. 
Sixth, we investigate whether our findings are affected by firm-size effects. For this 
purpose, we divide our sample into two subsamples based on firm-size and then 
re-estimate the regressions (not tabulated). We exclude either the largest 10 
percent or the smallest 10 percent of the financial institutions from the sample. 
The regressions results based on these two subsamples are very similar to the 
results reported in Tables 4 and 5 and the coefficients for the deltas and vegas as 
well as for the crisis interaction variables have the same signs and mostly the same 
significance levels as in our main regressions. This suggests that our empirical 
findings are not driven by the largest or the smallest institutions included in the 
sample.  
Seventh, we examine the sensitivity of our results to the sample period used in the 
regressions. Specifically, we re-estimate the regressions using three different 
truncated subsamples (not tabulated). The first truncated subsample excludes the 
first sample year 2005, the second subsample excludes the crisis year 2008, and 
the third excludes the last sample year 2010. When either year 2005 or 2010 is 
excluded, the results are broadly consistent with the estimates reported in Table 4 
and 5, and indicate that financial institutions with greater managerial risk-taking 
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at the onset of the financial crisis incentives were associated with higher MES and 
SRISK during the crisis in 2008. When we exclude the crisis year 2008 from the 
sample, the coefficient estimates for CEO vega and CFO vega are negative and 
statistically highly significant both in the MES and SRISK regressions, and the 
coefficients for CEO delta and CFO delta are statistically insignificant. This 
provides additional evidence that the sensitivities of top executive compensation 
to stock return volatility are negatively associated with the systemic risk of 
financial institutions, at least outside crisis periods.  
Eighth, in order to further examine the effects of the financial crisis on our 
findings, we exclude “troubled” financial institutions from the sample and then re-
estimate the regressions (not tabulated). We define “troubled” financial 
institutions as those institutions that either failed or reported losses in excess of 
two percent of total assets during the crisis. The regression results without the 
“troubled” institutions are very similar to the estimates reported in Tables 4 and 5. 
The overall association between managerial risk-taking incentives and systemic 
risk is negative, and the positive and statistically significant coefficients for Delta 
u Year2008 and Vega u Year2008 indicate that financial institutions with greater 
managerial risk-taking incentives were positively associated with systemic risk 
amidst the crisis in 2008. 
Finally, given that our sample contains different types of financial institutions, we 
examine the robustness of our results by restricting the sample to commercial 
banks and other lending institutions with a net loans to total assets ratio of at least 
30 percent. When the regressions are re-estimated with this restricted sample (not 
tabulated), the results are similar to our main analysis. Once again, the coefficients 
for the interaction variables Delta u Year2008 and Vega u Year2008 are positive and 
statistically significant both in the MES and SRISK regressions, and therefore 
suggest that the pre-crisis risk-taking incentives of the top executives are positively 
association with systemic risk during the crisis. Thus, we conclude that our results 
are robust to the exclusion of investment banks and non-bank financial services 
firms from the sample. 
4. Conclusions 
Politicians, regulators, and bank supervision authorities have emphasized the focal 
role of executive compensation policies at banking organizations in the 
development of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009. Moreover, the financial 
crisis highlighted the importance of systemic risk and the fact that risk-taking of 
individual institutions may create substantial negative externalities on the 
financial system. In this paper, we examine the linkage between systemic risk and 
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compensation-based risk-taking incentives of the top executives. The risk-taking 
incentives generated by executive compensation programs are generally designed 
to maximize shareholder value by mitigating managerial risk aversion. However, 
given the unique risk environment where financial institutions are protected by 
implicit and explicit government guarantees (Acharya, 2009, 2011; Acharya, 
Anginer and Warburton, 2016), a greater alignment of incentives between 
executives and shareholders may encourage excessive risk-taking in the financial 
industry.  
In our empirical analysis, we use data on large, publicly traded U.S. financial 
institutions to empirically examine whether systemic risk is associated with the 
risk-taking incentives generated by executive compensation. We measure the risk-
taking incentives of CEOs and CFOs with the sensitivities of their personal 
compensation to changes in the stock price and stock return volatility of their 
institutions. Furthermore, we use the marginal expected shortfall (MES) and 
systemic risk (SRISK) proposed by Acharya et al. (2012), Acharya et al. (2017), and 
Brownlees and Engle (2017) to gauge the systemic risk of individual financial 
institutions. MES and SRISK provide a measure of the exposure of a given financial 
institution to aggregate tail shocks in the financial system. 
We find an ambiguous relationship between managerial risk-taking incentives and 
systemic risk. Our empirical findings indicate that the sensitivities of top executive 
compensation to volatility are generally negatively associated with systemic risk, 
while the relation between executive pay-performance sensitivity and systemic risk 
is virtually nonexistent. These findings are in stark contrast with the hypothesis 
that greater compensation-based managerial risk-taking incentives would 
increase the level of systemic risk. However, our empirical findings also 
demonstrate that financial institutions with greater managerial risk-taking 
incentives were associated with significantly higher levels of systemic risk in 2008 
during the global financial crisis. Our estimates suggest that one standard 
deviation increases in the pre-crisis risk-taking incentives increase MES by about 
25-40 basis points and SRISK by several percentage points during the crisis. This 
positive association between CEO and CFO risk-taking incentives and systemic 
risk during the severe market turmoil in 2008 may indicate that financial 
institutions with greater compensation-based risk-taking incentives were taking 
more risk before the crisis in order to maximize shareholder wealth, and that these 
risks were then materialized and exposed during the financial crisis. 
 
 
  
124     Acta Wasaensia 
References 
Acharya, V. 2009. A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank 
regulation. Journal of Financial Stability, 5(3), 224–255. 
Acharya, V. 2011. Systemic risk and macro-prudential regulation. Working paper, 
New York University. 
Acharya, V., & Thakor, A. 2016. The dark side of liquidity creation: Leverage and 
systemic risk. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 28, 4–21.  
Acharya, V., Engle, R., & Richardson, M. 2012. Capital shortfall: A new approach 
to ranking and regulating systemic risks. American Economic Review Papers and 
Proceedings, 102(3), 59-64.  
Acharya, V., Pedersen, L. H., Philippon, T., & Richardson, M. 2017. Measuring 
systemic risk. Review of Financial Studies, 30(1), 2-47. 
Adams, R., & Mehran, H. 2012. Bank board structure and performance: evidence 
for large bank holding companies. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 21(2), 
243-267. 
Allen, F., & Carletti, E. 2013. What Is Systemic Risk? Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking, 45(1), 121–127. 
Ang, A., Chen, J., & Xing, Y. 2006. Downside risk. Review of Financial Studies, 19, 
1191–1239. 
Ang, Andrew, Joseph Chen, and Yuhang Xing, 2006, Downside risk, Review of 
Financial Studies 
Ang, Andrew, Joseph Chen, and Yuhang Xing, 2006, Downside risk, Review of 
Financial Studies 
Anginer, D., Demirguc-Kunt, A., & Zhu, M. 2014. How does competition affect 
bank systemic risk? Journal of Financial Intermediation, 23(1), 1–26. 
Bai, G., & Elyasiani, E. 2013. Bank stability and managerial compensation. Journal 
of Banking and Finance, 37(3), 799-813. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010). Principles for Enhancing 
Corporate Governance. Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International Settlements. 
Battaglia, F., & Gallo, A. 2017. Strong boards, ownership concentration and EU 
banks’ systemic risk-taking: Evidence from the financial crisis. Journal of 
International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 46, 128-146. 
Bebchuk, L. A., & Spamann, H. 2010. Regulating bankers’ pay. Georgetown Law 
Journal, 98(2), 247-287.   
Acta Wasaensia     125 
Bebchuk, L. A., Cohen, A., & Spamann, H. 2010. The wages of failure: Executive 
compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008. Yale Journal on 
Regulation, 27(2), 257. 
Beltratti, A., Stulz, R. 2012. The credit crisis around the globe: Why did some banks 
perform better? Journal of Financial Economics, 105(1), 1-17. 
Berger, Roman and Sedunov, 2016. Do bank bailouts reduce or increase systemic 
risk? The effects of TARP on financial system stability. Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City Research Working Papers, No. 16-08. 
Bhagat, S., & Bolton, B. 2014. Financial crisis and bank executive incentive 
compensation. Journal of Corporate Finance, 25, 313-341. 
Bisias, D., Flood, M., Lo, A., Valavanis, S. 2012. A survey of systemic risk analytics. 
Annual Review of Financial Economics, 4(1), 255-296. 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2009a. Federal Reserve Issues 
Proposed Guidance on Incentive Compensation. Press release on October 22, 
2009.  
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2009b. Proposed guidance on 
sound incentive compensation policies. Federal Register, 74(206), 55227-55238. 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2010. Bank Holding Company 
Supervision Manual, Supplement 38. Washington, D.C.: Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System.  
Brownlees, C., & Engle, R. 2017. SRISK: A conditional capital shortfall measure of 
systemic risk. Review of Financial Studies, 30(1), 48-79. 
Brunnermeier, M, Dong, G., & Palia, D. 2012. Banks’ non-interest income and 
systemic risk. Working paper, Princeton University. 
Calluzzo, P., & Dong, G.N. 2015. Has the financial system become safer after the 
crisis? The changing nature of financial institution risk. Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 53, 233-248. 
Chava, S., & Purnanandam, A. 2010. CEOs versus CFOs: Incentives and corporate 
policies. Journal of Financial Economics, 97(2), 263-278. 
Chen, C. R., Steiner, T. L., & Whyte, A. M. 2006. Does stock option-based executive 
compensation induce risk-taking? An analysis of the banking industry. Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 30, 915-945.  
Core, J., & Guay, W. 2002. Employee stock option portfolios and their sensitivities 
to price and volatility. Journal of Accounting Research, 40, 613-630. 
de Haan, J., & Vlahu, R. 2016. Corporate governance of banks: A survey. Journal 
of Economic Surveys, 30(2), 228-277. 
126     Acta Wasaensia 
DeYoung, R., Peng, E. Y., & Yan, M. 2013. Executive compensation and business 
policy choices at U.S. commercial banks. Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, 48(1), 165-196. 
Ellul, A., & Yerramilli, V. 2013. Stronger risk controls, lower risk: Evidence from 
U.S. bank holding Companies. Journal of Finance, 68(5), 1757-1803. 
Engle, R., Jondeau, E., & Rockinger, M. 2015. Systemic Risk in Europe. Review of 
Finance, 19(1), 145–190. 
Erkens D., Hung, M., & Matos, P. 2012. Corporate governance in the 2007-2008 
financial crisis: Evidence from financial institutions worldwide. Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 18(2), 389–411. 
Fahlenbrach R., & Stulz, R. 2011. Bank CEO incentives and the credit crisis. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 99(1), 11–26. 
Financial Stability Board. 2009. Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of 
Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments: Initial Considerations. Report to 
G20 finance ministers and governors, Financial Stability Board. 
Foos, D., Norden, L., & Weber, M. 2010. Loan growth and riskiness of banks. 
Journal of Banking and Finance, 34, 2929–2940. 
Fortin R., Goldberg, G., & Roth G. 2010. Bank risk taking at the onset of the current 
banking crisis. The Financial Review, 45(4), 891–913. 
Guo, L., Jalal, A., & Khaksari, S. 2015. Bank executive compensation structure, risk 
taking and the financial crisis. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 
45(3), 609-639. 
Hattori, A., Kikuchi, K., Niwa, F., & Uchida, Y. 2014. A Survey of Systemic Risk 
Measures: Methodology and Application to the Japanese Market. Bank of Japan 
IMES Discussion Paper No. 2014-E-3. 
Iqbal, J., Strobl, S., & Vähämaa, S. 2015. Corporate governance and the systemic 
risk of financial institutions. Journal of Economics and Business, 82, 42-61. 
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, 
agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–
360. 
John, K., Litov, L., & Yeung, B. 2008. Corporate Governance and Risk-taking. The 
Journal of Finance, 63(4), 1679–728. 
Kini, O., & Williams, R. 2012. Tournament incentives, firm risk, and corporate 
policies. Journal of Financial Economics, 103(2), 350-376 
Kirkpatrick, G. 2009. The corporate governance lessons from the financial crisis. 
Working paper, OECD. 
Acta Wasaensia     127 
Kleinow, J., Moreira, F., Strobl, S., & Vähämaa, S. 2017. Measuring systemic risk: 
A comparison of alternative market-based approaches. Finance Research Letters, 
21, 40-46. 
Laeven, L., & Levine, R. 2009. Bank governance, regulation, and risk taking. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 93(2), 259–275. 
Löffler, G., & Raupach, P. 2018. Pitfalls in the use of systemic risk measures. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 53(1), 269–298. 
Mayordomo, S., Rodriguez-Moreno, M., & Peña, J. I. 2014. Derivatives holdings 
and systemic risk in the U.S. banking sector. Journal of Banking and Finance, 45, 
84–104. 
Mehran, H., Morrison, A., & Shapiro, J. 2011. Corporate governance and banks: 
What have we learned from the financial crisis? Staff report, Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York. 
Mülbert, P. O. 2010. Corporate governance of banks after the financial crisis – 
theory, evidence, reforms. Working paper series in law no. 151, European 
Corporate Governance Institute, Brussels. 
Pais, A., & Stork, P.A. 2013. Bank size and systemic risk. European Financial 
Management, 19(3), 429–451. 
Palvia, A., Vähämaa, E. & Vähämaa, S. 2015. Are female CEOs and Chairwomen 
more conservative and risk averse? Evidence from the banking industry during the 
financial crisis. Journal of Business Ethics, 131, 577–594. 
Pathan, S. 2009. Strong boards, CEO power and bank risk-taking. Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 33(7), 1340-1350. 
Peni, E., Smith, S.D. & Vähämaa, S. 2013. Bank corporate governance and real 
estate lending during the financial crisis. Journal of Real Estate Research, 35(3), 
313–343. 
Peni, E., & Vähämaa, S. 2012. Did good corporate governance improve bank 
performance during the financial crisis? Journal of Financial Services Research, 
41(1-2), 19–35. 
PolettiǦHughes, J., & Ozkan, A. 2014. Ultimate controllers, ownership and the 
probability of insolvency in financially distressed firms. Managerial and Decision 
Economics, 35(1), 36– 50. 
128     Acta Wasaensia 
Figure 1. CEO deltas and vegas. 
The figures plot the mean and median values of CEO Delta and CEO Vega. 
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Appendix 1.  
List of financial institutions. 
1 American Express 39 Metlife 
2 Associated Banc-Corp. 40 Morgan Stanley 
3 Bank of America 41 National City 
4 Bank of Hawaii 42 New York Community Bancorp 
5 Bank of New York Mellon 43 Northern Trust  
6 BB&T  44 PNC Financial Services  
7 BBVA Compass Bancshares 45 Principal Financial Group 
8 Bear Stearns  46 Prosperity Bancshares 
9 BGC Partners  47 Prudential Financial  
10 BOK Financial  48 Raymond James Financial  
11 Capital One Financial 49 Regions Financial  
12 Capitol Federal Financial 50 SEI Investments 
13 Charles Schwab  51 Signature Bank 
14 Citigroup  52 Sallie Mae 
15 City National  53 Sovereign Bank 
16 Comerica 54 State Street  
17 Commerce Bancshares 55 Stifel Financial  
18 Countrywide 56 SunTrust  
19 Cullen/Frost Bankers 57 SVB Financial 
20 East West Bancorp 58 Synovus Financial  
21 Fannie Mae 59 T. Rowe Price Group
22 Fifth Third Bancorp 60 TCF Financial
23 First Citizens BancShares 61 TD Ameritrade
24 First Horizon National  62 TransAtlantic
25 First Niagara Financial  63 UMB Financial
26 Franklin Resources 64 UnionBanCal
27 Fulton Financial  65 US Bancorp
28 Goldman Sachs  66 Valley National Bancorp
29 Hancock  67 Washington Federal
30 Hudson City Bancorp 68 Webster Financial
31 Jefferies Group 69 Wells Fargo
32 JP Morgan Chase & Co. 70 WMI Holdings
33 KeyCorp 71 Zions Bancorporation
34 Legg Mason  
35 Lehman Brothers 
36 M&T Bank 
37 Marshall & Ilsley 
38 Merrill Lynch & Co. 
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1. Introduction 
Does executive compensation influence corporate strategies and organizational 
performance? If so, in what ways? Does executive compensation stimulate risky 
and novel corporate strategies through higher tournament incentives (Kini and 
Williams, 2012)? Alternatively, does executive compensation lead to more 
calculative and conservative corporate actions by making CEOs more powerful 
(Bebchuk, Cremers and Peyer, 2011)? These questions continue to attract 
scholarly, practitioner, and regulatory attention. So far, growing empirical 
evidence exists on the influence of executive compensation (including the CEO and 
the other senior executives) on the corporate risk-taking propensity for both non-
financial (Chava and Purnanandam, 2010; Kini and Williams, 2012) and financial 
firms (Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Bai and Elyasiani, 2013).1 Despite the evidence 
on the effect of executive compensation on firm performance, the role of pay 
inequality between the CEO and other executives (CEO pay-share) in bank risk-
taking is less clear.2 
Among several explanations offered for the collapse of the stock market 
capitalization of the banking industry during the global financial crisis (GFC), one 
is that executive compensation structures prompted inappropriate risk-taking, 
which ultimately contributed, at least to some extent, to the crisis (Bebchuk and 
Spamann, 2010; Bebchuk, Cohen and Spamann, 2010; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 
2011; Bolton, Mehran and Shapiro, 2015; Guo, Jala and Khaksari, 2015). For 
instance, according to the Financial Stability Forum (2009), 
“Compensation practices at large financial institutions are one factor 
among many that contributed to the financial crisis that began in 2007. 
High short-term profits led to generous bonus payments to employees 
without adequate regard to the longer-term risks they imposed on their 
firms. These perverse incentives amplified the excessive risk-taking that 
severely threatened the global financial system and left firms with fewer 
resources to absorb losses as risks materialized. The lack of attention to 
risk also contributed to the large, in some cases extreme absolute level of 
compensation in the industry.”  
                                                        
1  Several studies relate managerial compensation to the firm-risk and choice of risky 
projects (see Stulz, 1984; Smith and Stulz, 1985; Core and Guay, 1999; Guay, 1999; Coles, 
Daniel, and Naveen, 2006). For detailed review of literature on executive compensation, 
and risk-taking in banks, see de Haan and Vlahu (2016). 
2 CEO pay-share is defined as “the fraction of the aggregate compensation of the firm’s top-
five executive team captured by the CEO” (Bebchuk et al., 2011, p 200). 
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Importantly, the top executives, in the banking industry, play an important role in 
decision making regarding “tail risk” which may lead to failure of the bank (Bai 
and Elyasiani, 2013). Therefore, it is important to understand the relationship 
between the compensation of top executives and risk-taking in the banking 
industry. 
In this paper, we examine whether CEO pay-share (pay inequality between the 
CEO and the other top executives) is associated with risk-taking among large bank 
holding companies (BHCs).3 Our main hypothesis is that BHCs with greater CEO 
pay-share should have higher risk (default risk and tail risk). This is because, 
according to tournament theory, an executive’s rank in the firm determines his/her 
compensation (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). Ang, Lauterbach, and Schreiber (2002) 
argue that greater CEO pay is justified because CEOs have a greater responsibility 
towards the firm and also they are more competent. However, tournament theory 
provides different arguments for this view and argues how the CEO’s 
compensation can be several times greater than those of the other executives.4 In 
this regard, Lazear and Rosen (1981) propose a tournament model where workers 
in the firm are compensated based on their ranks. In this way, not only monitoring 
costs are reduced, but it also gives workers an incentive to win the tournament and 
receive the prize. In the case of executives, the CEO’s share of pay is the prize 
because that is substantially greater than those of the other executives. Greater 
CEO pay motivates the other top executives to be the next CEO and win the 
tournament (Ang et al., 2002). To achieve this, top executives adopt riskier policies 
to increase their performance (Kini and Williams, 2012). So, greater pay inequality 
would also result in the better performance of the firm (Lin et al., 2013). However, 
to achieve a higher level of performance executives will take on more risks in the 
presence of tournament incentives (Goel and Thakor, 2008).5 In doing so, the 
executives will increase the overall risk of the firm. In the banking industry, the 
pay inequality between the CEO and the other top executives is even larger (Ang et 
al., 2002) and this larger pay inequality may result in increased risk-taking in the 
banking industry. 
3 Bebchuk et al., (2011), Kini and Williams (2012), and Bai and Elyasiani (2013) use CEO 
pay-share as a measure of the CEO power and risk incentive measures of the CEO 
compensation.  
The regulatory burden under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) generally depends on bank size. BHCs with assets above USD 
10 billion are subject to greater oversight than banks with less than USD 10 billion in assets. 
Therefore, this study considers BHCs as large if the book value of their assets is greater 
than USD 10 billion in 2010 constant dollars. 
4 Ang et al. (2002) report that bank CEOs, on average, earn 1.8 times more than the next 
most highly paid executive in the bank, and 2.6 times more than the fifth most highly paid 
executive. 
5 For a detailed discussion and arguments around why every executive will take on riskier 
projects see the theoretical model of Goel and Thakor (2008). 
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In contrast to the tournament theory, Bebchuk et al. (2011) argue that firms might 
differ regarding tournament incentives for senior executives, and thus CEO pay-
share level might differ in the firms. Because the CEO has power over the decision-
making in the firm, the CEO might affect the level of pay-share. Therefore, a high 
CEO pay-share might indicate governance problems in the firm where CEO can 
extract a greater pay. The ability to extract greater pay can also refer to the 
additional information that other CEO power proxies (e.g., the CEO is also the 
founder and CEO duality) may not capture.6 With more power, CEO can run the 
firm for his/her own benefits at the expense of the shareholders (Adams, Almeida, 
and Ferreira, 2005). Thus, greater CEO power may result in lower firm value 
(Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrel, 2009) and lower credit rating (Ashbaugh-Skaife, 
Collins, and Lafond, 2006). In banks, CEO power is also associated with less bank 
risk (Pathan, 2009). This might be because; managers are risk-averse (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) and therefore adopt safer policies to protect their own investment 
in the firm (Pathan, 2009). Furthermore, the higher risk would also increase the 
probability of default by increasing the bankruptcy costs (Parrino et al., 2005). 
Therefore, unlike other senior executives, CEOs do not have strong incentives to 
adopt riskier policies rather CEOs are the most influential persons in decision-
making and with increased bank risk the probability of failure would increase and 
the probability to lose CEO title. Consistent with these arguments, our main 
alternative hypothesis is that BHCs with greater CEO pay-share should be less 
risky.  
We use CEO pay-share for two reasons. First, it is a risk incentive measure of CEO 
compensation (Kini and Williams, 2012). 7  Managerial risk-taking incentives 
generated by compensation also enhance managerial risk-taking in a firm (Coles, 
Daniel, and Naveen, 2006; Chava and Purnanandam, 2010; Kini and Williams, 
2012) and greater CEO pay gives other executives option-like incentives to increase 
firm risk in an attempt to be promoted as CEO. Second, CEO pay-share can capture 
CEO power because it captures many observable and unobservable dimensions of 
the top executive team in a firm. Therefore, it can also capture CEO’s role and 
relative centrality in the top executive team (Bebchuk et al., 2011). In this study, 
CEO pay-share is measured as the ratio of the CEO’s total annual compensation to 
the total annual compensation of the CEO and the next four most highly-paid 
executives in the BHC (Bebchuk et al., 2011; Bai and Elyasiani, 2013). We use the 
6 CEO Power is “the power the CEO has over the board and other top executives” (Adams, 
Almeida, and Ferreira, 2005, p 1408). 
7 We also use Vega, of CEO option holdings, which measures the CEO personal wealth 
sensitivity to stock return volatility (risk-sensitivity) as risk incentive measure of CEO 
compensation in additional analysis for robustness.   
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publically available consolidated BHC data from FRY-9C reports from 1991.8 We 
use four different measures as proxies of BHC risk: first, following Laeven and 
Levine (2009), the z-score, return on assets plus equity to assets ratio divided by 
standard deviation of return on assets; second, the market-based Merton (1974) 
distance to default (DD);9 third, again following Laeven and Levine (2009) and Bai 
and Elyasiani (2013), the total risk measured as the volatility of stock returns 
(annualized volatility of daily stock returns); fourth tail-risk, following Ellul and 
Yerramilli (2013), which is the negative of the average of the bank’s stock returns 
over the 5% of worst return days in the year.  
Using an unbalanced panel dataset of 122 large and economically significant U.S. 
BHCs (those with assets greater than USD 10 billion in 2010 constant dollars),10 
this study finds that greater CEO pay-share is associated with lower BHC risk. 
These findings are consistent with the alternative hypothesis (CEO power 
argument) suggesting that powerful CEOs reduce the overall risk exposure of the 
BHC to protect their own human capital and financial wealth. These results are 
robust against a number of alternative estimation methods, different sample 
periods (before GFC, and after Dodd-Frank), and even against tests for addressing 
endogeneity where CEO pay-share is instrumented with industry median pay-
share. These results may suggest that when CEO pay-share rises, CEOs become 
more risk-averse and powerful, and thus implement less risk business policies.  
This study makes several important contributions to the existing literature and 
recent policy debate regarding the CEO compensation in large BHCs. First, this 
study, broadly, contributes to the bank risk-taking literature (Laeven and Levine 
2009; Pathan 2009; Fortin et al., 2010; Beltratti and Stulz 2012; Ellul and 
Yerramilli 2013; Berger et al., 2014; Cheng, Hong and Scheinkman, 2015). 11  
Second, this study contributes to the bank compensation literature (Fahlenbrach 
and Stulz, 2011; Bai and Elyasiani, 2013). Third, this study contributes to the CEO 
pay-share literature (Bebchuk et al., 2011; Kini and Williams, 2012; Bai and 
Elyasiani, 2013). Bebchuk et al. (2011) find that CEO pay-share is negatively 
associated with firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q. On the other hand, Kini and 
Williams (2012) find that CEO pay-share is positively associated with firm risk as 
                                                        
8  Although the data has been available since 1986, the compensation data has been 
available only since 1992. 
9 Both z-score and DD measure the default risk. Higher the z-score and the DD, the lower 
is the default risk i.e. more firm stability. For simplicity, negative of z-score and DD are 
used as dependent variables in regressions i.e. higher z-score and DD mean higher default 
risk. 
10 We use Consumer Price Index data from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis to calculate 
constant dollars (base year 2010). 
11 For detailed review of literature on executive compensation and risk-taking in banks, see 
de Haan and Vlahu (2016). 
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measured by cash flow volatility and return volatility. Kini and Williams (2012) 
regard CEO pay-share as a tournament incentive that drives top executives to 
compete for the position of CEO. However, the above studies exclude the banking 
sector from their samples.12 Among banking studies, this study is closely related to 
that of Bai and Elyasiani (2013) who investigate whether CEO pay-share is related 
to the stability of BHC. They find that greater CEO pay-share ratio is related to 
greater stability among BHCs as measured by the z-score. However, the sample is 
based on data from 1992 to 2008, and therefore before the advent of Dodd-Frank. 
Our study uses comprehensive data on BHCs from 1992 to 2016, including the post 
Dodd-Frank years and using the sample of only economically significant BHCs 
(those having assets greater than $10 billion in 2010 constant dollars).  
The findings of this study have important implications for researchers, the board 
of directors, shareholders and regulators. Most of the previous studies focused on 
the composition of CEO pay. This study highlights the importance of inequality of 
compensation amongst the top executive team.  The inverse relationship between 
CEO pay-share and BHC risk supports the view of possible risk aversion i.e., CEOs 
with greater pay-share might pursue less risky strategies. The findings caution 
researchers against considering powerful CEOs as only risk-seekers. Moreover, the 
results indicate shareholders and boards of directors could influence CEO pay 
share to alter the risk-taking propensity of the management. The findings also have 
implications for regulations altering the relative CEO pay by imposing differential 
limits on the total compensations of CEOs and other executives. BHCs play an 
important role in the financial system and therefore are heavily protected and 
regulated. Thus, implicit and explicit guarantees provide financial institutions a 
different risk environment that is not applicable to non-financial firms. This 
highlights the importance to consider banks and BHCs separately in empirical 
analysis and policy development. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and 
introduces the variables used in the empirical analysis. Section 3 presents the 
methods and reports empirical findings on the association between CEO pay-share 
and the risk-taking among BHCs. The last section summarizes the findings and 
concludes the paper. 
                                                        
12 Most of the studies before GFC excluded financial firms from their sample because they 
were considered highly regulated. However, governance of financial institutions may be 
different from that of non-financial firms because of several reasons. For instance, financial 
institutions have larger number of stakeholders which complicates the governance of 
financial institutions. Apart from investors and depositors, regulators also have stake in 
the performance of financial institution because performance of financial institutions can 
also affect the health of the overall economy (Adams and Mehran, 2012). 
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2. Data and variables
Following previous studies on U.S. BHCs, the initial sample of this study 
consists of large publicly traded BHCs.13 All BHCs having assets of more than USD 
500 million file a FRY-9C report quarterly. Therefore, we collect the financial 
information of BHCs from the FRY-9C reports of the last quarter of each year, 
which are available from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s website for the 
period from 1992 to 2016. We start from 1992 because this is the first year when 
compensation data is available on executive compensation. The data on executive 
compensation is gathered from the ExecuComp database by COMPUSTAT. 
Following Minton, Stulz and Taboada (2017), the BHCs with missing data on total 
assets are dropped and further the sample is restricted to the BHCs those with 
assets greater than USD 10 billion constant in 2010.14 We use this threshold to 
focus on economically significant BHCs with activities comparable to those of large 
banks (according to Dodd-Frank). Matching FRY-9C data with compensation data 
yields a sample of 134 BHCs.  
The data on distance to default (default risk) was collected from the website of 
Credit Research Initiative of National University of Singapore. After merging with 
default risk data, the sample was further reduced to 124 BHCs. Stock price and 
return data is collected from DataStream, reducing the final sample to 122 BHCs.15 
In the robustness checks, the observations from the years (2007, 2008, and 2009) 
are excluded to avoid the GFC effect.16 The study sample includes high percentage 
of largest BHCs (having assets greater than USD 50 billion in 2010 constant dollars 
– Largest BHCs according to the Dodd-Frank) and it is argued that banks and
BHCs benefit from becoming bigger. Largest BHCs can have access to stronger
regulatory safety net (Minton et al., 2017) and thus reap the benefits of implicit
and explicit guarantees granted to largest financial institutions (International
Monetary Fund, 2014). 17  Therefore, we perform additional analyses to pay
attention to largest BHCs.
13 For instance, Adams and Mehran (2012), Bai and Elyasiani (2013), Ellul and Yerramilli 
(2013), Erel, Nadauld, and Stulz (2014), Khan, Scheule, and Wu (2017) etc. use bank 
holding companies’ data publically available at Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s website. 
14 We use prior year assets to classify banks therefore we download the data starting from 
fourth quarter of 1991. 
15 Based on the availability of default risk and stock price data the sample is reduced to 122 
BHCs. 
16  Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) show that banks with CEOs having better aligned 
incentives performed worse during the period of the GFC and consequently suffered 
decline in their stock-based wealth. This could alter the sensitivity to risk and return 
(DeYoung, Peng, and Yan, 2013). 
17 “Banks may also seek to grow faster and larger than justified by economies of scale and 
scope to reap the benefits of the implicit funding subsidy granted to TITF (too important 
to fail) institutions” IMF (2014).  
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(insert Table 1 about here) 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics by year for the full sample used in this 
study and for the largest BHCs. The number of BHCs is different each year and it 
ranges from 54 in 2008 to 71 in 2016. For the whole sample, mean assets (mean 
BHC size) increases over the years from almost USD 57 billion to USD 195 billion 
in 2010 constant dollars and the median of BHCs remains almost similar from 
beginning to end. As of December 2016, the BHCs included in this study account 
for 91.19% of total banking system assets.18 
2.1. Measures of BHC risk 
In line with established banking literature, four measures for BHC risk are used in 
this study. First, following Laeven and Levine (2009) for each BHC we calculate 
the z-score which is equal to return on assets plus the equity to assets ratio divided 
by standard deviation of return on assets:19 
ܼ െ ܵܿ݋ݎ݁ ൌ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊݋݊ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏሺܴܱܣሻ ൅ ሺܧݍݑ݅ݐݕݐ݋ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏሻܵݐܽ݊݀ܽݎ݀ܦ݁ݒ݅ܽݐ݅݋݊݋݂ܴܱܣ (1) 
ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets and Equity to assets is the ratio of 
equity to total assets. The z-score measures default risk or distance to default for 
each BHC. So, a higher z-score is associated with a more stable BHC (one with less 
default risk). We take the natural logarithm of the z-score for normal distribution 
and then the negative of the natural logarithm so that the inverse relation between 
CEO pay-share and BHC risk is direct.20 Second proxy for BHC risk is the distance-
to-default (DD), a concept originating from the structural credit risk model of 
Merton (1974). DD is a popular measure for gauging how far away a limited-
liability firm is from default (e.g., Duan, Sun, & Wang, 2012; Duan & Wang, 2012). 
The higher the DD, the lower the default risk.21 Similar to z-score, the negative of 
the natural logarithm of DD is used.  
Third, following Laeven and Levine (2009) and Bai and Elyasiani (2013), total risk 
measured as the volatility of stock returns to proxy for the BHC market risk. 
18  Here total banking system assets as of December 2016 are $16,780.224 billion 
representing the total assets of the 5,913 FDIC-insured commercial banks and savings 
institutions in the U.S. (FDIC Quarterly banking profile).  
19 Following Minton et al. (2017), the standard deviation of ROA is estimated using data 
from the three previous years. 
20 Since the z-score is highly skewed in the sample, we use the natural logarithm of z-score 
by following Laeven and Levine (2009), Beltratti and Stulz (2012) and Bai and Elyasiani 
(2013) and call it z-score. 
21 The calculation of DD is explained in Appendix. For methodological details on estimating 
distance to default see Duan et al. (2012).  
Acta Wasaensia     145 
Volatility of stock returns is the annualized volatility of daily stock returns in a 
year. Data for stock returns are collected from DataStream and we use a total 
return index that accounts for dividends. Fourth, following Ellul and Yerramilli 
(2013), BHC tail risk which is the negative of the average of a BHC’s stock returns 
over the 5% of worst return days in the year.22 Tail risk is an important measure of 
BHC risk because high-powered executive compensation schemes can encourage 
managers to increase tail risks (Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013). For risk, daily stock 
price data is gathered from DataStream.  
2.2. CEO pay-share 
Following previous studies (Bebchuk et al., 2011; Kini and Williams, 2012; Bai and 
Elyasiani, 2013), CEO pay-share variable is used to measure the compensation 
inequality between the CEO and other executives. CEO pay-share is calculated as: 
ܥܧܱ݌ܽݕ݄ܵܽݎ ௜݁ǡ௧
ൌ ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽܥܧܱܥ݋݉݌݁݊ݏܽݐ݅݋݊௜ǡ௧ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽܥ݋݉݌݁݊ݏܽݐ݅݋݊݋݂ݐ݋݌݂݅ݒ݁݁ݔ݁ܿݑݐ݅ݒ݁ݏሺ݈݅݊ܿݑ݀݅݊݃ܥܧܱሻ௜ǡ௧ 
(2) 
Total compensation data is taken from the ExecuComp database. Here total 
compensation includes salary, bonus, value of restricted stock grants, long term 
incentive pay, value of option grants and other annual pay. Only those banks are 
included in the sample where the total compensation for the CEO and the next four 
most highly-paid executives is available.   
2.3. Control variables 
In order to control for potential omitted variable bias (Gujarati 2003; Wooldridge 
2010), in the regressions, we account for various institution-specific 
characteristics to examine the association of CEO pay-share and BHC risk. The 
control variables used in this paper are determined by following the prior bank 
risk-taking literature (e.g., Pathan, 2009; Fortin et al., 2010; Brunnermeier et al., 
2012; Berger et al., 2014; Mayordomo et al., 2014) and, to some extent, by data 
availability. We control for firm size, capital ratio, profitability, growth, and the 
structure of assets and income. Although only economically significant and large 
BHCs are included in this study, consistent with previous studies, we control for 
the BHC size because business strategies, product compositions, and the corporate 
governance structures of a BHC are affected by the BHC’s size. Consistent with the 
                                                        
22 Tail risk is based on the expected shortfall (ES) measure. Tail risk is widely used within 
financial firms to measure expected loss conditional on returns (Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; 
Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, Richardson, 2017). For robustness, we also confirm our 
results by tail risk measured as the negative of a bank’s average stock returns over the 5% 
of worst return days of the S&P500. 
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literature, BHC size is measured (Size) by the logarithm of total assets. Secondly, 
we control for BHC’s capital ratio (or leverage ratio) as the ratio of equity to total 
assets.23  
In addition to Size and Capital ratio, we account for the BHC’s financial 
performance, growth, and asset and income structure. Financial performance is 
measured by Return on assets which is computed as the ratio of net income to total 
assets. Growth is measured as the annual percentage change in the amount of 
outstanding loans. We also control for the BHC’s business model and structure of 
the assets and liabilities with the ratio of net loans divided by total assets (Loans 
to assets) and the ratio of deposits to total assets (Deposits to assets). Finally, the 
ratio of non-interest income to total income (Non-interest income) is used to 
control for the level of income diversification and non-traditional banking 
activities. The data on these control variables are obtained from FRY-9C reports.  
3. Empirical analysis
3.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the data used in this study. With regard 
to CEO pay-share, the mean pay-share of 0.37 indicates that the average amount a 
CEO earns annually is 37% of what is paid to the top five executives in the BHC. 
This amount is comparable to the mean value of 35.7% found in Bebchuk et al. 
(2011) for non-bank sample. With regard to BHC risk proxies, the z-score is an 
average 3.15 which is consistent with and comparable to previous studies on banks 
(Laeven and Levine 2009; Bai and Elyasiani 2013) and distance to default has 
mean value of 2.59. Mean equity volatility is 4.02 and mean tail-risk is 4.26, which 
is comparable to Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) who report 4.7. 
In terms of BHC specific variables, the median asset value is $32.83 billion, and 
the mean asset value is $138.77 billion which is higher than $15.5 billion (median) 
and $129.3 billion (mean) found in Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011). The return over 
assets is 0.03 which is higher than 0.01 and 0.018 found in Fahlenbrach and Stulz 
(2011) and Bai and Elyasiani (2013), respectively. The loans to assets ratio is 0.60 
and deposits to asset ratio is 0.53. Finally, on average, the non-interest income is 
0.29 and capital ratio is 0.10 which are slightly higher than 0.25 and 0.81 found in 
23 We perform additional analysis where we exclude capital ratio from the control variables. 
Our results are robust to the exclusion of capital ratio among control variables. Previous 
studies (e.g. Baselga-Pascual, Trujillo-Ponce, Cardone-Riportella, 2015) argue that 
regressing capital ratio on the insolvency risk (measured by Z-score and distance to 
default) may be problematic because banks can alter their capital if they become more 
risky. Secondly, because of the construction of z-score and DD it may be problematic to 
include capital ratio as a control variables.  
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Bai and Elyasiani (2013). Overall, these statistics are not surprising because we 
only focus on large BHCs and over the large sample period (1992 to 2016). 
(insert Table 2 about here) 
Table 3 reports the pairwise correlations among the variables used in the empirical 
analysis. Table 3 shows that both measures of default risk (z-score and distance to 
default) are positively correlated to the CEO pay-share and both measures of 
market risk (equity volatility and tail risk) are negatively correlated to the CEO 
pay-share. These results provide some preliminary support to our alternative 
hypothesis (CEO power hypothesis) and suggest that CEO pay-share is associated 
with less BHC risk. However, the correlation analysis does not control other factors 
that affect BHC risk, so the results should be viewed with caution. The correlation 
analysis also indicates that collinearity is generally moderate between the 
explanatory variables. The highest correlation coefficient is between non-interest 
income and loans to assets of -0.64. Thus, multicollinearity may not be an issue in 
our analysis. 
(insert Table 3 about here) 
3.2. Univariate tests 
Table 4 reports the results of univariate tests. We divide the whole sample into two 
sub-samples based on CEO pay-share. The first sub-sample contains the BHCs 
with greater CEO pay-share (CEO pay-share in the top 25%) and the second sub-
sample contains the BHCs with lower CEO pay-share (CEO pay-share values in the 
bottom 25%). After dividing the sample into these sub-samples, we perform the 
two-tailed t-tests and Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney median tests with the null 
hypothesis that there are no differences in the means and medians between the 
BHCs with greater CEO pay-share and BHCs with lower CEO pay-share.  
(insert Table 4 about here) 
Table 4 shows that, except the z-score, the means and medians of all other BHC 
risk measures (distance to default, equity volatility, and tail-risk) between both 
groups are significantly different. BHCs with low CEO pay-share have higher risk 
levels than BHCs with greater CEO pay-share, which suggests that, in general, 
greater CEO pay-share is associated with less BHC risk. These results again 
provide support to the alternative hypothesis (CEO power hypothesis) that BHCs 
with greater CEO pay-share should be less risky. Lastly, results show that BHCs 
with high CEO pay-share have high loans and deposits but less non-interest 
income.  
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3.3. Regression results 
The following formal equation (3) is the baseline model to empirically test the 
relationship between CEO pay-share and BHC risk:    
ܴ݅ݏ݇௜ǡ௧ = ߙ ൅ߚଵܥܧܱ݌ܽݕ݄ܵܽݎ ௜݁ǡ௧ ൅ ߚଶܵ݅ݖ݁௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚଷܥܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽݎܽݐ݅݋௜ǡ௧
൅ ߚସܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊݋݊ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚହܮ݋ܽ݊ݏݐ݋ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜ǡ௧
൅ ߚ଺ܦ݁݌݋ݏ݅ݐݏݐ݋ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚ଻ܰ݋݊݅݊ݐ݁ݎ݁ݏݐܫ݊ܿ݋݉ ௜݁ǡ௧
൅෍ߙ௞ܤܪܥ௜௞
௡ିଵ
௞ୀଵ
൅ ෍ ߱௬ܻ݁ܽݎ௜௬
ଶ଴ଵ଺
௬ୀଵଽଽଶ
൅ ߝ௜ǡ௧
(3) 
Several alternative versions of equation (3) are estimated where the dependent 
variable Riski,t is proxied by four alternative measure of BHC risk.24 As discussed 
above, several BHC-specific financial variables that may affect the level of BHC risk 
are included. We use year fixed-effects to eliminate common business cycle effects 
across all BHCs and firm fixed-effects to examine the relationship between CEO 
pay-share and risk within BHCs. In all regressions, standard errors are clustered 
by BHC.25 
(insert Table 5 about here) 
Table 5 reports the results for equation (3). For each BHC risk measure, four 
estimations approaches are used. First, only year fixed effects are included in the 
regressions and second, in addition to year fixed effects, firm fixed effects are 
included. Third (not tabulated), we use lagged control variables by one year,26 and 
fourth (not tabulated), we estimate modified versions of equation (3) to include an 
interaction variable CEO pay-share × Largest BHC, for BHCs with total assets 
exceeding USD 50 billion.27  
The coefficient of CEO pay-share is negative for distance to default, equity 
volatility, and tail risk suggesting that CEO pay-share is negatively associated with 
BHC default risk, BHC market risk, and BHC tail risk. These results provide 
support to the alternative hypothesis that CEO pay-share is associated with less 
24 Negative of natural logarithm of z-score and distance to default, equity volatility, and tail 
risk. 
25 When using panel data, including year fixed effects and clustering standard errors is a 
common approach (Petersen, 2009). 
26 Previous studies (Coles et al., 2006; DeYoung et al., 2013) also use lagged explanatory 
variables. Following Bai and Elyasiani (2013), we use contemporaneous explanatory 
variables. We also select large BHC based on their prior year-end assets. However, in our 
study, the results are qualitatively similar when explanatory variables are lagged one year. 
27 Largest BHC is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the assets of the BHC are 
greater than 50 billion measured in 2010 constant US dollars and 0 otherwise. 
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BHC risk.28 These results are also economically significant and our sample also 
consists of large and economically significant BHCs. For instance, one standard 
deviation increase in CEO pay-share is associated with a 6.64% decrease in default 
risk (compared to the sample mean distance to default of 2.59) based on the 
coefficient in model (4). Similarly, one standard deviation increase in CEO pay-
share is associated with a 3.04% decrease in equity volatility based on model (6) 
and a 2.79% decrease in tail risk based on model (8). Overall, the results are 
consistent across alternative estimation approaches (i.e., contemporaneous 
variables, lagged variables, year fixed effects and bank fixed effects), suggesting 
that our inference (i.e., the BHC with greater CEO pay-share have less risk) is less 
likely to be biased due to omitted variables and reverse causality issues. These 
results provide support to the CEO power hypothesis (Pathan, 2009; Bebchuk et 
al., 2011), that is, greater CEO pay-share reduces BHC risk. 
3.4. Addressing reverse causality 
In this study, we find that BHCs with a higher CEO pay-share have lower BHC risk. 
There are two important concerns about the empirical results that must be 
addressed. First, it could be that the relationship between CEO pay-share and BHC 
risk is not captured because of omitted variables. To address this concern, we use 
firm fixed effects and BHC level control variables, as used in previous literature. 
Second, it could be that the relationship is endogenous and there is reverse 
causality, that BHC risk affects CEO pay-share and not the other way around (Coles 
et al. 2006; Bebchuk et al. 2011; Bai and Elyasiani 2013; Ellul and Yerramilli 2013). 
Previous studies show that boards of directors adjust CEO compensation based on 
the risk the firm carries (Coles et al. 2006). To address this issue, we estimate the 
regressions using instrumental variables for CEO pay-share. We follow Bebchuk et 
al. (2011) and Kini and Williams (2012) and use three variables as the instruments 
for CEO pay-share: industry median pay-share, number of vice presidents (VPs) in 
the top five executives and lastly whether the CFO is vice president (VP). Industry 
median pay-share is calculated each year for each BHC by excluding the respective 
BHC. The data informing these variables are collected from the ExecuComp 
database.  
(insert Table 6 about here) 
                                                        
28 Additionally, in unreported results, the coefficients for CEO pay-share with the Largest 
BHC interaction term are positive for all risk measures and statistically significant for all 
except the z-score. These results further suggest that CEO pay-share is associated with 
lower risk, even in, largest BHCs as the sum of the coefficients on CEO pay-share and CEO 
pay-share × Largest BHC is negative. 
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The results in Table 6 show that the CEO pay-share is negatively associated with 
BHC risk even after addressing endogeneity. The results show that when CEO pay-
share is instrumented the coefficients are negative and highly significant except 
the z-score. These results are consistent with previous regression results showing 
that greater CEO pay-share is associated with less BHC risk.  
3.5. BHC activities and CEO pay-share 
Large BHC companies engage in several different activities than smaller BHCs and 
banks. Therefore, we investigate whether these different activities can help us 
understand why CEO pay-share reduces risk-taking in large BHCs. Following prior 
studies (Bai and Elyasiani, 2013; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; Erel et al., 2014; 
Minton et al., 2017), we identify important BHC activities than could potentially 
affect the association between CEO pay-share and BHC risk. Following Bai and 
Elyasiani (2013), the model is described as: 
  ܤܪܥܽܿݐ݅ݒ݅ݐݕ௜ǡ௧ = ߙ ൅ߚଵܥܧܱ݌ܽݕ െ ݏ݄ܽݎ݁௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚଶܵ݅ݖ݁௜ǡ௧ ൅
ߚଷܥܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽݎܽݐ݅݋௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚସܮ݋ܽ݊݈݋ݏݏ݌ݎ݋ݒ݅ݏ݅݋݊ݏ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚହܣݏݏ݁ݐܿ݋݊ܿ݁݊ݐݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜ǡ௧ 
൅෍ߙ௞ܤܪܥ௜௞
௡ିଵ
௞ୀଵ
൅ ෍ ߱௬ܻ݁ܽݎ௜௬
ଶ଴ଵ଺
௬ୀଵଽଽଶ
൅ ߝ௜ǡ௧ 
(4) 
Several alternative versions of equation (3) are estimated where the dependent 
variable BHC activity, is proxied by six alternative BHC activities: 1) Non-interest 
income which is the ratio of non-interest income to total income; 2) Deposits to 
assets is the ratio of deposits to total assets; 3) RE loans to assets which the ratio 
of real estate loans to total assets; 4) CI loans to assets which is the ratio of 
commercial and industrial loans to total assets; 5) Securities to assets which is the 
ratio of total securities to total assets, and 6) Trading to assets which is the ratio 
of total trading assets to total assets. Following Bai and Elyasiani (2013), we also 
control for BHC-specific characteristics that may affect the different BHC 
activities. These include: Size which is the natural logarithm of total assets, Capital 
ratio which is the ratio of equity to total assets, Loan loss provisions which is the 
ratio of the BHC’s loan loss reserve to total assets, and Asset concentration which 
is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) of BHC loans. HHI measures the 
concentration of BHC assets across different categories of loan. We include both 
year fixed-effects and firm-fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at the 
BHC level. 
(insert Table 7 about here) 
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Table 7 reports the results for BHC activities. The results suggest that CEO pay-
share affects the business activities in large BHCs. The CEO pay-share is negatively 
associated with Non-interest income suggesting greater CEO pay-share reduces 
the level of non-traditional BHC activities. These results are consistent with the 
view that CEO pay-share affects the CEO’s risk preference and thus engage in a 
greater levels of traditional activities i.e. through less risky deposits (Bai and 
Elyasiani, 2013; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013).29 The CEO pay-share is positively 
associated with RE loans to assets and CI loans to assets. Overall, the results 
suggest that greater CEO pay-share makes CEO more risk-averse and provides 
incentive to implement less risky investment policies.  
3.6. Additional robustness tests  
We perform several robustness tests to make sure that the findings are reliable and 
robust to additional analysis. First, to make sure that the results are not affected 
by the outliers in the sample, we winsorize all the independent variables at the 1 
percent and 99 percent levels and re-estimate all the models in Tables 5 with these 
winsorized variables. The regression results (not tabulated) are similar to the 
models in Tables 5, suggesting that the BHCs with greater CEO pay-share are 
associated with lower BHC risk. These findings suggest that the results are not 
driven by outliers.  
Second, in order to make sure that we only consider deposit-taking BHCs, we re-
estimate the regression models in Tables 5 by restricting the sample to the banks 
having a deposits to assets ratio of at least 10% in the previous year (Minton et al. 
2017). 30 The regression results (not tabulated) are similar to the OLS results 
presented in Tables 5. The regression coefficients for CEO pay-share are negatively 
and mostly statistically significant, indicating a negative association between CEO 
pay-share and BHC risk. The coefficients are not significant for the z-score as a 
dependent variable, which is consistent with full-sample results.  
Third, we exclude GFC years (2007, 2008, and 2009) from the sample and re-
estimate the regression models in Tables 5. The results for these analyses (not 
tabulated) are consistent with the main findings of this paper in that CEO pay-
share is negatively associated with BHC risk. Most of the coefficients are 
statistically significant for CEO pay-share, which suggests that the results would 
remain qualitatively similar even when the crisis period is excluded from the 
sample.  
                                                        
29  Following Beltratti and Stulz (2012), we also use deposit funding and find (results 
unreported) that CEO pay-share is positively associated with Deposits to assets which 
further lends support to this argument.  
30 This restricted sample contains 118 BHCs.  
152     Acta Wasaensia 
Fourth, for parsimony, we re-estimate several models in Tables 5 to include only 
three control variables: size, capital ratio, and return on assets. The regression 
coefficients (not tabulated here) for CEO pay-share are negative and statically 
significant for all the BHC risk proxies except the z-score. These findings are 
consistent with the main regression findings that show that BHC with greater CEO 
pay-share are associated with lower BHC risk.  
Fifth, following Kini and Williams (2012) and Bai and Elyasiani (2013), we control 
for risk-taking managerial incentives and include vega (CEO compensation 
sensitivity to risk) in the regressions. Then we re-estimate the models in Tables 5 
(results not tabulated) and find that vega is positively related to BHC risk. 
However, the coefficients for CEO pay-share remain negative and statistically 
significant. These results suggest that even when controlling for option-based 
managerial risk-taking incentives, the relationship between CEO pay-share 
remains consistent with the main regression results. 
4. Conclusions
This study investigates whether CEO pay-share (pay inequality between the CEO 
and the other top executives) is associated with risk-taking in large BHCs. Using a 
comprehensive dataset on large U.S. BHCs, we contribute to the previous bank and 
BHC risk literature by documenting that CEO pay-share is associated with lower 
levels of risk in large BHCs. These findings are consistent with previous literature 
on CEO pay-share (Bebchuk et al., 2011; Bai and Elyasian, 2013) that greater CEO 
pay-share represents CEO power, and powerful CEOs will protect their human and 
financial investment in a BHC by lowering the BHC risk levels. Additional tests 
show that CEO pay-share is negatively associated with non-traditional and risky 
BHC activities (e.g., non-interest income, trading) suggesting that greater CEO 
pay-share makes CEO more risk-averse and provides an incentive to implement 
less risky investment policies. 
The findings reported in this study have important implications. Previous studies, 
mostly, focus on the composition of CEO pay. This study also highlights the 
importance of the spread of compensation among the top executive team. Our 
results indicate that CEO pay-share is negatively associated with risky business 
policies, so the board of directors could adjust CEO pay-share to alter the risk-
taking propensity of the management.  
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Table 1. Yearly Sample Description 
Total Assets in Constant USD Billion 
Full Sample Largest BHCs (>$50B) % of Largest BHCs 
Year BHCs Mean Median Mean Median 
1992 55 56.99 36.34 120.01 79.52 34.55 
1993 58 60.42 33.03 122.76 84.56 37.93 
1994 58 65.63 34.01 134.36 97.46 37.93 
1995 58 70.68 29.59 142.32 105.30 39.66 
1996 56 76.05 30.99 156.08 106.25 39.29 
1997 55 85.65 40.90 173.74 109.55 40.00 
1998 54 99.24 42.91 210.39 118.34 38.89 
1999 60 109.07 39.09 227.52 108.86 41.67 
2000 60 116.90 40.37 254.75 107.46 40.00 
2001 62 122.87 40.17 267.54 100.70 40.32 
2002 70 120.68 40.53 273.39 104.04 38.57 
2003 68 134.56 42.08 266.23 108.33 45.59 
2004 61 162.97 46.77 308.35 109.21 49.18 
2005 63 150.52 51.52 275.10 106.20 50.79 
2006 56 180.76 50.09 338.64 124.15 50.00 
2007 55 191.89 46.31 372.01 144.91 49.09 
2008 54 212.31 38.94 420.42 155.54 48.15 
2009 56 201.09 34.27 412.59 148.86 46.43 
2010 59 228.60 51.04 419.14 145.65 52.54 
2011 58 231.06 47.75 442.89 169.39 50.00 
2012 58 224.03 42.03 442.66 155.89 48.28 
2013 71 189.96 35.36 408.37 134.92 43.66 
2014 70 198.50 36.35 419.92 144.29 44.29 
2015 71 191.63 36.03 423.09 140.09 42.25 
2016 71 195.69 35.10 420.11 136.21 43.66 
This table reports the yearly sample of publicly traded BHCs from 1992 to 2016. The BHC is only 
included in the sample if its assets are greater than $10 billion in 2010 constant dollars (the 
minimum threshold for greater oversight under Dodd-Frank). This table also reports the 
percentage of largest BHCs defined as BHCs having assets greater than $50 billion in 2010 
constant dollars (the threshold for enhanced supervision under Dodd-Frank) in the sample. 
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Appendix 1.  General procedure to calculate distance to default 
(DD) 
The Merton (1974) model views the firm’s equity value as a European call option on the 
firm’s assets, with a strike price equal to the face value of the firm’s liabilities. This is 
because of the shareholders’ limited liability and their residual claim on the firm’s assets. 
If the firm’s value exceeds the level of liabilities (strike price) at the time of maturity, when 
the value of the equity is positive, shareholders exercise their option and the firm survives. 
If the firm’s value falls below the level of liabilities (strike price) at the time of maturity, 
when the value of equity becomes zero, the model assumes shareholders do not exercise 
their option and the firm defaults. Thus, the larger the positive distance between firm 
value and firm liabilities, the lower is the probability of financial distress. 
Value of firm ( ஺ܸ) = value of equity ( ௘ܸ) + Value of debt (X) 
Value of equity ( ௘ܸ) = Value of firm ( ஺ܸ) – Value of debt (X) 
Value of firm ( ஺ܸ) > Value of debt (X) Î Value of equity ( ௘ܸ) is positive (firm survives) 
Value of firm ( ஺ܸ) < Value of debt (X) Î Value of equity ( ௘ܸ) is zero (firm defaults)   
The Merton (1974) model has two important assumptions for the calculation of DD. First, 
it assumes that the value of the firm follows the geometric Brownian motion that is 
expressed as follows: 
݀ ஺ܸ ൌ ߤ ஺ܸ݀ݐ ൅ߪ஺ ஺ܸܹ݀ (A.1) 
where ஺ܸ  denotes the value of firm’s assets, ߤ  represents expected continuously 
compounded returns on the firm’s assets, ߪ஺  indicates instantaneous volatility of the 
firm’s assets, and ܹ݀ is a standard Wiener process. 
Second, the model assumes that the firm has only two securities outstanding; namely, 
common stock and a zero coupon bond maturing at time (T).  
Based on these two assumptions, the equity of the firm can be viewed as a call option on 
the value of the firm’s assets, with a strike price equal to face value of the debt maturing 
at time T. Therefore, the market value of equity as a function of the total value of the firm’s 
assets can be expressed by using Black and Scholes’ (1973) formula for call options: 
௘ܸ ൌ ஺ܸܰሺ݀ଵሻ െ ܺ݁ି௥்ܰሺ݀ଶሻ (A.2) 
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where ௘ܸ is the market value of the firm’s equity, X is the face value of the debt, r is the 
risk-free rate, T is the time horizon for the maturity of debt, N symbolizes the function of 
the cumulative standard normal distribution, and ݀ଵ and ݀ଶ are given by the following 
formulas: 
݀ଵ ൌ 
௟௡ቀೇಲ೉ ቁାቀ௥ା
భ
మఙಲమቁ்
ఙಲξ் ,      ݀ଶ ൌ ݀ଵ െߪ஺ξܶ (A.3) 
In Eq. (A.2), ௘ܸ, X, r, and T are readily observable and known factors, whereas ஺ܸ and ߪ஺ 
are difficult to observe and are unknown factors. This means there are two unknowns in 
one equation, so a unique solution to Eq. (A.2) is not available. Thus, another equation 
involving one of the two unknown factors is required.  
As in the Merton (1974) model, it is assumed that the value of the firm’s equity is a 
function of the value of its assets and time, so the second equation that relates the 
volatility of the firm’s equity to the volatility of the firm’s assets can be written as: 
ߪ௘ ൌ ቀ௏ಲ௏೐ቁ
డ௏೐
డ௏ಲ ߪ஺ (A.4) 
According to the Black-Scholes-Merton model, the term డ௏೐డ௏ಲ in Eq. (4) is equal to ܰሺ݀ଵሻ, 
and can be rewritten as follows: 
ߪ௘ ൌ ቀ௏ಲ௏೐ቁ ܰሺ݀ଵሻߪ஺ (A.5) 
Now, Eq. (A.2) and (A.5) can be solved simultaneously for the values of ஺ܸ and ߪ஺, and DD 
can be calculated by using the following equation: 
ܦܦ ൌ  ௟௡ቀ
ೇಲ
೉ ቁାቀఓି
భ
మఙಲమቁ்
ఙಲξ் (A.6) 
The probability of default (PD) is calculated as follows: 
ܲܦ ൌ ܰሺെܦܦሻ  (A.7) 
In a nutshell, for the calculation of DD, the following steps are required: 
Estimating the volatility of the firm’s equity (ߪ௘) through historical stock price data or 
option-implied volatility data. Historical stock price data to estimate the volatility of the 
firm’s equity is easily available. Following the Hull (2009)  methodology, equity volatility 
can be calculated as: 
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ܴ௜ ൌ ሺ݌ݎ௧ െ ݌ݎ௧ିଵሻ (A.8) 
where ܴ௜ is the daily stock returns, is the natural logarithm, ݌ݎ௧is the stock price at the 
end of the day and ݌ݎ௧ିଵ is the stock price at the end of the previous day: ݅ =1, 2, 3…n. 
Annualized volatility is then estimated as: 
ߪ௘ ൌ ଵ
ටభ೙
ට ଵ௡ିଵσ ோ೔మ೙೔సభ െ
ଵ
௡ሺ௡ିଵሻ ሺσ ܴ௜ሻ௡௜ୀଵ
ଶ (A.9) 
where n denotes the number of observations in one year i.e., number of trading days. 
Selecting the forecasting horizon (T). Generally, the forecast horizon is one year (T=1).  
Measuring the face value of the debt (X). Generally, current liabilities plus half of the non-
current liabilities are used to proxy the face value of debt, as also advised by Moody’s 
KMV.  
Collecting the risk-free rate (r). 3-month bank accepted bill or T-bills can be used to proxy 
risk-free rate.  
Measuring the market value of equity ( ௘ܸ). It is calculated as the number of outstanding 
shares multiplied by market price per share. 
Solving Eq. (A.2) and (A.5) simultaneously for the values of ( ஺ܸ ) andሺߪ௘ ), and then 
calculate the DD using Eq. (A.6) and PD using Eq. (A.7). 
